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ESSAYS,

MORAL

AND

POLITICAL.

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ESSAY I.

Of the DELICACY *of* TASTE *and* PASSION.

THERE is a certain *Delicacy* of *Paſſion*, to which ſome People are ſubject, that makes them extremely ſenſible to all the Accidents of Life, and gives them a lively Joy upon every proſperous Event, as well as a piercing Grief, when they meet with Croſſes and Adverſity. Favours and Good Offices eaſily engage their Friendſhip; while the ſmalleſt Injury provokes their Reſentment. Any Honour or Mark of Diſtinction elevates them above Meaſure; but they are as ſenſibly touch'd with Contempt. People of this Character have, no doubt, much more lively Enjoyments as well as more pungent Sorrows, than Men of more cool and ſedate Tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanc'd, there is no one, that would not rather chuſe to be of the latter Character, were he entirely Maſter of his own Diſpoſition. Good or ill Fortune is very little at our own Diſpoſal: And when a Perſon, that has this Senſibility of Temper, meets with any Misfortune, his Sorrow or Reſentment takes intire Poſſeſſion of him, and deprives him of all Reliſh in the

common Occurrences of Life; the right Enjoyment of which forms the greateſt Part of our Happineſs. Great Pleaſures are much leſs frequent than great Pains; ſo that a ſenſible Temper muſt meet with fewer Trials in the former Way than in the latter. Not to mention, that Men of ſuch lively Paſſions are apt to be tranſported beyond all Bounds of Prudence and Diſcretion, and to take falſe Steps in the Conduct of Life, which are often irretrievable.

THERE is a *Delicacy* of *Taſte* obſervable in ſome Men, which very much reſembles this *Delicacy* of *Paſſion*, and produces the ſame Senſibility to Beauty and Deformity of every Kind, as that does to Proſperity and Adverſity, Obligations and Injuries. When you preſent a Poem or a Picture to a Man poſſeſs'd of this Talent, the Delicacy of his Feeling, or Sentiments, makes him be touched very ſenſibly by every Part of it; nor are the maſterly Strokes perceived with a more exquiſite Reliſh and Satisfaction, than the Negligences or Abſurdities with Diſguſt and Uneaſineſs. A polite and judicious Converſation affords him the higheſt Entertainment; Rudeneſs or Impertinence is as great a Puniſhment to him. In ſhort, Delicacy of Taſte has the ſame Effect as Delicacy of Paſſion: It enlarges the Sphere both of our Happineſs and Miſery, and makes us ſenſible of Pains, as well as Pleaſures, that eſcape the reſt of Mankind.

I BELIEVE, however, there is no one, who will not agree with me, that notwithſtanding this Reſemblance,

ſemblance, a Delicacy of Taſte is as much to be deſir'd and cultivated as a Delicacy of Paſſion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if poſſible. The good or ill Accidents of Life are very little at our Diſpoſal; but we are pretty much Maſters what Books we ſhall read, what Diverſions we ſhall partake of, and what Company we ſhall keep. The ancient Philoſophers endeavour'd to render Happineſs entirely independent of every Thing external. That is impoſſible to be *attain'd:* But every wiſe Man will endeavour to place his Happineſs on ſuch Objects as depend moſt upon himſelf: And *that* is not to be *attain'd* ſo much by any other Means as by this Delicacy of Sentiment. When a Man is poſſeſs'd of that Talent, he is more happy by what pleaſes his Taſte, than by what gratifies his Appetites, and receives more Enjoyment from a Poem or a Piece of Reaſoning than the moſt expenſive Luxury can afford.

How far the Delicacy of Taſte, and that of Paſſion, are connected together in the original Frame of the Mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears to be a very conſiderable Connexion betwixt them. For we may obſerve that Women, who have more delicate Paſſions than Men, have alſo a more delicate Taſte of the Ornaments of Life, of Dreſs, Equipage, and the ordinary Decencies of Behaviour. Any Excellency in theſe hits their Taſte much ſooner than ours; and when you pleaſe their Taſte, you ſoon engage their Affections.

BUT whatever Connexion there may be originally betwixt theſe Diſpoſitions, I am perſuaded, that nothing is ſo proper to cure us of this Delicacy of Paſſion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined Taſte, which enables us to judge of the Characters of Men, of Compoſitions of Genius, and of the Productions of the nobler Arts. A greater or leſs Reliſh of thoſe obvious Beauties that ſtrike the Senſes, depends entirely upon the greater or leſs Senſibility of the Temper: But, with Regard to the Liberal Arts and the Sciences, a fine Taſte is really nothing but ſtrong Senſe, or at leaſt depends ſo much upon it, that they are inſeparable. To judge aright of a Compoſition of Genius, there are ſo many Views to be taken in, ſo many Circumſtances to be compared, and ſuch a Knowledge of human Nature requiſite, that no Man, who is not poſſeſs'd of the ſoundeſt Judgment, will ever make a tolerable Critic in ſuch Performances. And this is a new Reaſon for cultivating a Reliſh in the Liberal Arts. Our Judgment will ſtrengthen by this Exerciſe: We ſhall form truer Notions of Life: Many Things, which rejoice or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our Attention: And we ſhall loſe by Degrees that Senſibility and Delicacy of Paſſion, which is ſo incommodious.

BUT perhaps I have gone too far in ſaying, That a cultivated Taſte for the polite Arts extinguiſhes the paſſions, and renders us indifferent to thoſe Objects which are ſo fondly purſued by the reſt of Mankind. When I reflect a little more, I find, that it rather

rather improves our Senſibility for all the tender and agreeable Paſſions; at the ſame Time that it renders the Mind incapable of the rougher and more boiſterous Emotions.

Ingenuas didiciſſe fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec ſinit eſſe feros.

FOR this, I think there may be aſſign'd two very natural Reaſons. In the *firſt* Place, nothing is ſo improving to the Temper as the Study of the Beauties, either of Poetry, Eloquence, Muſick, or Painting. They give a certain Elegance of Sentiment, which the reſt of Mankind are entire Strangers to. The Emotions they excite are ſoft and tender. They draw the Mind off from the Hurry of Buſineſs and Intereſt; cheriſh Reflection; diſpoſe to Tranquillity; and produce an agreeable Melancholy, which, of all Diſpoſitions of the Mind, is the beſt ſuited to Love and Friendſhip.

IN the *ſecond* Place, a Delicacy of Taſte is favourable to Love and Friendſhip, by confining our Choice to few People, and making us indifferent to the Company and Converſation of the greateſt Part of Men. You will very ſeldom find, that mere Men of the World, whatever ſtrong Senſe they may be endowed with, are very nice in diſtinguiſhing of Characters, or in marking thoſe inſenſible Differences and Gradations which make one Man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent Senſe, is ſufficient for their Entertainment: They talk to him, of their Pleaſure and Affairs, with the ſame Frankneſs as

they would to any other: And finding many, that are fit to ſupply his Place, they never feel any Vacancy or Want in his Abſence. But to make Uſe of the Alluſion of a famous * *French* Author, the Judgment may be compared to a Clock or Watch, where the moſt ordinary Machine is ſufficient to tell the Hours; but the moſt elaborate and artificial can only point out the Minutes and Seconds, and diſtinguiſh the ſmalleſt Differences of Time. One that has well digeſted his Knowledge both of Books and Men, has little Enjoyment but in the Company of a few ſelect Companions. He feels too ſenſibly, how much all the reſt of Mankind fall ſhort of the Notions he has entertained. And, his Affections being thus confined in a narrow Circle, no Wonder he carries them further than if they were more general and undiſtinguiſhed. The Gaiety and Frolick of a Bottle-Companion improves with him into a ſolid Friendſhip: And the Ardours of a youthful Appetite become an elegant Paſſion.

* *Monſ.* Fontenelle, *Pluralité des Mondes.* Soir 6.

ESSAY II.

Of the LIBERTY *of* the PRESS.

THERE is nothing more apt to ſurpriſe a Foreigner, than the extreme Liberty we enjoy in this Country, of communicating whatever we pleaſe to the Publick, and of openly cenſuring every Meaſure which is enter'd into by the King or his Miniſters. If the Adminiſtration reſolve upon War, 'tis affirm'd, that either wilfully or ignorantly they miſtake the Intereſt of the Nation, and that Peace, in the preſent Situation of Affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the Paſſion of the Miniſters be for Peace, our Political Writers breathe nothing but War and Devaſtation, and repreſent the pacifick Conduct of the Government as mean and puſillanimous. As this Liberty is not indulg'd in any other Government, either Republican or Monarchical; in *Holland* and *Venice*, no more than in *France* or *Spain*; it may very naturally give Occaſion to theſe two Queſtions, *How it happens that* Great Britain *enjoys ſuch a peculiar Privilege?* and, *Whether the unlimited Exerciſe of this Liberty be advantageous or prejudicial to the Publick?*

As to the firſt Queſtion, Why the Laws indulge us in ſuch an extraordinary Liberty? I believe the

Reaſon may be deriv'd from our mix'd Form of Government, which is neither wholly Monarchical, nor wholly Republican. 'Twill be found, if I miſtake not, to be a true Obſervation in Politicks, That the two Extremes in Government, of Liberty and Slavery, approach neareſt to each other; and, that as you depart from the Extremes, and mix a little of Monarchy with Liberty, the Government becomes always the more free; and, on the other Hand, when you mix a little of Liberty with Monarchy, the Yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. I ſhall endeavour to explain myſelf. In a Government, ſuch as that of *France*, which is entirely abſolute, and where Laws, Cuſtom, and Religion, all concur to make the People fully ſatisfied with their Condition, the Monarch cannot entertain the leaſt *Jealouſy* againſt his Subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great *Liberties* both of Speech and Action. In a Government altogether Republican, ſuch as that of *Holland*, where there is no Magiſtrate ſo eminent as to give *Jealouſy* to the State, there is alſo no Danger in intruſting the Magiſtrates with very large diſcretionary Powers; and tho' many Advantages reſult from ſuch Powers, in the Preſervation of Peace and Order; yet they lay a conſiderable Reſtraint on Mens Actions, and make every private Subject pay a great Reſpect to the Government. Thus it is evident, that the two Extremes, of abſolute Monarchy and of a Republic, approach very near to each other in the moſt material Circumſtances. In the *firſt*, the Magiſtrate has no Jealouſy of the People: In the *ſecond*, the People have no Jealouſy of the Magiſtrate:

giſtrate: Which want of Jealouſy begets a mutual Confidence and Truſt in both Caſes, and produces a Species of Liberty in Monarchies, and of arbitrary Power in Republics.

TO juſtify the other Part of the foregoing Obſervation, that in every Government the Means are moſt wide of each other, and that the Mixtures of Monarchy and Liberty render the Yoke either more eaſy or more grievous; I muſt take Notice of a Remark of *Tacitus* with Regard to the *Romans* under their Emperors, that they neither could bear total Slavery nor total Liberty, *Nec totam ſervitutem, nec totam libertatem pati poſſunt*. This Remark a famous Poet has tranſlated and applied to the *Engliſh*, in his admirable Deſcription of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Policy and Government.

Et fit aimer ſon joug a l'Anglois indompté,
Qui ne peut ni ſervir, ni vivre en liberté.

HENRIADE, *Liv.* 1.

ACCORDING to theſe Remarks, we are to conſider the *Roman* Government under the Emperors as a Mixture of Deſpotiſm and Liberty, where the Deſpotiſm prevailed; and the *Engliſh* Government as a Mixture of the ſame Kind, but where the Liberty predominates. The Conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing Obſervation; and ſuch as may be expected from thoſe mixed Forms of Government, which beget a mutual Watchfulneſs and Jealouſy. The *Roman* Emperors were, many of

them, the moſt frightful Tyrants that ever diſgraced Humanity; and 'tis evident their Cruelty was chiefly excited by their *Jealouſy*, and by their obſerving, that all the great Men of *Rome* bore with Impatience the Dominion of a Family, which, but a little before, was no ways ſuperior to their own. On the other Hand, as the Republican Part of the Government prevails in *England*, tho' with a great Mixture of Monarchy, 'tis obliged, for its own Preſervation, to maintain a watchful *Jealouſy* over the Magiſtrates, to remove all diſcretionary Powers, and to ſecure every one's Life and Fortune by general and inflexible Laws. No Action muſt be deemed a Crime but what the Law has plainly determined to be ſuch: No Crime muſt be imputed to a Man but from a legal Proof before his Judges: And even theſe Judges muſt be his Fellow-Subjects, who are obliged, by their own Intereſt, to have a watchful Eye over the Encroachments and Violence of the Miniſters. From theſe Cauſes it proceeds, that there is as much Liberty, and even, perhaps, Licentiouſneſs in *Britain*, as there were formerly Slavery and Tyranny in *Rome*.

These Principles account for the great Liberty of the Preſs in theſe Kingdoms, beyond what is indulg'd in any other Government. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that deſpotic Power would ſteal in upon us, were we not extreme watchful to prevent its Progreſs, and were there not an eaſy Method of conveying the Alarum from one End of the Kingdom to the other. The Spirit of the People muſt frequently be rouz'd to curb the Ambition of the Court; and the Dread

of

of rouzing this Spirit, muſt be employ'd to prevent that Ambition. Nothing is ſo effectual to this Purpoſe as the Liberty of the Preſs, by which all the Learning, Wit, and Genius of the Nation may be employ'd on the Side of Liberty, and every one be animated to its Defence. As long, therefore, as the Republican Part of our Government can maintain itſelf againſt the Monarchical, it muſt be extreme jealous of the Liberty of the Preſs, as of the utmoſt Importance to its Preſervation.

SINCE therefore the Liberty of the Preſs is ſo eſſential to the Support of our mix'd Government; this ſufficiently decides the ſecond Queſtion, *Whether this Liberty be advantageous or prejudicial*; there being nothing of greater Importance in every State than the Preſervation of the ancient Government, eſpecially if it be a free one. But I would fain go a Step farther, and aſſert, that ſuch a Liberty is attended with ſo few inconveniencies, that it may be claim'd as the common Right of Mankind, and ought to be indulg'd them almoſt in every Government; except the Eccleſiaſtical, to which indeed it would be fatal. We need not dread from this Liberty any ſuch ill Conſequences as follow'd from the Harangues of the popular Demagogues of *Athens* and Tribunes of *Rome*. A Man reads a Book or Pamphlet alone and cooly. There is none preſent from whom he can catch the Paſſion by Contagion. He is not hurry'd away by the Force and Energy of Action. And ſhould he be wrought up to never ſo ſeditious a Humour, there is no violent Reſolution pre-

ſented to him, by which he can immediately vent his Paſſion. The Liberty of the Preſs, therefore, however abus'd, can ſcarce ever excite popular Tumults or Rebellion. And as to thoſe Murmurs or ſecret Diſcontents it may occaſion, 'tis better they ſhould get Vent in Words, that they may come to the Knowledge of the Magiſtrate before it be too late, in order to his providing a Remedy againſt them. Mankind, 'tis true, have always a greater Propenſion to believe what is ſaid to the Diſadvantage of their Governors, than the contrary; but this Inclination is inſeparable from them, whether they have Liberty or not. A Whiſper may fly as quick, and be as pernicious as a Pamphlet. Nay, it will be more pernicious, where Men are not accuſtom'd to think freely, or diſtinguiſh betwixt Truth and Falſhood.

IT has alſo been found, as the Experience of Mankind increaſes, that the *People* are no ſuch dangerous Monſter as they have been repreſented, and that 'tis in every Reſpect better to guide them, like rational Creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute Beaſts. Before the united Provinces ſet the Example, Toleration was deem'd incompatible with good Government; and 'twas thought impoſſible, that a Number of religious Sects could live together in Harmony and Peace, and have all of them an equal Affection to their common Country, and to each other. *England* has ſet a like Example of civil Liberty; and tho' this Liberty ſeems to occaſion ſome ſmall Ferment at preſent, it has not as yet produced any pernicious Effects; and it is to be hoped, that Men,

Men, being every Day more accuſtomed to the free Diſcuſſion of public Affairs, will improve in their Judgment of them, and be with greater Difficulty ſeduced by every idle Rumour and popular Clamour.

'TIS a very comfortable Reflection to the Lovers of Liberty, that this peculiar Privilege of *Britain* is of a Kind that cannot eaſily be wreſted from us, but muſt laſt as long as our Government remains, in any Degree, free and independent. 'Tis ſeldom, that Liberty of any Kind is loſt all at once. Slavery has ſo frightful an Aſpect to Men accuſtomed to Freedom, that it muſt ſteal in upon them by Degrees, and muſt diſguiſe itſelf in a thouſand Shapes, in order to be received. But, if the Liberty of the Preſs ever be loſt, it muſt be loſt at once. The general Laws againſt Sedition and Libelling are at preſent as ſtrong as they poſſibly can be made. Nothing can impoſe a farther Reſtraint, but either the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the Preſs, or the giving very large diſcretionary Powers to the Court to puniſh whatever diſpleaſes them. But theſe Conceſſions would be ſuch a bare-fac'd Violation of Liberty, that they will probably be the laſt Efforts of a deſpotic Government. We may conclude, that the Liberty of *Britain* is gone for ever when theſe Attempts ſhall ſucceed.

ESSAY III.

Of IMPUDENCE *and* MODESTY.

I AM of Opinion, That the Complaints againſt Providence have been often ill-grounded, and that the good or bad Qualities of Men are the Cauſes of their good or bad Fortune, more than what is generally imagined. There are, no Doubt, Inſtances to the contrary, and pretty numerous ones too; but few, in Compariſon of the Inſtances we have of a right Diſtribution of Proſperity and Adverſity: Nor indeed could it be otherwiſe from the common Courſe of human Affairs. To be endowed with a benevolent Diſpoſition, and to love others, will almoſt infallibly procure Love and Eſteem; which is the chief Circumſtance in Life, and facilitates every Enterprize and Undertaking; beſides the Satisfaction, which immediately reſults from it. The Caſe is much the ſame with the other Virtues. Proſperity is naturally, tho' not neceſſarily attached to Virtue and Merit; and Adverſity, in like Manner, to Vice and Folly.

I MUST, however, confeſs, that this Rule admits of an Exception, with Regard to one moral Quality; and that *Modeſty* has a natural Tendency to conceal

ceal a Man's Talents, as *Impudence* diſplays them to the utmoſt, and has been the only Cauſe why many have riſen in the World, under all the Diſadvantages of low Birth and little Merit. Such Indolence and Incapacity is there in the Generality of Mankind, that they are apt to receive a Man for whatever he has a Mind to put himſelf off for; and admit his over-bearing Airs as Proofs of that Merit which he aſſumes to himſelf. A decent Aſſurance ſeems to be the natural Attendant of Virtue; and few Men can diſtinguiſh Impudence from it: As, on the other Hand, Diffidence, being the natural Reſult of Vice and Folly, has drawn Diſgrace upon Modeſty, which in outward Appearance ſo nearly reſembles it.

As Impudence, tho' really a Vice, has the ſame Effects upon a Man's Fortune, as if it were a Virtue; ſo we may obſerve, that it is almoſt as difficult to be attain'd, and is, in that Reſpect, diſtinguiſh'd from all the other Vices, which are acquired with little Pains, and continually encreaſe upon Indulgence. Many a Man, being ſenſible that Modeſty is extremely prejudicial to him in the making his Fortune, has reſolved to be impudent, and to put a bold Face upon the Matter: But, 'tis obſervable, that ſuch People have ſeldom ſucceeded in the Attempt, but have been obliged to relapſe into their primitive Modeſty. Nothing carries a Man thro' the World like a true genuine natural Impudence. Its Counterfeit is good for nothing, nor can ever ſupport itſelf. In any other Attempt, whatever Faults a Man commits and is ſenſible of, he is ſo much the nearer his End.

But

But when he endeavours at Impudence, if he ever fail'd in the Attempt, the Remembrance of that Failure will make him bluſh, and will infallibly diſconcert him: After which every Bluſh is a Cauſe for new Bluſhes, 'till he be found out to be an arrant Cheat, and a vain Pretender to Impudence.

If any thing can give a modeſt Man more Aſſurance, it muſt be ſome Advantages of Fortune, which Chance procures to him. Riches naturally gain a Man a favourable Reception in the World, and give Merit a double Luſtre, when a Perſon is endowed with it; and ſupply its Place, in a great Meaſure, when it is abſent. 'Tis wonderful to obſerve what Airs of Superiority Fools and Knaves, with large Poſſeſſions, give themſelves above Men of the greateſt Merit in Poverty. Nor do the Men of Merit make any ſtrong Oppoſition to theſe Uſurpations; or rather ſeem to favour them by the Modeſty of their Behaviour. Their good Senſe and Experience make them diffident of their Judgment, and cauſe them to examine every thing with the greateſt Accuracy: As, on the other Hand, the Delicacy of their Sentiments makes them timorous leſt they commit Faults, and loſe in the Practice of the World that Integrity of Virtue, ſo to ſpeak, of which they are ſo jealous. To make Wiſdom agree with Confidence, is as difficult as to reconcile Vice and Modeſty.

These are the Reflections that have occurr'd to me upon this Subject of Impudence and Modeſty; and

and I hope the Reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee them wrought into the following Allegory.

JUPITER, in the Beginning, joined VIRTUE, WISDOM and CONFIDENCE together; and VICE, FOLLY, and DIFFIDENCE: And in that Society ſet them upon the Earth. But though he thought he had matched them with great Judgment, and ſaid that *Confidence* was the natural Companion of *Virtue*, and that *Vice* deſerved to be attended with *Diffidence*, they had not gone far before Diſſenſion aroſe among them. *Wiſdom*, who was the Guide of the one Company, was always accuſtomed, before ſhe ventured upon any Road, however beaten, to examine it carefully; to enquire whither it led; what Dangers, Difficulties and Hindrances might poſſibly or probably occur in it. In theſe Deliberations ſhe uſually conſum'd ſome Time; which Delay was very diſpleaſing to *Confidence*, who was always inclin'd to hurry on, without much Forethought or Deliberation, in the firſt Road he met. *Wiſdom* and *Virtue* were inſeparable: But *Confidence* one Day, following his impetuous Nature, advanc'd a conſiderable Way before his Guides and Companions; and not feeling any Want of their Company, he never enquir'd after them, nor ever met with them more. In like Manner the Society, tho' join'd by *Jupiter*, diſagreed and ſeparated. As *Folly* ſaw very little Way before her, ſhe had nothing to determine concerning the Goodneſs of Roads, nor could give the Preference to one above another; and this Want of Reſolution was encreas'd by *Diffidence*, who, with her Doubts and Scruples,

ples, always retarded the Journey. This was a great Annoyance to *Vice*, who lov'd not to hear of Difficulties and Delays, and was never ſatisfy'd without his full Career, in whatever his Inclinations led him to. *Folly*, he knew, tho' ſhe hearken'd to *Diffidence*, would be eaſily manag'd when alone; and therefore, as a vicious Horſe throws his Rider, he openly beat away this Controller of all his Pleaſures, and proceeded in his Journey with *Folly*, from whom he is inſeparable. *Confidence* and *Diffidence* being, after this Manner, both thrown looſe from their reſpective Companies, wander'd for ſome Time; till at laſt Chance had led them at the ſame Time to one Village. *Confidence* went directly up to the great Houſe, which belong'd to WEALTH, the Lord of the Village; and without ſtaying for a Porter, intruded himſelf immediately into the innermoſt Apartments, where he found *Vice* and *Folly* well receiv'd before him. He join'd the Train; recommended himſelf very quickly to his Landlord; and enter'd into ſuch Familiarity with *Vice*, that he was enliſted in the ſame Company with *Folly*. They were frequent Gueſts of *Wealth*, and from that Moment inſeparable. *Diffidence*, in the mean Time, not daring to approach the Great Houſe, accepted of an Invitation from POVERTY, one of the Tenants; and entering the Cottage, found *Wiſdom* and *Virtue*, who being repuls'd by the Landlord, had retir'd thither. *Virtue* took Compaſſion of her, and *Wiſdom* found, from her Temper, that ſhe would eaſily improve: So they admitted her into their Society. Accordingly, by their Means, ſhe alter'd in a little Time ſomewhat

of

of her Manner, and becoming much more amiable and engaging, was now called by the Name of MODESTY. As ill Company has a greater Effect than good, *Confidence*, tho' more refractory to Counſel and Example, degenerated ſo far by the Society of *Vice* and *Folly*, as to paſs by the Name of IMPUDENCE. Mankind, who ſaw theſe Societies as *Jupiter* firſt join'd them, and know nothing of theſe mutual Deſertions, are led into ſtrange Miſtakes by thoſe Means; and wherever they ſee *Impudence*, make account of *Virtue* and *Wiſdom*, and wherever they obſerve *Modeſty*, call her Attendants *Vice* and *Folly*.

ESSAY IV.

That POLITICS *may be reduc'd to a* SCIENCE.

IT is a great Queſtion with ſeveral, Whether there be any eſſential Difference betwixt one Form of Government and another? and, Whether every Form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill adminiſtred *? Were it once admitted, that all Governments are alike, and that the only Difference conſiſts in the Character and Conduct of the Governors, moſt political Diſputes would be at an End, and all *Zeal* for one Conſtitution above another muſt be eſteem'd mere Bigotry and Folly. But tho' I be a Friend to *Moderation*, I cannot forbear condemning this Sentiment, and ſhould be ſorry to think, that human Affairs admit of no greater Stability, than what they receive from the caſual Humours and Characters of particular Men.

'Tis true, thoſe who maintain, that the Goodneſs of all Government conſiſts in the Goodneſs of the

* *For Forms of Government let Fools conteſt:*
Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt.
ESSAY on MAN, Book 3.

Admini-

Adminiſtration, may cite many particular Inſtances in Hiſtory where the very ſame Government, in different Hands, varies ſuddenly into the two oppoſite Extremes of good and bad. Compare the *French* Government under *Henry* III. and under *Henry* IV. Oppreſſion, Levity, Artifice on the Part of the Rulers; Faction, Sedition, Treachery, Rebellion, Diſloyalty on the Part of the Subjects: Theſe compoſe the Character of the former miſerable Æra. But when the Patriot and heroic Prince, who ſucceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the Throne, the Government, the People, every thing ſeem'd to be totally chang'd, and all from the Difference of the Temper and Sentiments of theſe two Sovereigns. An equal Difference of a contrary Kind, may be found in comparing the Reigns of *Elizabeth* and *James*, at leaſt with Regard to foreign Affairs; and Inſtances of this Kind may be multiply'd, almoſt without Number, from antient as well as modern Hiſtory.

BUT here I would beg Leave to make a Diſtinction. All abſolute Governments (and ſuch the *Engliſh* Government was, in a great Meaſure, till the Middle of the laſt Century, notwithſtanding of the numerous Panegyrics on the antient *Engliſh* Liberty) muſt very much depend on the Adminiſtration; and this is one of the great Inconveniences of that Form of Government. But a Republican and free Government would be a moſt glaring Abſurdity, if the particular Checks and Controuls, provided by the Conſtitution, had really no Influence, and made it not the Intereſt, even of bad Men, to operate for the public

public Good. Such is the Intention of theſe Forms of Government, and ſuch is their real Effect, where they are wiſely conſtituted: As, on the other Hand, they are the Sources of all Diſorder, and of the blackeſt Crimes, where either Skill or Honeſty has been wanting in their original Frame and Inſtitution.

So great is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Government, and ſo little Dependence have they on the Humours and Temper of Men, that Conſequences almoſt as general and certain may be deduced from them, on moſt Occaſions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences afford us.

The *Roman* Government gave the whole Legiſlative Power to the Commons, without allowing a Negative either to the Nobility, or Conſuls. This unbounded Power the Commons poſſeſſed in a collective Body, not in a Repreſentative. The Conſequences were: When the People, by Succeſs and Conqueſt, had become very numerous, and had ſpread themſelves to a great Diſtance from the Capital, the City-Tribes, tho' the moſt contemptible, carried almoſt every Vote: They were, therefore, moſt cajol'd by every one who affected Popularity: They were ſupported in Idleneſs by the general Diſtribution of Corn, and by particular Bribes, which they received from almoſt every Candidate: By this Means they became every Day more licentious, and the *Campus Martius* was a perpetual Scene of Tumult and Sedition: Armed Slaves were introduced among theſe raſcally Citizens; ſo that the whole Govern-

ment fell into Anarchy, and the greateſt Happineſs the *Romans* could look for, was the deſpotic Power of the *Cæſars*. Such are the Effects of Democracy without a Repreſentative.

A NOBILITY may poſſeſs the Whole, or any Part of the legiſlative, Power of a State, after two different Ways. Either every Nobleman ſhares the Power as Part of the whole Body, or the whole Body enjoys the Power as compoſed of Parts, which have each a diſtinct Power and Authority. The *Venetian* Nobility are an Inſtance of the firſt Kind of Government: The *Poliſh* of the ſecond. In the *Venetian* Government the whole Body of Nobility poſſeſſes the whole Power, and no Nobleman has any Authority which he receives not from the Whole. In the *Poliſh* Government every Nobleman, by Means of his Fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary Authority over his Vaſſals, and the whole Body has no Authority but what it receives from the Concurrence of its Parts. The diſtinct Operations and Tendencies of theſe two Species of Government might be made moſt apparent even *a priori*. A *Venetian* Nobility is infinitely preferable to a *Poliſh*, let the Humours and Education of Men be ever ſo much vary'd. A Nobility, who poſſeſs their Power in common, will preſerve Peace and Order, both among themſelves, and their Subjects; and no Member can have Authority enough to controul the Laws for a Moment. They will preſerve their Authority over the People, but without any grievous Tyranny, or any Breach of private Property; becauſe ſuch a tyrannical Government is not

not the Intereſt of the whole Body, however it may be the Intereſt of ſome Individuals. There will be a Diſtinction of Rank betwixt the Nobility and People, but this will be the only Diſtinction in the State. The whole Nobility will form one Body, and the whole People another, without any of thoſe private Feuds and Animoſities, which ſpread Ruin and Deſolation every where. 'Tis eaſy to ſee the Diſadvantages of a *Poliſh* Nobility in every one of theſe Particulars.

'Tis poſſible ſo to conſtitute a free Government, as that a ſingle Perſon, call him Duke, Prince, or King, ſhall poſſeſs a very large Share of the Power, and ſhall form a proper Balance or Counterpoiſe to the other Parts of the Legiſlature. This chief Magiſtrate may be either *elective* or *hereditary*; and tho' the former Inſtitution may, to a ſuperficial View, appear moſt advantageous; yet a more accurate Inſpection will diſcover in it greater Inconveniencies than in the latter, and ſuch as are founded on Cauſes and Principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the Throne, in ſuch a Government, is a Point of too great and too general Intereſt, not to divide the whole People into Factions: From whence a Civil War, the greateſt of Ills, may be apprehended, almoſt with Certainty, upon every Vacancy. The Prince elected muſt be either a *Foreigner* or a *Native:* The former will be ignorant of the People whom he is to govern; ſuſpicious of his new Subjects, and ſuſpected by them; giving his Confidence entirely to Strangers, who will have no other Thoughts but of enriching themſelves in the quickeſt Manner, while their Maſter's Favour

and Authority are able to ſupport them. A Native will carry into the Throne all his private Animoſities and Friendſhips, and will never be regarded, in his Elevation, without exciting the Sentiments of Envy in thoſe who formerly conſider'd him as their Equal. Not to mention, that a Crown is too high a Reward ever to be given to Merit alone, and will always induce the Candidates to employ Force, or Money, or Intrigue, to procure the Votes of the Electors: So that ſuch a Choice will give no better Chance for a ſuperior Merit in the Prince, than if the State had truſted to Birth alone to determine their Sovereign.

IT may therefore be pronounced as an univerſal Axiom in Politics, *That an hereditary Prince, a Nobility without Vaſſals, and a People voting by their Repreſentatives, form the beſt* MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, *and* DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that Politics admit of general Truths, which are invariable by the Humour or Education either of Subject or Sovereign, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other Principles of this Science, which may ſeem to deſerve that Character.

IT may eaſily be obſerv'd, that though free Governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their Freedom; yet they are the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive for their Provinces: And this Obſervation may, I believe, be fix'd as a Maxim of the Kind we are here ſpeaking of. When a Monarch extends his Dominions by Conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new Subjects as on

the ſame Footing; becauſe, in Reality, all his Subjects are to him the ſame, except the few Friends and Favourites, with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any Diſtinction betwixt them in his *general* Laws; and, at the ſame Time, is no leſs careful to prevent all *particular* Acts of Oppreſſion on the one as on the other. But a free State neceſſarily makes a great Diſtinction, and muſt always do ſo, till Men learn to love their Neighbours as well as themſelves. The Conquerors, in ſuch a Government, are all Legiſlators, and will be ſure ſo to contrive Matters, by Reſtrictions of Trade, and by Taxes, as to draw ſome private, as well as public, Advantage from their Conqueſts. Provincial Governors have alſo a better Chance in a Republic, to eſcape with their Plunder, by Means of Bribery or Intereſt; and their Fellow-Citizens, who find their own State to be inriched by the Spoils of their Subject-Provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate ſuch Abuſes. Not to mention, that 'tis a neceſſary Precaution in a free State to change the Governors frequently; which obliges theſe temporary Tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient Wealth before they give place to their Succeſſors. What cruel Tyrants were the *Romans* over the World during the Time of their Commonwealth! 'Tis true, they had Laws to prevent Oppreſſion in their Provincial Magiſtrates; but *Cicero* informs us, that the *Romans* could not better conſult the Intereſt of the Provinces than by repealing theſe very Laws. For, ſays he, in that Caſe our Magiſtrates, having entire Impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own

own Rapaciouſneſs: Whereas, at preſent, they muſt alſo ſatisfy that of their Judges, and of all the great Men of *Rome*, whoſe Protection they ſtand in need of. Who can read of the Cruelties and Oppreſſions of *Verres* without Horror and Aſtoniſhment? And, who is not touched with Indignation to hear, that after *Cicero* had exhauſted on that abandoned Criminal all the Thunders of the moſt divine Eloquence, and had prevailed ſo far as to get him condemned to the utmoſt Extent of the Laws; yet that cruel Tyrant lived peaceably to old Age, in Opulence and Eaſe, and, thirty Years afterward, was put into the Proſcription by *Mark Anthony*, upon account of his exorbitant Wealth, where he fell, along with *Cicero* himſelf, and all the moſt virtuous Men of *Rome*? After the Diſſolution of the Commonwealth, the *Roman* Yoke became eaſier upon the Provinces, as *Tacitus* informs us; and it may be obſerved, that many of the worſt Emperors, *Domitian*, for Inſtance, were very careful to prevent all Oppreſſion of the Provinces. In * *Tiberius*'s Time, *Gaul* was eſteemed richer than *Italy* itſelf: Nor do I find, during the whole Time of the *Roman* Monarchy, that the Empire became leſs rich or populous in any of its Provinces; though indeed its Valour and military Diſcipline were always upon the Decline. If we paſs from ancient to modern Times, we ſhall find the ſame Obſervation to hold true. The Provinces of abſolute Monarchies are always better treated than thoſe

* *Egregium reſumendæ libertati tempus, ſi ipſi florentes, quam inops Italia, quam imbellis urbana plebs, nihil validum in exercitibus, niſi quod externum cogitarent.* TACIT. Ann. Lib. 3.

of free States. Compare the *Païs conquis* of *France* with *Ireland*, and you'll be convinc'd of this Truth; though this latter Kingdom being, in a good meaſure, peopled from *England*, poſſeſſes ſo many Rights and Privileges as ſhould naturally make it challenge better Treatment than that of a conquered Province. *Corſica* is alſo an obvious Inſtance to the ſame Purpoſe.

THERE is an Obſervation of *Machiavel*, with Regard to the Conqueſts of *Alexander* the *Great*, which, I think, may be regarded as one of thoſe eternal political Truths which no Time or Accidents can vary. It may ſeem ſtrange, ſays that Politician, that ſuch ſudden Conqueſts, as thoſe of *Alexander*, ſhou'd be poſſeſs'd ſo peaceably by his Succeſſors, and that the *Perſians*, during all the Confuſions and Civil Wars of the *Greeks*, never made the ſmalleſt Efforts towards the Recovery of their former independent Government. To ſatisfy us concerning the Cauſe of this remarkable Event, we may conſider, that a Monarch may govern his Subjects after two different Ways. He may either follow the Maxims of the Eaſtern Princes, and ſtretch his Power ſo far as to leave no Diſtinction of Ranks among his Subjects, but what proceeds immediately from himſelf; no Advantages of Birth; no hereditary Honours and Poſſeſſions; and, in a Word, no Credit among the People, except from his Commiſſion alone. Or a Monarch may exert his Power in a milder Manner, like our *European* Princes; and leave other Sources of Honour, beſide his Smile and Favour: Birth, Titles, Poſſeſſions, Valour, Integrity, Knowledge, or brave and fortunate Atchievements.

In

In the former Species of Government, after a Conqueſt, 'tis impoſſible ever to ſhake off the Yoke; ſince no one poſſeſſes, among the People, ſo much perſonal Credit and Authority as to begin ſuch an Enterprize: Whereas, in the latter Species of Government, the leaſt Misfortune, or Diſcord of the Victors, will encourage the Vanquiſh'd to take Arms, who have Leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every Undertaking.

SUCH is the Reaſoning of *Machiavel*, which ſeems to me very ſolid and concluſive; tho' I wiſh he had not mix'd Falſhood with Truth, in aſſerting, that Monarchies govern'd according to the Eaſtern Policy, tho' more eaſily kept when once they are ſubdued, yet are the moſt difficult to be ſubdued; ſince they cannot contain any powerful Subject, whoſe Diſcontent and Faction may facilitate the Enterprizes of an Enemy. For beſides, that ſuch a tyrannical Government enervates the Courage of Men, and renders them indifferent concerning the Fortunes of their Sovereign; beſides this, I ſay, we find, by Experience, that even the temporary and delegated Authority of the Generals and Magiſtrates, being always, in ſuch Governments, as abſolute within its Sphere, as that of the Prince himſelf, is able, with Barbarians accuſtomed to a blind Submiſſion, to produce the moſt dangerous and fatal Revolutions. So that, in every Reſpect, a gentle Government is preferable, and gives the greateſt Security to the Sovereign as well as to the Subject.

LEGISLATORS, therefore, ſhould not truſt the future Government of a State entirely to Chance, but

ought to provide a Syſtem of Laws to regulate the Adminiſtration of public Affairs to the lateſt Poſterity. Effects will always correſpond to Cauſes; and wiſe Regulations in any Commonwealth are the moſt valuable Legacy which can be left to future Ages. In the ſmalleſt Court or Office, the ſtated Forms and Methods, by which Buſineſs muſt be conducted, are found to be a conſiderable Check on the natural Depravity of Mankind. Why ſhould not the Caſe be the ſame in public Affairs? Can we aſcribe the Stability and Wiſdom of the *Venetian* Government, thro' ſo many Ages, to any thing but the Form of Government? And is it not eaſy to point out thoſe Defects in the original Conſtitution, which produc'd the tumultuous Governments of *Athens* and *Rome*, and ended at laſt in the Ruin of theſe two famous Republics? And ſo little Dependance has this Affair on the Humours and Education of particular Men, that one Part of the ſame Republic may be wiſely conducted, and another weakly, by the very ſame Men, merely on account of the Difference of the Forms and Inſtitutions, by which theſe Parts are regulated. Hiſtorians inform us, that this was actually the Caſe with *Genoa*. For while the State was always full of Sedition, and Tumult, and Diſorder, the Bank of St. *George*, which had become a conſiderable Part of the People, was conducted, for ſeveral Ages, with the utmoſt Integrity and Wiſdom *.

THE

* *Eſſempio veramente raro, & da Filoſofi intante loro imaginate & vedute Republiche mai non trovato, vedere dentro ad un medeſimo cerchio, fra medeſimi cittadini, la liberta, & la tirannide, la*

THE Ages of greateſt public Virtue are not always moſt eminent for private Virtue. Good Laws may beget Order and Moderation in the Government, where the Manners and Cuſtoms have inſtill'd little Humanity or Juſtice into the Tempers of Men. The moſt illuſtrious Period of the *Roman* Hiſtory, conſider'd in a political View, is that betwixt the Beginning of the firſt and End of the laſt *Punic* War; the due Balance betwixt the Nobility and People being then fix'd by the Conteſts of the Tribunes, and not being yet loſt by the Extent of Conqueſts. Yet at this very Time, the horrid Practice of poiſoning was ſo common, that, during one Seaſon, a *Prætor* puniſh'd capitally for this Crime above three thouſand * Perſons, in a Part of *Italy*. There is a ſimilar, or rather a worſe Inſtance †, in the more early Times of the Commonwealth. So deprav'd in their private Life were that People, whom in their Hiſtories we ſo much admire. I doubt not but they were really more virtuous during the Time of the two *Triumvirates*, when they were tearing their common Country to Pieces, and ſpreading Slaughter and Deſolation over the Face of the Earth, merely for the Choice of Tyrants ‡.

la vita civile et la corrotta, la giuſtitia & la licenza; perche quello ordine ſolo mantiene quella citta piena di coſtumi antichi & venerabili. E s'egli auveniſſe (che col tempo in ogni modo auverrà) que San Giorgio tutta quella città occupaſſe, ſarrebbe quella una Republica piu que la Venetiana *memorabile.*

Della Hiſt. Florentinè, Lib. 8.

* T. LIVII, cap. 43. † *Id.* lib. 8. cap. 18.

‡ *L'Aigle contre L'Aigle, Romains contre Romains Combattants ſeulement pour le choix des Tyrans.* CORNEILLE.

HERE, then, is a ſufficient Inducement to maintain, with the utmoſt ZEAL, in every free State, thoſe Forms and Inſtitutions by which Liberty is ſecured, the public Good conſulted, and the Avarice or Ambition of particular Men reſtrained and puniſhed. Nothing does more Honour to human Nature, than to ſee it ſuſceptible of ſo noble a Paſſion; as nothing can be a greater Indication of Meanneſs of Heart in any Man, than to ſee him devoid of it. A Man who loves only himſelf, without Regard to Friendſhip or Merit, is a deteſtable Monſter; and a Man, who is only ſuſceptible of Friendſhip, without public Spirit, or a Regard to the Community, is deficient in the moſt material Part of Virtue.

BUT this is a Subject that need not be longer inſiſted on at preſent. There are enow of Zealots on both Sides to kindle up the Paſſions of their Partizans, and under the Pretence of public Good, purſue the Intereſts and Ends of their particular Faction. For my Part, I ſhall always be more Fond of promoting Moderation than Zeal; though perhaps the ſureſt Way of producing Moderation in every Party, is to increaſe our Zeal for the Public. Let us therefore try, if it be poſſible, from the foregoing Doctrine, to draw a Leſſon of Moderation with regard to the Parties in which our Country is at preſent * divided; at the ſame Time, that we allow not this Moderation to abate the Induſtry and Paſſion with which every Individual is bound to purſue the Good of his Country.

* In 1742.

THOSE

THOSE who either attack or defend a Miniſter in ſuch a Government as ours, where the utmoſt Liberty is allowed, always carry Matters to Extremes, and exaggerate his Merit or Demerit with regard to the Public. His Enemies are ſure to charge him with the greateſt Enormities, both in domeſtic and foreign Management; and there is no Meanneſs or Crime, of which, in their Account, he is not capable. Unneceſſary Wars, ſcandalous Treaties, Profuſion of public Treaſure, oppreſſive Taxes, every Kind of Maleadminiſtration is aſcribed to him. To aggravate the Charge, his pernicious Conduct, it is ſaid, will extend its baneful Influence even to Poſterity, by undermining the beſt Conſtitution in the World, and diſordering that wiſe Syſtem of Laws, Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, by which our Anceſtors, for ſo many Centuries, have been ſo happily governed. He is not only a wicked Miniſter in himſelf, but has removed every Security provided againſt wicked Miniſters for the future.

ON the other Hand, the Partizans of the Miniſter make his Panegyric run as high as the Accuſation againſt him, and celebrate his wiſe, ſteady, and moderate Conduct in every Part of his Adminiſtration. The Honour and Intereſt of the Nation ſupported abroad, public Credit maintained at home, Perſecution reſtrain'd, Faction ſubdu'd; the Merit of all theſe Bleſſings is aſcrib'd ſolely to the Miniſter. At the ſame Time he crowns all his other Merits, by a religious Care of the beſt Conſtitution in the World, which he has preſerved inviolate in all its Parts, and

has tranſmitted entire, to be the Happineſs and Security of the lateſt Poſterity.

When this Accuſation and Panegyric are receiv'd by the Partizans of each Party, no Wonder they engender a moſt extraordinary Ferment on both Sides, and fill the whole Nation with the moſt violent Animoſities. But I would fain perſuade theſe Party-Zealots, that there is a flat Contradiction both in the Accuſation and Panegyric, and that it were impoſſible for either of them to run ſo high, were it not for this Contradiction. If our Conſtitution be really * *that noble Fabric, the Pride of* Britain, *the Envy of our Neighbours, rais'd by the Labour of ſo many Centuries, repair'd at the Expence of ſo many Millions, and cemented by ſuch a Profuſion of Blood*; I ſay, if our Conſtitution does in any Degree deſerve theſe Elogiums, it wou'd never have ſuffer'd a wicked and a weak Miniſter to govern triumphantly for a Courſe of Twenty Years, when oppos'd by the greateſt Geniuſes of the Nation, who exercis'd the utmoſt Liberty of Tongue and Pen, in Parliament, and in their frequent Appeals to the People. But, if the Miniſter be wicked and weak, to the Degree ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on, the Conſtitution muſt be faulty in its original Principles, and he cannot conſiſtently be charg'd with undermining the beſt Conſtitution of the World. A Conſtitution is only ſo far good, as it provides a Remedy againſt Male-adminiſtration; and if the *Britiſh* Conſtitution, when in its greateſt Vigour, and repair'd by two ſuch remarkable Events, as the *Revolution* and *Acceſſion*, by which our ancient Royal Family was ſacrificed

* *Diſſertation on Parties*, Letter 10.

crificed to it; if our Conſtitution, I ſay, with ſo great Advantages, does not, in Fact, provide any ſuch Remedy againſt Male-adminiſtration, we are rather beholden to any Miniſter that undermines it, and affords us an Opportunity of erecting a better Conſtitution in its Place.

I WOU'D make Uſe of the ſame Topics to moderate the Zeal of thoſe who defend the Miniſter. *Is our Conſtitution ſo excellent?* Then a Change of Miniſtry can be no ſuch dreadful Event; ſince 'tis eſſential to ſuch a Conſtitution, in every Miniſtry, both to preſerve itſelf from Violation, and to prevent all Enormities in the Adminiſtration. *Is our Conſtitution very bad?* Then ſo extraordinary a Jealouſy and Apprehenſion, on account of Changes, is ill-plac'd; and a Man ſhould no more be anxious in this Caſe, than a Huſband, who had marry'd a Woman from the Stews, ſhould be watchful to prevent her Infidelity. Public Affairs, in ſuch a Conſtitution, muſt neceſſarily go to Confuſion, by whatever Hands they are conducted; and the Zeal of *Patriots* is much leſs requiſite in that Caſe than the Patience and Submiſſion of *Philoſophers*. The Virtue and good Intentions of *Cato* and *Brutus* are highly laudable; But, to what Purpoſe did their Zeal ſerve? To nothing, but to haſten the fatal Period of the *Roman* Government, and render its Convulſions and dying Agonies more violent and painful.

I WOULD not be underſtood to mean, that public Affairs deſerve no Care and Attention at all. Would Men be moderate and conſiſtent, their Claims might

be admitted; at leaſt might be examin'd. The *Country-Party* might ſtill aſſert, that our Conſtitution, tho' excellent, will admit of Male-adminiſtration to a certain Degree; and therefore, if the Miniſter be bad, 'tis proper to oppoſe him with a *ſuitable* Degree of Zeal. And, on the other Side, the *Court-Party* may be allow'd, upon the Suppoſition that the Miniſter were good, to defend, and with *ſome* Zeal too, his Adminiſtration. I would only perſuade Men not to contend, as if they were fighting *pro aris & focis*, and change a good Conſtitution into a bad one, by the Violence of their Factions *.

I HAVE

* *What our Author's Opinion was of the famous Miniſter here pointed at, may be learn'd from that Eſſay, printed in the former Edition, under the Title of* A Character of Sir ROBERT WALPOLE. *It was as follows:* There never was a Man, whoſe Actions and Character have been more earneſtly and openly canvaſſed, than thoſe of the preſent Miniſter, who, having govern'd a learned and free Nation for ſo long a Time, amidſt ſuch mighty Oppoſition, may make a large Library of what has been wrote for and againſt him, and is the Subject of above Half the Paper that has been blotted in this Nation within theſe Twenty Years. I wiſh, for the Honour of our Country, that any one Character of him had been drawn with ſuch *Judgment* and *Impartiality*, as to have ſome Credit with Poſterity, and to ſhew, that our Liberty has, once at leaſt, been employ'd to good Purpoſe. I am only afraid of failing in the former Quality of Judgment: But if it ſhould be ſo, 'tis but one Page more thrown away, after an hundred Thouſand, upon the ſame Subject, that have periſh'd, and become uſeleſs. In the mean Time, I ſhall flatter myſelf with the pleaſing Imagination, that the following Character will be adopted by future Hiſtorians.

SIR

I HAVE not here conſidered any Thing that is perſonal in the preſent Controverſy. In the beſt Conſtitution of the World, where every Man is reſtrain'd

SIR *ROBERT WALPOLE*, Prime Miniſter of *Great Britain*, is a Man of Ability, not a Genius; good natur'd, not virtuous; conſtant, not magnanimous; moderate, not equitable †. His Virtues, in ſome Inſtances, are free from the Allay of thoſe Vices, which uſually accompany ſuch Virtues: He is a generous Friend, without being a bitter Enemy. His Vices, in other Inſtances, are not compenſated by thoſe Virtues which are nearly ally'd to them: His Want of Enterpriſe is not attended with Frugality. The private Character of the Man is better than the public: His Virtues more than his Vices: His Fortune greater than his Fame. With many good Qualities he has incurr'd the public Hatred: With good Capacity he has not eſcap'd Ridicule. He would have been eſteem'd more worthy of his high Station, had he never poſſeſs'd it; and is better qualify'd for the ſecond than for the firſt Place in any Government. His Miniſtry has been more advantageous to his Family than to the Public, better for this Age than for Poſterity, and more pernicious by bad Precedents than by real Grievances. During his Time Trade has flouriſh'd, Liberty declin'd, and Learning gone to Ruin. As I am a Man, I love him; as I am a Scholar, I hate him; as I am a *Briton*, I calmly wiſh his Fall. And were I a Member of either Houſe, I would give my Vote for removing him from St. *James*'s; but ſhould be glad to ſee him retire to *Houghton-Hall*, to paſs the Remainder of his Days in Eaſe and Pleaſure.

The Author is pleaſed to find, that after Animoſities are laid, and Calumny has ceas'd, the whole Nation almoſt have return'd to the ſame moderate Sentiments with regard to this great Man; if

† Moderate in the Exerciſe of Power, not equitable in engroſſing it.

they

ſtrain'd by the moſt rigid Laws, 'tis eaſy to diſcover either the good or bad Intentions of a Miniſter, and to judge, whether his perſonal Character deſerves Love or Hatred. But ſuch Queſtions are of little Importance to the Public, and lay thoſe who employ their Pens upon them, under a juſt Suſpicion either of Malevolence or of Flattery.

they are not rather become more favourable to him, by a very natural Tranſition, from one Extreme to another. The Author would not oppoſe theſe humane Sentiments towards the Dead; tho' he cannot forbear obſerving, that the not paying more of our public Debts was, as hinted in this Character, a great, and the only great, Error in that long Adminiſtration.

ESSAY V.

Of the firſt PRINCIPLES *of* GOVERNMENT.

NOTHING is more ſurprizing to thoſe, who conſider human Affairs with a Philoſophical Eye, than to ſee the Eaſineſs with which the many are governed by the few; and to obſerve the implicite Submiſſion with which Men reſign their own Sentiments and Paſſions to thoſe of their Rulers. When we enquire by what Means this Wonder is brought about, we ſhall find, that as FORCE is always on the Side of the Governed, the Governors have nothing to ſupport them but OPINION. 'Tis therefore, on Opinion only that Government is founded; and this Maxim extends to the moſt deſpotic and moſt military Governments, as well as to the moſt free and moſt popular. The *Soldan* of *Ægypt*, or the *Emperor* of *Rome*, might drive his harmleſs Subjects, like brute Beaſts, againſt their Sentiments and Inclination: But he muſt, at leaſt, have led his *Mamalukes*, or *Prætorian Bands*, like Men, by their Opinion.

OPINION is of two Kinds, *viz.* Opinion of INTEREST, and Opinion of RIGHT. By Opinion of

of Intereſt, I chiefly underſtand the Senſe of the public Advantage which is reap'd from Government; along with the Perſuaſion, that the particular Government, which is eſtabliſh'd, is equally advantageous with any other that could eaſily be ſettled. When this Opinion prevails among the Generality of a State, or among thoſe who have the Force in their Hands, it gives great Security to any Government.

RIGHT is of two Kinds, Right to POWER, and Right to PROPERTY. What Prevalence Opinion of the firſt Kind has over Mankind, may eaſily be underſtood by obſerving the Attachment which all Nations have to their ancient Government, and even to thoſe Names which have had the Sanction of Antiquity. Antiquity always begets the Opinion of Right; and whatever diſadvantageous Sentiment we may entertain of Mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of Blood and Treaſure in the Maintenance of public Right. This Paſſion we may denominate Enthuſiaſm, or we may give it what Appellation we pleaſe; but a Politician, who ſhould overlook its influence on human Affairs, would prove himſelf to have but a very limited Underſtanding. There is, indeed, no Particular, in which, at firſt Sight, there may appear a greater Contradiction in the Frame of the human Mind than the preſent. When Men act in a Party, they are apt, without any Shame or Remorſe, to neglect all the Ties of Honour and Morality, in order to ſerve their Party; and yet, when a Party is form'd upon a Point of Right or Principle, there is no Occaſion, wherein Men diſcover a greater Obſti-

nacy,

nacy, and a more determined Senſe of Juſtice and Equity. The ſame ſocial Diſpoſition of Mankind is the Cauſe of both theſe contradictory Appearances.

'TIS ſufficiently underſtood, that the Opinion of Right to Property is of the greateſt Moment in all Matters of Government. A noted Author has made Property the Foundation of all Government; and moſt of our Political Writers ſeem inclin'd to follow him in that Particular. This is carrying the Matter too far; but ſtill it muſt be own'd, that the Opinion of Right to Property has a great Influence in this Subject.

UPON theſe three Opinions, therefore, of *Intereſt*, of *Right to Power*, and of *Right to Property*, are all Governments founded, and all Authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other Principles, which add Force to theſe, and determine, limit, or alter their Operation; ſuch as *Self-Intereſt*, *Fear*, and *Affection*: But ſtill I aſſert, that theſe other Principles can have no Influence alone, but ſuppoſe the antecedent Influence of thoſe Opinions above-mention'd. They are, therefore, to be eſteem'd the ſecondary, not the original Principles of Government.

FOR, *firſt*, as to *Self-Intereſt*, by which I mean the Expectation of particular Rewards, diſtinct from the general Protection which we receive from Government, 'tis evident, that the Magiſtrate's Authority muſt be antecedently eſtabliſh'd, or, at leaſt, be hop'd for, in order to produce this Expectation. The Expectation of Reward may augment the Authority with regard to ſome particular Perſons; but can never give Birth

Birth to it with regard to the Public. Men naturally look for the greateſt Favours from their Friends and Acquaintance; and therefore, the Hopes of any conſiderable Number of the State, would never center in any particular Set of Men, if theſe Men had no other Title to Magiſtracy, and had no Influence over the Opinions of Mankind. The ſame Obſervation may be extended to the other two Principles of *Fear* and *Affection*. No Man would have any Reaſon to *fear* the Fury of a Tyrant, if he had no Authority over any but from Fear; ſince, as a ſingle Man, his bodily Force can reach but a ſmall Way, and whatever Power he has beyond, muſt be founded either on our own Opinion, or on the preſum'd Opinion of others. And tho' *Affection* to Wiſdom and Virtue in a *Sovereign* extends very far, and has great Influence; yet he muſt be antecedently ſuppos'd to be inveſted with a public Character, otherwiſe the public Eſteem will ſerve him in no Stead, nor will his Virtue have any Influence beyond his private Sphere.

A GOVERNMENT may endure for ſeveral Ages, tho' the Balance of Power, and the Balance of Property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any Member of the State has acquir'd a large Share of the Property; but, from the original Conſtitution of the Government, has no Share of the Power. Under what Pretext would any Individual of that Order pretend to intermeddle in public Affairs? As Men are commonly much attach'd to their ancient Government, it is not to be expected, that the Public would ever favour ſuch Uſurpations. But where the original Conſtitution

ſtitution allows any Share of the Power, though ſmall, to an Order of Men, that poſſeſſes a large Share of the Property, 'tis eaſy for them gradually to ſtretch their Authority, and bring the Balance of Power to coincide with that of Property. This has been the Caſe with the Houſe of Commons in *England*.

MOST Writers, that have treated of the *Britiſh* Government, have ſuppoſed, that as the Houſe of Commons repreſents all the Commons of *Great Britain*; ſo its Weight in the Scale is proportioned to the Property and Power of all whom it repreſents. But this Principle muſt not be received as abſolutely true. For though the People are apt to attach themſelves more to the Houſe of Commons, than to any other Member of the Conſtitution, that Houſe being choſen by them as their Repreſentatives, and as the public Guardians of their Liberty; yet are there Inſtances where the Houſe, even when in Oppoſition to the Crown, has not been follow'd by the People; as we may particularly obſerve of the *Tory* Houſe of Commons in the Reign of King *William*. Were the Members of the Houſe obliged to receive Inſtructions from their Conſtituents, like the *Dutch* Deputies, this would entirely alter the Caſe; and, if ſuch immenſe Power and Riches, as thoſe of the whole Commons of *Britain*, were brought into the Scale, 'tis not eaſy to conceive, that the Crown could either influence that Multitude of People, or withſtand that Overbalance of Property. 'Tis true, the Crown has great Influence over the collective Body of *Britain* in the Elections of Members; but were this Influence, which

at

at preſent is only exerted once in ſeven Years, to be employ'd in bringing over the People to every Vote, it would ſoon be waſted; and no Skill, Popularity or Revenue, could ſupport it. I muſt, therefore, be of Opinion, that an Alteration, in this Particular, would introduce a total Alteration in our Government, and would ſoon reduce it to a pure Republic; and, perhaps, to a Republic of no inconvenient Form. For though the People collected in a Body, like the *Roman* Tribes, be quite unfit for Government, yet when diſperſed in ſmall Bodies, they are more ſuſceptible both of Reaſon and Order; the Force of popular Currents and Tides is, in ſome Meaſure, broke; and the public Intereſt may be purſued with Method and Conſtancy. But 'tis needleſs to reaſon any farther concerning a Form of Government, which is never likely to have place in *Britain*, and which ſeems not to be the Aim of any Party amongſt us. Let us cheriſh and improve our ancient Government as much as poſſible, without encouraging a Paſſion for ſuch dangerous Novelties.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, that the preſent political Controverſy, with regard to *Inſtructions*, is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any Deciſion, as it is managed by both Parties. The Country-Party do not pretend, that a Member is abſolutely bound to follow Inſtructions, as an Ambaſſador or General is confined by his Orders, and that his Vote is not to be received in the Houſe, but ſo far as it is conformable to them. The Court-Party, again, do not pretend, that the Sentiments of the

the People ought to have no Weight with every Member; much leſs that he ought to deſpiſe the Sentiments of thoſe whom he repreſents, and with whom he is more particularly connected. And if their Sentiments be of Weight, why ought they not to expreſs theſe Sentiments? The Queſtion, then, is only concerning the Degrees of Weight which ought to be plac'd on Inſtructions. But ſuch is the Nature of Language, that 'tis impoſſible for it to expreſs diſtinctly theſe different Degrees; and if Men will carry on a Controverſy on this Head, it may well happen, that they differ in their Language, and yet agree in their Sentiments; or differ in their Sentiments, and yet agree in their Language. Beſides, how is it poſſible to fix theſe Degrees, conſidering the Variety of Affairs that come before the Houſe, and the Variety of Places which Members repreſent? Ought the Inſtructions of *Totneſs* to have the ſame Weight as thoſe of *London*? Or Inſtructions, with regard to the *Convention*, which reſpected foreign Politics, to have the ſame Weight as thoſe with regard to the *Exciſe*, which reſpected only our domeſtic Affairs?

ESSAY VI.

Of LOVE *and* MARRIAGE.

I KNOW not whence it proceeds, that Women are ſo apt to take amiſs every thing that is ſaid in Diſparagement of the married State; and always conſider a Satyr upon Matrimony as a Satyr upon themſelves. Do they mean by this, that they are the Parties principally concerned, and that if a Backwardneſs to enter into that State ſhould prevail in the World, they would be the greateſt Sufferers? Or, are they ſenſible, that the Misfortunes and Miſcarriages of the married State are owing more to their Sex than to ours? I hope they do not intend to confeſs either of theſe two Particulars, or to give ſuch an Advantage to their Adverſaries, the Men, as even to allow them to ſuſpect it.

I HAVE often had Thoughts of complying with this Humour of the Fair Sex, and of writing a Panegyric upon Marriage: But, in looking around for Materials, they ſeem'd to be of ſo mix'd a Nature, that at the Concluſion of my Reflections, I found I was as much diſpoſed to write a Satyr, which might be placed on the oppoſite Pages of my Panegyric: And I am afraid, that as Satyr is, on moſt Occaſions,

thought to have more Truth in it than Panegyric, I ſhould have done their Cauſe more Harm than Good by this Expedient. To miſrepreſent Facts is what, I know, they will not require of me. I muſt be more a Friend to Truth, than even to them, where their Intereſts are oppoſite.

I SHALL tell the Women what it is our Sex complains of moſt in the married State; and if they be diſpoſed to ſatisfy us in this Particular, all the other Differences will be eaſily accommodated. If I be not miſtaken, 'tis their Love of Dominion which is the Ground of the Quarrel; though 'tis very likely, that they will think it an unreaſonable Love of it in us, which makes us inſiſt ſo much upon that Point. However this may be, no Paſſion ſeems to have more Influence on female Minds, than this for Power; and there is a remarkable Inſtance in Hiſtory of its prevailing above another Paſſion, which is the only one that can be ſuppoſed a proper Counter-poiſe for it. We are told, that all the Women in *Scythia* once conſpired againſt the Men, and kept the Secret ſo well, that they executed their Deſign before they were ſuſpected. They ſurpriſed the Men in Drink, or aſleep, bound them all faſt in Chains; and having called a ſolemn Council of the whole Sex, it was debated what Expedient ſhould be uſed to improve the preſent Advantage, and prevent their falling again into Slavery. To kill all the Men did not ſeem to the Reliſh of any Part of the Aſſembly, notwithſtanding the Injuries formerly received; and they were afterwards pleaſed to make a great Merit of this Lenity of theirs. It was, therefore

therefore, agreed to put out the Eyes of the whole male Sex, and thereby reſign for ever after all the Vanity they could draw from their Beauty, in order to ſecure their Authority. We muſt no longer pretend to Dreſs and Show, ſay they; but then we ſhall be free from Slavery. We ſhall hear no more tender Sighs; but in return we ſhall hear no more imperious Commands. Love muſt for ever leave us; but he will carry Subjection along with him.

'Tis regarded by ſome as an unlucky Circumſtance, ſince the Women were reſolved to maim the Men, and deprive them of ſome of their Senſes, in order to render them humble and dependent, that the Senſe of Hearing could not ſerve their Purpoſe, ſince 'tis probable the Females would rather have attack'd that than the Sight: And I think it is agreed among the Learned, that, in a married State, 'tis not near ſo great an Inconvenience to loſe the former Senſe as the latter. However this may be, we are told, by modern Anecdotes, that ſome of the *Scythian* Women did ſecretly ſpare their Huſbands Eyes; preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that they could govern them as well by Means of that Senſe as without it. But ſo incorrigible and intractable were theſe Men, that their Wives were all obliged, in a few Years, as their Youth and Beauty decay'd, to imitate the Example of their Siſters; which it was no difficult Matter to do in a State where the female Sex had once got the Superiority.

I KNOW not if our *Scottiſh* Ladies derive any thing of this Humour from their *Scythian* Anceſtors;

but, I muſt confeſs, that I have often been ſurpriz'd to ſee a Woman very well pleas'd to take a Fool for her Mate, that ſhe might govern with the leſs Controul; and could not but think her Sentiments, in this Reſpect, ſtill more barbarous than thoſe of the *Scythian* Women above mentioned, as much, as the Eyes of the Underſtanding are more valuable than thoſe of the Body.

BUT to be juſt, and to lay the Blame more equally, I am afraid it is the Fault of our Sex, if the Women be ſo fond of Rule, and that if we did not abuſe our Authority, they would never think it worth while to diſpute it. Tyrants, we know, produce Rebels; and all Hiſtory informs us, that Rebels, when they prevail, are apt to become Tyrants in their Turn. For this Reaſon, I could wiſh there were no Pretenſions to Authority on either Side; but that every thing was carry'd on with perfect Equality, as betwixt two equal Members of the ſame Body. And to induce both Parties to embrace thoſe amicable Sentiments, I ſhall deliver to them *Plato*'s Account of the Origin of Love and Marriage.

MANKIND, according to that fanciful Philoſopher, were not, in their Original, divided into Male and Female, as at preſent; but each individual Perſon was a Compound of both Sexes, and was in himſelf both Huſband and Wife, melted down into one living Creature. This Union, no Doubt, was very entire, and the Parts very well adjuſted together, ſince there reſulted a perfect Harmony betwixt the Male and Fe-

male, altho' they were oblig'd to be inſeparable Companions. And ſo great was the Harmony and Happineſs flowing from it, that the ANDROGYNES (for ſo *Plato* calls them) or MEN-WOMEN, became inſolent upon their Proſperity, and rebell'd againſt the Gods. To puniſh them for this Temerity, *Jupiter* could contrive no better Expedient, than to divorce the Male-Part from the Female, and make two imperfect Beings of the Compound, which was before ſo perfect. Hence the Origin of Men and Women, as diſtinct Creatures. But notwithſtanding this Diviſion, ſo lively is our Remembrance of the Happineſs we enjoy'd in our primæval State, that we are never at reſt in this Situation; but each of theſe Halves is continually ſearching thro' the whole Species to find the other Half, which was broken from it: And when they meet, they join again with the greateſt Fondneſs and Sympathy. But it often happens, that they are miſtaken in this Particular; that they take for their Half what no way correſponds to them; and that the Parts do not meet nor join in with each other, as is uſual in Fractures. In this Caſe the Union is ſoon diſſolv'd, and each Part is ſet looſe again to hunt for its loſt Half, joining itſelf to every one it meets by Way of Trial, and enjoying no Reſt, till its perfect Sympathy with its Partner ſhews, that it has at laſt been ſucceſsful in its Endeavours.

WERE I diſpos'd to carry on this Fiction of *Plato*, which accounts for the mutual Love betwixt the Sexes in ſo agreeable a Manner, I would do it by the following Allegory,

WHEN

WHEN *Jupiter* had ſeparated the Male from the Female, and had quell'd their Pride and Ambition by ſo ſevere an Operation, he could not but repent him of the Cruelty of his Vengeance, and take Compaſſion on poor Mortals, who were now become incapable of any Repoſe or Tranquillity. Such Cravings, ſuch Anxieties, ſuch Neceſſities aroſe, as made them curſe their Creation, and think Exiſtence itſelf a Puniſhment. In vain had they Recourſe to every other Occupation and Amuſement. In vain did they ſeek after every Pleaſure of Senſe, and every Refinement of Reaſon. Nothing could fill that Void, which they felt in their Hearts, or ſupply the Loſs of their Partner, who was ſo fatally ſeparated from them. To remedy this Diſorder, and to beſtow ſome Comfort, at leaſt, on human Race in their forlorn Situation, *Jupiter* ſent down LOVE and HYMEN to collect the broken Halves of human Kind, and piece them together, in the beſt Manner poſſible. Theſe two Deities found ſuch a prompt Diſpoſition in Mankind to unite again in their primitive State, that they proceeded on their Work with wonderful Succeſs for ſome Time; till at laſt, from many unlucky Accidents, Diſſenſion aroſe betwixt them. The chief Counſellor and Favourite of *Hymen* was CARE, who was continually filling his Patron's Head with Proſpects of Futurity; a Settlement, Family, Children, Servants; ſo that little elſe was regarded in all the Matches *they* made. On the other Hand, *Love* had choſen PLEASURE for his Favourite, who was as pernicious a Counſellor as the other, and would never allow *Love* to look be-

yond the preſent momentary Gratification, or the ſatisfying of the prevailing Inclination. Theſe two Favourites became, in a little Time, irreconcileable Enemies, and made it their chief Buſineſs to undermine each other in all their Undertakings, No ſooner had *Love* fix'd upon two Halves, which he was cementing together, and forming to a cloſe Union, but *Care* inſinuates himſelf, and bringing *Hymen* along with him, diſſolves the Union produc'd by *Love*, and joins each Half to ſome other Half, which he had provided for it. To be reveng'd of this, *Pleaſure* creeps in upon a Pair already join'd by *Hymen*; and calling *Love* to his Aſſiſtance, they Under-hand contrive to join each Half, by ſecret Links, to Halves, which *Hymen* was wholly unacquainted with. It was not long before this Quarrel was felt in its pernicious Conſequences; and ſuch Complaints aroſe before the Throne of *Jupiter*, that he was obliged to ſummon the offending Parties to appear before him, in order to give an Account of their Proceedings. After hearing the Pleadings on both Sides, he order'd an immediate Reconcilement betwixt *Love* and *Hymen*, as the only Expedient for giving Happineſs to Mankind: And that he might be ſure this Reconcilement ſhould be durable, he laid his ſtrict Injunctions on them never to join any Halves without conſulting their Favourites *Care* and *Pleaſure*, and obtaining the Conſent of both to the Conjunction. Where this Order is ſtrictly obſerv'd, the *Androgyne* is perfectly reſtor'd, and human Race enjoy the ſame Happineſs as in their primæval State. The Seam is ſcarce perceiv'd that joins the two Beings together; but both of them combine to form one perfect and happy Creature.

ESSAY VII.

Of the STUDY *of* HISTORY.

THERE is nothing I would recommend more earneſtly to my female Readers than the Study of Hiſtory, as an Occupation, of all others, the beſt ſuited both to their Sex and Education; much more inſtructive than their ordinary Books of Amuſement, and more entertaining than thoſe ſerious Compoſitions, which are uſually to be found in their Cloſets. Among other important Truths, which they may learn from Hiſtory, they may be inform'd of two Particulars, the Knowledge of which may contribute very much to their Quiet and Repoſe; *That* our Sex, as well as theirs, are far from being ſuch perfect Creatures as they are apt to imagine, and, *That* Love is not the only Paſſion, that governs the Male-World, but is often overcome by Avarice, Ambition, Vanity, and a thouſand other Paſſions. Whether they be the falſe Repreſentations of Mankind in thoſe two Particulars, that endear Romances and Novels ſo much to the fair Sex, I know not; but muſt confeſs, I am ſorry to ſee them have ſuch an Averſion to Matter of Fact, and ſuch an Appetite for Falſhood. I remember I was once deſired by a young Beauty, for whom I had ſome Paſſion, to ſend her ſome Novels and Romances for her

Amuſement in the Country; but was not ſo ungenerous as to take the Advantage, which ſuch a Courſe of Reading might have given me, being reſolved not to make Uſe of poiſoned Arms againſt her. I therefore ſent her *Plutarch*'s Lives, aſſuring her, at the ſame Time, that there was not a Word of Truth in them from Beginning to End. She peruſed them very attentively, 'till ſhe came to the Lives of *Alexander* and *Cæſar*, whoſe Names ſhe had heard of by Accident; and then returned me the Book, with many Reproaches for deceiving her.

I MAY indeed be told, that the fair Sex have no ſuch Averſion to Hiſtory, as I have repreſented, provided it be *ſecret* Hiſtory, and contain ſome memorable Tranſaction proper to excite their Curioſity. But as I do not find that Truth, which is the Baſis of Hiſtory, is at all regarded in thoſe Anecdotes, I cannot admit of this as a Proof of their Paſſion for that Study. However this may be, I ſee not why the ſame Curioſity might not receive a more proper Direction, and lead them to deſire Accounts of thoſe who lived in paſt Ages as well of their Contemporaries. What is it to *Cleora*, whether *Fulvia* entertains a ſecret Commerce of *Love* with *Philander* or not? Has ſhe not equal Reaſon to be pleaſed, when ſhe is informed, (what is whiſpered about among Hiſtorians) that *Cato*'s Siſter had an Intrigue with *Cæſar*, and palmed her Son, *Marcus Brutus*, upon her Huſband for his own, tho', in Reality, he was her Gallant's? And are not the Loves of *Meſſalina* or *Julia* as proper Subjects of Diſcourſe as any Intrigue that this City has produced of late Years.

BUT

BUT I know not whence it comes, that I have been thus ſeduc'd into a Kind of Raillery againſt the Ladies: Unleſs, perhaps, it proceed from the ſame Cauſe, that makes the Perſon, who is the Favourite of the Company, be often the Object of their good-natur'd Jeſts and Pleaſantries. We are pleaſed to addreſs ourſelves after any Manner to a Perſon that is agreeable to us; and, at the ſame Time, preſume, that nothing will be taken amiſs by one who is ſecure of the good Opinion and Affections of every one preſent. I ſhall now proceed to handle my Subject more ſeriouſly, and ſhall point out the many Advantages, that flow from the Study of Hiſtory, and ſhew how well ſuited it is to every one, but particularly to thoſe who are debarred the ſeverer Studies, by the Tenderneſs of their Complexion, and the Weakneſs of their Education. The Advantages found in Hiſtory ſeem to be of three Kinds, as it amuſes the Fancy, as it improves the Underſtanding, and as it ſtrengthens Virtue.

IN Reality, what more agreeable Entertainment to the Mind, than to be tranſported into the remoteſt Ages of the World, and to obſerve human Society, in its Infancy, making the firſt faint Eſſays towards the Arts and Sciences: To ſee the Policy of Government, and the Civility of Converſation refining by Degrees, and every thing that is ornamental to human Life advancing towards its Perfection. To remark the Riſe, Progreſs, Declenſion and final Extinction of the moſt

flouriſhing Empires: The Virtues, which contributed to their Greatneſs; and the Vices, which drew on their Ruin. In ſhort, to ſee all human Race, from the Beginning of Time, paſs, as it were, in Review before us, appearing in their true Colours, without any of thoſe Diſguiſes, which, during their Life-time, ſo much perplexed the Judgment of the Beholders. What Spectacle can be imagined ſo magnificent, ſo various, ſo intereſting? What Amuſement, either of the Senſes or Imagination, can be compared with it? Shall thoſe trifling Paſtimes, which engroſs ſo much of our Time, be preferr'd as more ſatisfactory, and more fit to engage our Attention? How perverſe muſt that Taſte be, which is capable of ſo wrong a Choice of Pleaſures?

But Hiſtory is a moſt improving Part of Knowledge, as well as an agreeable Amuſement; and a great Part of what we commonly call *Erudition*, and value ſo highly, is nothing but an Acquaintance with hiſtorical Facts. An extenſive Knowledge of this kind, belongs to Men of Letters; but I muſt think it an unpardonable Ignorance in Perſons of whatever Sex or Condition, not to be acquainted with the Hiſtory of their own Country, along with the Hiſtories of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*. A Woman may behave herſelf with good Manners, and have even ſome Vivacity in her Turn of Wit; but where her Mind is ſo unfurniſh'd, 'tis impoſſible her Converſation can afford any Entertainment to Men of Senſe and Reflection.

I MUST add, That Hiſtory is not only a valuable Part of Knowledge, but opens the Door to many other Parts of Knowledge, and affords Materials to moſt of the Sciences. And indeed, if we conſider the Shortneſs of human Life, and our limited Knowledge, even of what paſſes in our own Time, we muſt be ſenſible, that we ſhould be for ever Children in Underſtanding, were it not for this Invention, which extends our Experience to all paſt Ages, and to the moſt diſtant Nations; making them contribute as much to our Improvement in Wiſdom, as if they had actually lain under our Obſervation. A Man acquainted with Hiſtory may, in ſome reſpect, be ſaid to have lived from the Beginning of the World, and to have been making continual Additions to his Stock of Knowledge in every Century.

THERE is alſo an Advantage in that Knowledge which is acquired by Hiſtory, above what is learned by the Practice of the World, that it brings us acquainted with human Affairs, without diminiſhing in the leaſt from the moſt delicate Sentiments of Virtue. And, to tell the Truth, I know not any Study or Occupation ſo unexceptionable as Hiſtory in this Particular. Poets can paint Virtue in the moſt charming Colours; but, as they addreſs themſelves entirely to the Paſſions, they often become Advocates for Vice. Even Philoſophers are apt to bewilder themſelves in the Subtilty of their Speculations; and we have ſeen ſome go ſo far as to deny the Reality of all moral Diſtinc-

tions. But I think it a Remark worthy the Attention of the ſpeculative Reader, that the Hiſtorians have been, almoſt without Exception, the true Friends of Virtue, and have always repreſented it in its proper Colours, however they may have erred in their Judgments of particular Perſons. *Machiavel* himſelf diſcovers a true Sentiment of Virtue in his Hiſtory of *Florence*. When he talks as a *Politician*, in his general Reaſonings, he conſiders Poiſoning, Aſſaſſination and Perjury as lawful Arts of Power; but when he ſpeaks as an *Hiſtorian*, in his particular Narrations, he ſhews ſo keen an Indignation againſt Vice, and ſo warm an Approbation of Virtue, in many Paſſages, that I could not forbear applying to him that Remark of *Horace*, That if you chaſe away Nature, though with never ſo great Indignity, ſhe will always return upon you. Nor is this Combination of Hiſtorians in Favour of Virtue at all difficult to be accounted for. When a Man of Buſineſs enters into Life and Action, he is more apt to conſider the Characters of Men, as they have Relation to his Intereſt, than as they ſtand in themſelves; and has his Judgment warped on every Occaſion by the Violence of his Paſſion. When a Philoſopher contemplates Characters and Manners in his Cloſet, the general abſtract View of the Objects leaves the Mind ſo cold and unmoved, that the Sentiments of Nature have no room to play, and he ſcarce feels the Difference betwixt Vice and Virtue. Hiſtory keeps in a juſt Medium betwixt theſe Extremes, and places the Objects in their true Point of View. The Writers of Hiſtory, as well as the Readers, are ſufficiently intereſted

tereſted in the Characters and Events, to have a lively Sentiment of Blame or Praiſe; and, at the ſame Time, have no particular Intereſt or Concern to pervert their Judgment.

Veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eliciuntur.

ESSAY VIII.

Of the INDEPENDENCY *of* PARLIAMENT.

I HAVE frequently obſerv'd, in comparing the Conduct of the *Court* and *Country* Parties, that the former are commonly leſs aſſuming and dogmatical in Converſation, more apt to make Conceſſions; and tho' not, perhaps, more ſuſceptible of Conviction, yet more able to bear Contradiction than the latter; who are apt to fly out upon any Oppoſition, and to regard one as a mercenary deſigning Fellow, if he argues with any Coolneſs and Impartiality, or makes any Conceſſions to their Adverſaries. This is a Fact, which, I believe, every one may have obſerv'd, who has been much in Companies where political Queſtions have been diſcuſs'd; though, were one to aſk the reaſon of this Difference, every Party would be apt to aſſign a different Reaſon. Gentlemen in the *Oppoſition* will aſcribe it to the very Nature of their Party, which, being founded on public Spirit, and a Zeal for the Conſtitution, cannot eaſily endure ſuch Doctrines, as are of pernicious Conſequence to Liberty. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, will be apt to put us in Mind of the Clown mention'd by Lord *Shaftsbury*. "A

"Clown,

" Clown, ſays that * excellent Author, once took a " Fancy to hear the *Latin* Diſputes of Doctors at an " Univerſity. He was aſk'd what Pleaſure he could " take in viewing ſuch Combatants, when he could " never know ſo much, as which of the Parties had " the better." *For that Matter*, reply'd the Clown, " *I a'n't ſuch a Fool neither, but I can ſee who's the firſt* " *that puts t'other into a Paſſion*, Nature herſelf dic- " tated this Leſſon to the Clown, that he who had the " better of the Argument would be eaſy and well-hu- " mour'd: But he who was unable to ſupport his Cauſe " by Reaſon, would naturally loſe his Temper, and " grow violent."

To which of theſe Reaſons ſhall we adhere? To neither of them, in my Opinion; unleſs we have a Mind to inliſt ourſelves, and become Zealots in either Party. I believe I can aſſign the Reaſon of this different Conduct of the two Parties, without offending either. The Country Party are plainly moſt popular at preſent, and, perhaps, have been ſo in moſt Adminiſtrations: So that, being accuſtomed to prevail in Company, they cannot endure to hear their Opinions controverted, but are as confident on the publick Favour, as if they were ſupported in all their Sentiments by the moſt infallible Demonſtration. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, are commonly ſo run down by your popular Talkers, that if you ſpeak to them with any Moderation, or make them the ſmalleſt Conceſſions, they think themſelves extremely beholden to you, and are apt to return the Favour by a like Mo-

* Miſcellaneous Reflections, p. 107.

deration

deration and Facility on their Part. To be furious and paſſionate, they know, would only gain them the Character of *ſhameleſs Mercenaries*; not that of *zealous Patriots*, which is the Character that ſuch a warm Behaviour is apt to acquire to the other Party.

In all Controverſies, we find, without regarding the Truth or Falſhood on either Side, that thoſe who defend the eſtabliſh'd and popular Opinions, are always the moſt dogmatical and imperious in their Stile: While their Adverſaries affect a moſt extraordinary Gentleneſs and Moderation, in order to ſoften, as much as poſſible, any Prejudices that may lye againſt them. Conſider the Behaviour of our *Free-thinkers* of all Denominations, whether they be ſuch as decry all Revelation, or only oppoſe the exorbitant Power of the Clergy; *Collins*, *Tindal*, *Foſter*, *Hoadley*. Compare their Moderation and Good-manners, with the furious Zeal and Scurrility of their Adverſaries, and you will be convinc'd of the Truth of my Obſervation. A like Difference may be obſerv'd in the Conduct of thoſe *French* Writers, who maintain'd the Controverſy, with regard to ancient and modern Learning. *Boileau*, *Monſieur & Madame Dacier*, *l'Abbe de Bos*, who defended the Party of the Ancients, mix'd their Reaſonings with Satyre and Invective: While *Fontenelle*, *la Motte*, *Charpentier*, and even *Perrault* never tranſgreſs'd the Bounds of Moderation and Good-breeding; tho' provok'd by the moſt ſevere Railleries of their Adverſaries.

I AM led into this Train of Reflection, by conſidering ſome Papers wrote upon that grand Topic of *Court-Influence, and Parliamentary Dependence*, where, in my humble Opinion, the Country Party ſhew too rigid an Inflexibility, and too great a Jealouſy of making Conceſſions to their Adverſaries. Their Reaſonings loſe their Force, by being carried too far; and the Popularity of their Opinions has ſeduc'd them to neglect, in ſome Meaſure, their Juſtneſs and Solidity. The following Reaſoning will, I hope, ſerve to juſtify me in this Opinion.

POLITICAL Writers have eſtabliſh'd it as a Maxim, That in contriving any Syſtem of Government, and fixing the ſeveral Checks and Controuls of the Conſtitution, every Man ought to be ſuppos'd a *Knave*, and to have no other End, in all his Actions, but private Intereſt. By this Intereſt we muſt govern him, and, by Means of it, make him co-operate to public Good, notwithſtanding his inſatiable Avarice and Ambition. Without this, ſay they, we ſhall in vain boaſt of the Advantages of any Conſtitution, and ſhall find, in the End, that we have no Security for our Liberties or Poſſeſſions, except the Good-will of our Rulers; that is, we ſhall have no Security at all.

'TIS therefore a juſt *political* Maxim, *That every Man muſt be ſuppoſed a Knave*: Though, at the ſame Time, I muſt own it appears ſomewhat ſtrange, that a Maxim ſhould be true in *Politics*, which is falſe in *Fact*. But to ſatisfy us on this Head, we may conſider, that

Men are generally more honeſt in their private than in their public Character, and will go greater Lengths to ſerve a Party, than where their own private Intereſt is alone concerned. Honour is a great Check upon Mankind: But where a conſiderable Body of Men act together, this Check is, in a great Meaſure, removed; ſince a Man is ſure to be approved of by his own Party, for what promotes the common Intereſt, and he ſoon learns to deſpiſe the Clamours of his Adverſaries. To which we may add, that every Court or Senate is determined by the Majority; ſo that, if Self-Intereſt influences only the Majority, (as it will always do in the preſent depraved State of Mankind) the whole Senate follows the Allurements of this ſeparate Intereſt, and acts as if it contained not one Member, who had any Regard to public Intereſt and Liberty.

When, therefore, there offers to my Cenſure, and Examination, any Plan of Government, real or imaginary, where the Power is diſtributed among ſeveral Courts, and ſeveral Orders of Men, I always conſider the private Intereſt of each Court, and each Order; and, if I find, that, by the artful Diviſion of the Power, the private Intereſt muſt neceſſarily, in its Operation, concur with the Public, I pronounce that Government to be wiſe and happy. If, on the contrary, the private Intereſt of each Order be not check'd, and be not directed to public Intereſt, I ſhall look for nothing but Faction, Diſorder, and Tyranny from ſuch a Government. In this Opinion I am juſtified by Experience, as well as by the Authority of all Philo-

Philoſophers and Politicians, both ancient and modern.

How much, therefore, would it have ſurpriſed ſuch a Genius as *Cicero*, or *Tacitus*, to have been told, That, in a future Age, there ſhould ariſe a very regular Syſtem of *mixt* Government, where the Power was ſo diſtributed, that one Rank, whenever it pleaſed, might ſwallow up all the reſt, and engroſs the whole Power of the Conſtitution. Such a Government, they would have been apt to ſay, will not be a mix'd Government. For ſo great is the natural Ambition of Men, that they are never ſatisfied with Power; and if one Order of Men, by purſuing its own Intereſt, can uſurp upon every other Order, it will certainly do ſo, and render itſelf, as far as poſſible, abſolute and uncontroulable.

But, in this Opinion, Experience ſhews they would have been miſtaken. For this is actually the Caſe with the *Britiſh* Conſtitution. The Share of Power allotted by our Conſtitution to the Houſe of Commons is ſo great, that it abſolutely commands all the other Parts of our Government. The King's legiſlative Power is plainly no proper Check to it. For tho' the King has a Negative in the paſſing of all Laws; yet this, in Fact, is eſteemed of ſo little Moment, that whatever paſſes the two Houſes, is always ſure to be paſs'd into a Law, and the Royal Aſſent is little better than a mere Form. The principal Weight of the Crown lies in the executive Power. But beſides that the executive Power, in every Government, is altoge-

altogether ſubordinate to the legiſlative; beſides this, I ſay, the Exerciſe of this Power requires an immenſe Expence, and the Commons have aſſumed to themſelves the ſole Power of diſpoſing of public Money. How eaſy, therefore, would it be for that Houſe to wreſt from the Crown all theſe Powers, one after another, by making every Grant of Money conditional, and chooſing their Time ſo well, that their Refuſal of Subſidies ſhould only diſtreſs the Government, without giving foreign Powers any Advantage over us? Did the Houſe of Commons depend in the ſame Manner on the King, and had none of the Members any Property but from his Gift, would not he command all their Reſolutions, and be from that Moment abſolute? As to the Houſe of Lords, they are a very powerful Support to the Crown as long as they are, in their Turn, ſupported by it; but both Experience and Reaſon ſhew us, that they have no Force nor Authority ſufficient to maintain themſelves alone, without any ſuch Support.

How, therefore, ſhall we ſolve this Paradox? And by what Means is this Member of our Conſtitution confin'd within its proper Limits; ſince, from our very Conſtitution, it muſt neceſſarily have as much Power as it demands, and can only be confin'd by itſelf? How is this conſiſtent with our conſtant Experience of human Nature? I anſwer, That the Intereſt of the Body is here reſtrain'd by the Intereſt of the Individuals, and that the Houſe of Commons ſtretches not its Power, becauſe ſuch an Uſurpation would be contrary to the Intereſt of the Majority of its

its Members. The Crown has ſo many Offices at its Diſpoſal, that when aſſiſted by the honeſt and diſintereſted Part of the Houſe, it will always command the Reſolutions of the whole; ſo far at leaſt, as to preſerve the ancient Conſtitution from Danger. We may, therefore, give to this Influence what Name we pleaſe; we may call it by the invidious Appellations of *Corruption* and *Dependence*; but ſome Degree and ſome Kind of it are inſeparable from the very Nature of the Conſtitution, and neceſſary to the Preſervation of our mix'd Government.

INSTEAD then of aſſerting * abſolutely, that the Dependence of Parliament, in every Degree, is an Infringement of *Britiſh* Liberty, the Country-Party would have done better to have made ſome Conceſſions to their Adverſaries, and have only examined what was the proper Degree of this Dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to Liberty. But ſuch a Moderation is not to be expected of Party-Men of any Kind. After a Conceſſion of this Nature, all Declamation muſt be abandoned; and a ſerious calm Enquiry into the proper Degrees of Court-Influence, and Parliamentary Dependence would have been expected by the Readers. And tho' the Advantage, in ſuch a Controverſy, might poſſibly remain to the *Country-Party*; yet the Victory would not have been ſo compleat as they wiſh for, nor would a true Patriot have given an entire Looſe to his Zeal, for fear of running Matters into a contrary Extreme, by di-

* See *Diſſertation on Parties*, throughout.

miniſhing

miniſhing too * far the Influence of the Crown. 'Twas, therefore, thought beſt to deny, that this Extreme could ever be dangerous to the Conſtitution, or that the Crown could ever have too little Influence over Members of Parliament.

All Queſtions concerning the proper Medium betwixt any two Extremes are very difficult to be decided; both becauſe it is difficult to find *Words* proper to fix this Medium, and becauſe the Good and Ill, in ſuch Caſes, run ſo gradually into each other, as even to render our *Sentiments* doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar Difficulty in the preſent Caſe, which would embarraſs the moſt knowing and moſt impartial Examiner. The Power of the Crown is always lodged in a ſingle Perſon, either King or Miniſter; and as this Perſon may have either a greater or leſs Degree of Ambition, Capacity, Courage, Popularity or Fortune, the Power, which is too great in one Hand, may become too little in another. In pure Republics, where the Power is diſtributed among ſeveral Aſſemblies or Senates, the Checks and Controuls are more regular in their Operation; becauſe the Members of ſuch numerous Aſſemblies may be preſumed to be al-

* By that *Influence of the Crown*, which I would juſtify, I mean only, that ariſing from the Offices and Honours which are at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. As to private *Bribery*, it may be conſidered in the ſame Light as the Practice of employing Spies, which is ſcarce juſtifiable in a good Miniſter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a Spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all Miniſtries, and is to be regarded as a ſhameleſs Proſtitution.

ways

ways nearly equal in Capacity and Virtue; and 'tis only their Number, Riches, or Authority, that enter into Conſideration. But a limited Monarchy admits not of any ſuch Stability; nor is it poſſible to aſſign to the Crown ſuch a determinate Degree of Power, as will, in every Hand, form a proper Counter-balance to the other Parts of the Conſtitution. This is an unavoidable Diſadvantage, among the many Advantages, attending that Species of Government.

ESSAY

ESSAY IX.

Whether the BRITISH GOVERNMENT *inclines more to* ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, *or to a* REPUBLIC.

IT affords a violent Prejudice againſt almoſt every Art and Science, that no prudent Man, however ſure of his Principles, dares propheſy concerning any Event, or foretell the remote Conſequences of Things. A Phyſician will not venture to pronounce concerning the Condition of his Patient a Fortnight or Month after: And ſtill leſs dares a Politician foretell the Situation of public Affairs a few Years hence. *Harrington* thought himſelf ſo ſure of his general Principle, *That the Balance of Power depends on that of Property*, that he ventured to pronounce it impoſſible ever to reeſtabliſh Monarchy in *England:* But his Book was ſcarce publiſhed when the King was reſtored; and we ſee that Monarchy has ever ſince ſubſiſted upon the ſame Footing as before. Notwithſtanding of this unlucky Example, I will venture to examine a very important Queſtion, *viz. Whether the* Britiſh *Government inclines more to abſolute Monarchy, or to a Republic; and in which of theſe two Species of Government it will*

will moſt probably terminate? As there ſeems not to be any great Danger of a ſudden Revolution either Way, I ſhall at leaſt eſcape the Shame attending my Temerity, if I ſhould be found to have been miſtaken?

THOSE who aſſert, That the Balance of our Government inclines towards Abſolute Monarchy, may ſupport their Opinion by the following Reaſons. That Property has a great Influence on Power cannot poſſibly be denied; but yet the general Maxim, *That the Balance of the one depends upon the Balance of the other*, muſt be received with ſeveral Limitations. 'Tis evident, that much leſs Property in a ſingle Hand will be able to counter-balance a greater Property in ſeveral Hands; not only becauſe it is difficult to make many Perſons combine in the ſame Views and Meaſures; but alſo becauſe Property, when united, cauſes much greater Dependence, than the ſame Property, when diſperſed. An hundred Perſons, of 1000 *l.* a Year a-piece, can conſume all their Income, and no Body ſhall ever be the better for them, except their Servants and Tradeſmen, who juſtly regard their Profits as the Product of their own Labour. But a Man poſſeſs'd of 100,000 *l.* a Year, if he has either any Generoſity, or any Cunning, may create a great Dependence by Obligations, and ſtill a greater by Expectations. Hence we find, that in all free Governments any Subject exorbitantly rich has always created Jealouſy, even tho' his Riches bore no manner of Proportion to the Riches of the State. *Craſſus*'s Fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about * ſixteen

* As Intereſt in *Rome* was higher than with us, this might yield above 100,000 *l.* a Year.

hundred

hundred thouſand Pound in our Money; and yet we find, that, though his Genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by Means of his Riches alone, to counter-balance, during his Life-time, the Power of *Pompey* as well as of *Cæſar*, who afterwards became Maſter of the World. The Wealth of the *Medicis* made them Maſters of *Florence*; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconſiderable, compared to the united Property of that opulent Republic.

THESE Conſiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent Idea of the *Britiſh* Spirit and Love of Liberty; ſince we could maintain our free Government, during ſo many Centuries, againſt ou Sovereigns, who, beſides the Power and Dignity and Majeſty of the Crown, have always been poſſeſs'd of much more Property, than any Subject has ever enjoy'd in any Commonwealth. But it may be ſaid, that this Spitit, however great, will never be able to ſupport itſelf againſt that immenſe Property, which is now lodg'd in the King, and which is ſtill increaſing. Upon a moderate Computation, there are near three Millions at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. The Civil Liſt amounts to near a Million; the Collection of all Taxes to another Million; and the Employments in the Army and Navy, along with Eccleſiaſtical Preferments, to above a third Million: A monſtrous Sum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth Part of the whole Income and Labour of the Kingdom. When we add to this immenſe Property, the increaſing Luxury of the Nation, our Proneneſs to Corruption, along with the

great Power and Prerogatives of the Crown, and the Command of ſuch numerous military Forces, there is no one but muſt deſpair, without extraordinary Efforts, of being able to ſupport our free Government much longer under all theſe Diſadvantages.

On the other Hand, thoſe who maintain, that the Byaſs of the *Britiſh* Government leans towards a Republic, may ſupport their Opinion by very ſpecious Arguments. It may be ſaid, that though this immenſe Property in the Crown, be join'd to the Dignity of firſt Magiſtrate, and to many other legal Powers and Prerogatives, which ſhould naturally give it a greater Influence; yet it really becomes leſs dangerous to Liberty upon that very Account. Were *Britain* a Republic, and were any private Man poſſeſs'd of a Revenue, a third, or even a tenth Part as large as that of the Crown, he would very juſtly excite Jealouſy; becauſe he would infallibly have great Authority in the Government: And ſuch an irregular Authority, not avowed by the Laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater Authority, which is derived from them. A * Man poſſeſs'd of uſurp'd Authority, can ſet no Bounds to his Pretenſions: His Partizans have Liberty to hope for every thing in his Favours: His Enemies provoke his Ambition, along with his Fears, by the Violence of their Oppoſition: And the Government being thrown into a Ferment,

* *On ne monte jamais ſi haut que quand on ne ſqait pas ou on va,* ſaid *Cromwell* to the Preſident *de Bellievre.*

DE RETZ's Memoirs.

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every corrupted Humour in the State naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal Authority, tho' very great, has always ſome Bounds, which terminate both the Hopes and Pretenſions of the Perſon poſſeſs'd of it: The Laws muſt have provided a Remedy againſt its Exceſſes: Such an eminent Magiſtrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his Uſurpations: And as his legal Authority is quietly ſubmitted to, he has little Temptation and little Opportunity of extending it farther. Beſides, it happens, with regard to ambitious Aims and Projects, what may be obſerved with regard to Sects of Philoſophy and Religion. A new Sect excites ſuch a Ferment, and is both oppoſed and defended with ſuch Vehemence, that it ſpreads always faſter, and multiplies its Partizans with greater Rapidity, than any old eſtabliſhed Opinion, recommended by the Sanction of the Laws and of Antiquity. Such is the Nature of Novelty, that where any thing pleaſes, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but, if it diſpleaſes, it is doubly diſpleaſing, upon that very Account. And, in moſt Caſes, the Violence of Enemies is favourable to ambitious Projects, as well as the Zeal of Partizans.

It may farther be ſaid, that tho' Men be very much govern'd by Intereſt; yet even Intereſt itſelf, and all human Affairs are merely govern'd by *Opinion*. Now, there has been a very ſudden and a very ſenſible Change in the Opinions of Men within theſe laſt fifty Years, by the Progreſs of Learning and of Liberty. Moſt People, in this Iſland, have diveſted themſelves of all ſuper-

ſuperſtitious Reverence to Names and Authority: The Clergy have entirely loſt their Credit: Their Pretenſions and Doctrines have been ridicul'd; and even Religion can ſcarce ſupport itſelf in the World. The mere Name of *King* commands little Reſpect; and to talk of a King as GOD's Vicegerent upon Earth, or to give him any of thoſe magnificent Titles, which formerly dazzled Mankind, would but excite Laughter in every one. Tho' the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, may maintain its Authority in Times of Tranquillity, upon private Intereſt and Influence; yet, as the leaſt Shock or Convulſion muſt break all theſe Intereſts to Pieces, the kingly Power, being no longer ſupported by the ſettled Principles and Opinions of Men, will immediately diſſolve. Had Men been in the ſame Diſpoſition at the *Revolution*, as they are at preſent, Monarchy would have run a great Riſque of being entirely loſt in this Iſland.

DURST I venture to deliver my own Sentiments amidſt theſe oppoſite Arguments, I would aſſert, that unleſs there happen ſome extraordinary Convulſion, the Power of the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, is rather upon the Increaſe; though, at the ſame Time, I own, that its Progreſs ſeems to me very ſlow, and almoſt inſenſible. The Tide has run long, and with ſome Rapidity, to the Side of popular Government, and is juſt beginning to turn towards Monarchy.

'TIS well known, that every Government muſt come to a Period, and that Death is unavoidable to

the political as well as to the animal Body. But, as one Kind of Death may be preferable to another, it may be enquir'd, whether it be more deſirable for the *Britiſh* Conſtitution to terminate in a popular Government, or in abſolute Monarchy? Here I would declare frankly, that tho' Liberty be infinitely preferable to Slavery, in almoſt every Caſe; yet I would much rather wiſh to ſee an abſolute Monarch than a Republic in this Iſland. For, let us conſider, what Kind of Republic we have Reaſon to expect. The Queſtion is not concerning any fine imaginary Republic, which a Man may form a Plan of in his Cloſet. There is no Doubt, but a popular Government may be imagined more perfect than abſolute Monarchy, or even than our preſent Conſtitution. But what Reaſon have we to expect that any ſuch Government will ever be eſtabliſhed in *Britain*, upon the Diſſolution of our Monarchy? If any ſingle Perſon acquire Power enough to take our Conſtitution to Pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an abſolute Monarch; and we have had already an Inſtance of this Kind, ſufficient to convince us, that ſuch a Perſon will never reſign his Power, or eſtabliſh any free Government. Matters, therefore, muſt be truſted to their natural Progreſs and Operation; and the Houſe of Commons, according to its preſent Conſtitution, muſt be the only Legiſlature in ſuch a popular Government. The Inconveniences, attending ſuch a Situation of Affairs, preſent themſelves by Thouſands. If the Houſe of Commons, in ſuch a Caſe, ever diſſolves itſelf, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil War every Election. If it continues itſelf, we ſhall ſuffer all the Tyranny

of

of a Faction, ſub-divided into new Factions. And as ſuch a violent Government cannot long ſubſiſt, we ſhall, at laſt, after infinite Convulſions and Civil Wars, find Repoſe in abſolute Monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have eſtabliſhed peaceably from the Beginning. Abſolute Monarchy, therefore, is the eaſieſt Death, the true *Euthanaſia* of the *Britiſh* Conſtitution.

THUS, if we have Reaſon to be more jealous of Monarchy, becauſe the Danger is more imminent from that Quarter; we have alſo Reaſon to be more jealous of popular Government, becauſe that Danger is more terrible. This may teach us a Leſſon of Moderation in all our political Controverſies.

ESSAY X.

Of PARTIES *in general.*

OF all Men, that diſtinguiſh themſelves by memorable Atchievements, the firſt Place of Honour, in my Opinion, is due to LEGISLATORS, and Founders of States, who tranſmit a Syſtem of Laws and Inſtitutions to ſecure the Peace, Happineſs, and Liberty of future Generations. The Influence of uſeful Inventions in the Arts and Sciences may, perhaps, extend farther than thoſe of wiſe Laws, whoſe Effects are limited both in Time and Place; but the Benefit ariſing from the former is not ſo ſenſible as that which proceeds from the latter. Speculative Sciences do, indeed, improve the Mind; but this Advantage reaches only to a few Perſons, who have Leiſure to apply themſelves to them. And as to practical Arts, which increaſe the Commodities and Enjoyments of Life, 'tis well known, that Mens Happineſs conſiſts not ſo much in an Abundance of theſe, as in the Peace and Security with which they poſſeſs them; and thoſe Bleſſings can only be derived from good Government. Not to mention, that general Virtue and good Morals in a State, which are ſo requiſite to Happineſs, can never ariſe from the moſt

refined

refined Precepts of Philoſophy, or even the ſevereſt Injunctions of Religion; but muſt proceed entirely from the virtuous Education of the Youth, the Effect of wiſe Laws and Inſtitutions. I muſt, therefore, be of a different Opinion from my Lord BACON in this Particular, and muſt regard Antiquity as ſomewhat unjuſt in its Diſtribution of Honour, when it made Gods of all the Inventors of uſeful Arts, ſuch as *Ceres*, *Bacchus*, *Æſculapius*; and dignified Legiſlators; ſuch as *Romulus* and *Theſeus*, only with the Appellation of Demi-Gods, and Heroes.

As much as Legiſlators and Founders of States ought to be honoured and reſpected among Men, as much ought the Founders of Sects and Factions to be deteſted and hated; becauſe the Influence of Factions is directly contrary to that of Laws. Factions ſubvert Government, render Laws impotent, and beget the fierceſt Animoſities among Men of the ſame Nation, who ought to give mutual Aſſiſtance and Protection to each other. And what ſhould render the Founders of Factions more odious is, the Difficulty of extirpating Factions, when once they have taken Riſe in any State. They naturally propagate themſelves for many Centuries, and ſeldom end but by the total Diſſolution of that Government, in which they are planted. They are, beſides, Seeds which grow moſt plentifully in the richeſt Soils; and tho' deſpotic Governments be not entirely free from them, it muſt be confeſs'd, that they riſe more eaſily, and propagate themſelves faſter in free Governments, where they always infect the Legiſlature itſelf, which alone could be able, by the ſteady

Application of Rewards and Puniſhments, to eradicate them.

FACTIONS or Parties may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into Factions founded on perſonal Friendſhip or Animoſity among thoſe who compoſe the Factions, and into thoſe founded on ſome real Difference of Sentiment or Intereſt. The Reaſon of this Diſtinction is obvious, tho' I muſt acknowledge, that Parties are ſeldom found pure and unmixt, either of the one Kind or the other. 'Tis not often ſeen, that a Government divides into Factions, where there is no Difference in the Views of theſe Factions, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in thoſe Factions, which are founded on the moſt real and moſt material Difference, there is always obſerved to be a great deal of perſonal Animoſity or Affection. But notwithſtanding of this Mixture, a Party may be denominated either perſonal or real, according to that Principle which is predominant, and is found to have the greateſt Influence.

PERSONAL Factions ariſe moſt eaſily in ſmall Republics. Every domeſtic Quarrel becomes an Affair of State. Love, Vanity, Emulation, any Paſſion begets public Diviſion, as well as Ambition and Reſentment. The *Neri* and *Bianchi* of *Florence*, the *Fregoſi* and *Adorni* of *Genoa*, the *Colonneſi* and *Orſini* of modern *Rome*, were Parties of this Kind.

MEN have ſuch a Propenſity to divide into perſonal Factions, that the ſmalleſt Appearance of real Dif-

Difference will beget them. What can be imagined more trivial than the Difference betwixt one Colour of Livery and another in Horſe-Races? And yet this Difference begot two moſt inveterate Factions in the *Greek* Empire, the *Praſini* and *Veneti*, who never ſuſpended their Animoſities, till they ruined that unhappy Government.

WE find in the *Roman* Hiſtory a very remarkable Faction betwixt two Tribes, the *Pollia* and *Papiria*, which continued for the Space of near three hundred Years, and diſcovered itſelf in their Suffrages at every Election of Magiſtrates *. This Faction was the more remarkable, that it could continue for ſo long a Tract of Time; even tho' it did not ſpread itſelf, nor draw any of the other Tribes into a Share of the Quarrel. If Mankind had not a ſtrong Propenſity to ſuch Diviſions, the Indifference of the reſt of the Community muſt have ſuppreſs'd this fooliſh Animo-

* As this Fact has not been much obſerved by Antiquaries or Politicians, I ſhall deliver it in the Words of the *Roman* Hiſtorian. *Populus* Tuſculanus *cum conjugibus ac liberis* Romam *venit: Ea multitudo, veſte mutata, & ſpecie reorum tribus circuit, genibus ſe omnium advolvens. Plus itaque miſericordia ad pœnæ veniam impetrandam, quam cauſa ad crimen purgandum valuit. Tribus omnes, præter* Polliam, *antiquarunt legem.* Polliæ *ſententia fuit, puberes verberatos necari, liberos conjugeſque ſub corona lege belli venire: Memoriamque ejus iræ* Tuſculanis *in pœnæ tam atrocis auctores manſiſſe ad patris ætatem conſtat; nec quemquam fere ex* Pollia *tribu candidatum* Papiriam *ferre ſolitam.* T. LIVII, lib. 8. The *Caſtelani* and *Nicolotti* are two mobbiſh Factions in *Venice*, who frequently box together, and then lay aſide their Quarrels preſently.

ſity, which had not any Aliment of new Benefits and Injuries, of Sympathy and Antipathy, which never fail to take Place, when the whole State is rent into two equal Factions.

NOTHING is more uſual than to ſee Parties, which have begun upon a real Difference, continue even after that Difference is loſt. When Men are once inliſted on different Sides, they contract an Affection to the Perſons with whom they are united, and an Animoſity againſt their Antagoniſts: And theſe Paſſions they often tranſmit to their Poſterity. The real Difference betwixt *Guelf* and *Ghibbelline* was long in *Italy*, before theſe Factions were extinguiſhed. The *Guelfs* adher'd to the Pope, the *Ghibbellines* to the Emperor; and yet the Family of *Sforſa*, who were in Alliance with the Emperor, though they were *Guelfs*, being expelled *Milan* by the King * of *France*, aſſiſted by *Jacomo Trivulzio* and the *Ghibbellines*, the Pope concurred with them, and they form'd Leagues with the Pope againſt the Emperor.

THE Civil Wars, which aroſe ſome few Years ago in *Morocco*, betwixt the *Blacks* and *Whites*, merely on account of their Complexion, are founded on a very pleaſant Difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were Things rightly examin'd, we afford much more Occaſion of Ridicule to the *Moors*. For pray, what are all the Wars of Religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing Part of the World?

* LEWIS XIIth.

They

They are, in my Opinion, more abſurd than the *Mooriſh* Civil Wars. The Difference of Complexion is a ſenſible and a real Difference: But the Difference about an Article of Faith, which is utterly abſurd and unintelligible, is not a real Difference of Sentiments, but only a Difference of a few Phraſes and Expreſſions, which one Party accepts of, without underſtanding them; and the other refuſes, in the ſame Manner. Beſides, I do not find, that the *Whites* in *Morocco* ever impos'd on the *Blacks* any Neceſſity of altering their Complexion, or threaten'd them with Inquiſitions and penal Laws in caſe of Obſtinacy: Nor have the *Blacks* been more unreaſonable in this Particular. But is a Man's Opinion, where he is able to form a real Opinion, more at his Diſpoſal than his Complexion? And can one be induc'd by Force or Fear to do more than paint and diſguiſe in the one Caſe as well as in the other?

REAL Factions may be divided into Factions from *Intereſt*, from *Principle*, and from *Affection*. Of all Factions, thoſe from Intereſt are the moſt reaſonable, and the moſt excuſable. Where two Orders of Men, ſuch as the Nobles and People, have a diſtinct Authority in a Government, that is not very accurately balanc'd and model'd, they naturally follow a diſtinct Intereſt; nor can we reaſonably expect a different Conduct from that Degree of Selfiſhneſs, which is implanted in human Nature. It requires very great Skill in a Legiſlator to prevent ſuch Factions; and many Philoſophers are of Opinion, that this Secret, like the *Grand Elixir*, or *Perpetual Motion*, may amuſe Men

in Theory, but can never poſſibly be reduc'd to Practice. In deſpotic Governments, indeed, Factions often do not appear; but they are never the leſs real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very Account. The diſtinct Orders of Men, Nobles and People, Soldiers and Merchants, have all a diſtinct Intereſt; but the more Powerful oppreſſes the Weaker with Impunity, and without Reſiſtance; which begets a ſeeming Tranquillity in ſuch Governments.

THERE has been an Attempt to divide the *landed* and *trading* Intereſt in *England*; but without Succeſs. The Intereſt of theſe two Bodies is not really diſtinct, and never will be ſo, till our public Debts increaſe to ſuch a Degree, as to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable.

PARTIES from *Principles*, eſpecially abſtract ſpeculative Principles, are known only to modern Times, and are, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary and unaccountable *Phænomena*, that have ever yet appear'd in human Affairs. Where different Principles beget a Contrariety of Conduct, as all different political Principles do, the Matter may be more eaſily explain'd. A Man, who eſteems the true Right of Government to lye in one Man, or one Family, cannot eaſily agree with his Fellow-Citizen, who thinks, that another Man or Family is poſſeſs'd of this Right. Each naturally wiſhes that Right may take Place, according to his own Notions of it. But where the Difference of Principles begets no Contrariety of Action, but each may

may follow his own Way, without interfering with his Neighbour, as happens in all religious Controverſies; what Madneſs, what Fury can beget ſuch unhappy and ſuch fatal Diviſions?

TWO Men, travelling on the Highway, the one Eaſt, the other Weſt, can eaſily paſs each other, if the Way be broad enough: But two Men, reaſoning upon oppoſite Principles of Religion, cannot ſo eaſily paſs, without ſhocking; tho' one ſhould think, that the Way were alſo, in that Caſe, ſufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without Interruption, in his own Way. But ſuch is the Nature of the human Mind, that it always takes hold of every Mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully ſtrengthen'd and corroborated by an Unanimity of Sentiments, ſo it is ſhock'd and diſturb'd by any Contrariety. Hence the Eagerneſs, which moſt People diſcover in a Diſpute; and hence their Impatience of Oppoſition, even in the moſt ſpeculative and indifferent Opinions.

THIS Principle, however frivolous it may appear, ſeems to have been the Origin of all religious Wars and Diviſions. But, as this Principle is univerſal in human Nature, its Effects would not have been confin'd to one Age, and to one Sect of Religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental Cauſes, which raiſe it to ſuch a Height, as to produce the higheſt Miſery and Devaſtation. Moſt Religions of the ancient World aroſe in the unknown Ages of Government, when Men were as yet barbarous and uninſtructed, and the Prince, as well as Peaſant, was diſpos'd

pos'd to receive, with implicite Faith, every pious Tale or Fiction that was offer'd him. The Magiſtrate embrac'd the Religion of the People, and entering cordially into the Care of ſacred Matters, naturally acquir'd an Authority in them, and united the Eccleſiaſtical with the Civil Power. But the *Chriſtian* Religion ariſing, while Principles directly oppoſite to it were firmly eſtabliſh'd in the polite Part of the World, who deſpis'd the Nation that firſt broach'd this Novelty; no Wonder, that in ſuch Circumſtances, it was but little countenanc'd by the Civil Magiſtrate, and that the Prieſthood were allow'd to engroſs all the Authority in the new Sect. So bad a Uſe did they make of this Power, even in thoſe early Times, that the Perſecutions of Chriſtianity may, perhaps *, *in Part*, be aſcrib'd to the Violence inſtill'd by them into their Followers. And the ſame Principles of Prieſtly Government continuing, after Chriſtianity became the

* I ſay, *in Part*; For 'tis a vulgar Error to imagine, that the Ancients were as great Friends to Toleration as the *Engliſh* or *Dutch* are at preſent. The Laws againſt external Superſtition were very ancient among the *Romans*; and the *Jews* as well as *Chriſtians* were ſometimes puniſh'd by them: Though, in general, theſe Laws were not rigorouſly executed. Immediately after the Conqueſt of *Gaul*, they forbad all but the Natives to be initiated into the Religion of the *Druids*; and this was a Kind of Perſecution. In about a Century after this Conqueſt, they quite aboliſh'd that Superſtition by penal Laws; which would have been a very grievous Perſecution, if the Imitation of the *Roman* Manners had not, before-hand, wean'd the *Gauls* from their ancient Prejudices. *Suetonius in vita Claudii.* This is an Inſtance of the uſual Caution and Moderation of the *Romans*

the eſtabliſh'd Religion, they have engender'd a Spirit of Perſecution, which has ever ſince been the Poiſon of human Society, and the Source of the moſt inveterate Factions in every Government. Such Factions, therefore, on the Part of the People, may juſtly be eſteem'd Factions of *Principle*, but, on the Part of the Prieſts, who are the prime Movers, they are really Factions of *Intereſt*.

THERE is another Cauſe (beſide the Authority of the Prieſts, and the Separation of the Eccleſiaſtical and Civil Powers) that has contributed to render *Chriſtendom* the Scene of religious Wars and Diviſions. Religions, that ariſe in Ages totally ignorant and barbarous, conſiſt moſtly of traditional Tales and Fictions, which may be very different in every Sect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the Tradition of his own Sect, without much Reaſoning or Diſputation. But as Philoſophy was widely ſpread over the World, at the Time that Chriſtianity aroſe, the Teachers of the new Sect were oblig'd to form a Syſtem of ſpeculative Opinions; to divide, with ſome Accuracy, their Articles of Faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and confirm with all the Subtilty of Argument and Science. From hence naturally aroſe Keen-

mans in ſuch Caſes; and very different from their violent and ſanguinary Method of treating the *Chriſtians*. Hence we may entertain a Suſpicion, that thoſe furious Perſecutions of *Chriſtianity* were, in ſome Meaſure, owing to the imprudent Zeal and Bigotry of the firſt Propagators of that Sect; and Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory affords us many Reaſons to confirm this Suſpicion.

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neſs in Diſpute, when Chriſtianity came to be ſplit into new Diviſions and Hereſies: And this Keenneſs aſſiſted the Prieſts in their pernicious Policy, of begetting a mutual Hatred and Antipathy among their deluded Followers. Sects of Philoſophy, in the ancient World, were more zealous than Parties of Religion; but, in modern Times, Parties of Religion are more furious and enrag'd than the moſt cruel Factions that ever aroſe from Intereſt and Ambition,

I HAVE mention'd Parties from *Affection* as a Kind of *real* Parties, beſide thoſe from *Intereſt* and *Principle*. By Parties from Affection, I underſtand thoſe which are founded on the different Affections of Men towards particular Families and Perſons, whom they deſire to rule over them. Theſe Parties are often very violent; though, I muſt own, it is ſomewhat unaccountable, that Men ſhould attach themſelves ſo ſtrongly to Perſons, whom they are no Way acquainted with, whom perhaps they never ſaw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any Favour. Yet this we find often to be the Caſe, and even with Men, who, on other Occaſions, diſcover no great Generoſity of Spirit, nor are found to be eaſily tranſported by Friendſhip beyond their own Intereſt. We are apt, I know not how, to think the Relation betwixt us and our Sovereign very cloſe and intimate. The Splendor of Majeſty and Power beſtows an Importance on the Fortunes even of a ſingle Perſon. And when a Man's Good-nature does not give him this imaginary Intereſt, his Ill-nature will do it, from Spite and Oppoſition to Perſons whoſe Sentiments are different from his own.

ESSAY XI.

Of the PARTIES *of* GREAT-BRITAIN.

WERE the *Britiſh* Government propoſed as a Subject of Speculation to a ſtudious Man, he would immediately perceive in it a Source of Diviſion and Party, which it would be almoſt impoſſible for it, in any Adminiſtration, to avoid. The juſt Balance betwixt the Republican and Monarchical Part of our Conſtitution is really, in itſelf, ſo extreme delicate and uncertain, that when join'd to Mens Paſſions and Prejudices, 'tis impoſſible but different Opinions muſt ariſe concerning it, even among Perſons of the beſt Underſtanding. Thoſe of mild Tempers, who love Peace and Order, and deteſt Sedition and Civil Wars, will always entertain more favourable Sentiments of Monarchy, than Men of bold and generous Spirits, who are paſſionate Lovers of Liberty, and think no Evil comparable to Subjection and Slavery. And tho' all reaſonable Men agree in general to preſerve our mix'd Government; yet when they come to Particulars, ſome will incline to truſt larger Powers to the Crown, to beſtow on it more Influence, and to guard againſt

againſt its Encroachments with leſs Caution, than others who are terrified at the moſt diſtant Approaches of Tyranny and deſpotic Power. Thus there are Parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very Nature of our Conſtitution, which may properly enough be denominated † COURT and COUNTRY Parties. The Strength and Violence of each of theſe Parties will much depend upon the particular Adminiſtration. An Adminiſtration may be ſo bad, as to throw a great Majority into the Country Party; as a good Adminiſtration will reconcile to the Court many of the moſt paſſionate Lovers of Liberty. But, however the Nation may fluctuate betwixt theſe two Parties, the Parties will always ſubſiſt, as long as we are govern'd by a limited Monarchy.

BUT, beſides this Difference of *Principle*, thoſe Parties are very much fomented by a Difference of INTEREST, without which they could ſcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The Crown will naturally

† Theſe Words have become of general Uſe, and therefore I ſhall employ them, without intending to expreſs by them an univerſal Blame of the one Party, or Approbation of the other. The Court-Party may, no Doubt, on ſome Occaſions, conſult beſt the Intereſt of the Country, and the Country-Party oppoſe it. In like Manner, the *Roman* Parties were denominated *Optimates* and *Populares*; and *Cicero*, like a true Party-Man, defines the *Optimates* to be ſuch as, in all their publick Conduct, regulated themſelves by the Sentiments of the beſt and worthieſt of the *Romans*: *Pro Sextio*. The Term of *Country-Party* may afford a favourable Definition or Etymology of the ſame Kind: But it would be Folly to draw any Argument from that Head, and I have no Regard to it in employing theſe Terms.

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beſtow all its Truſt and Power upon thoſe, whoſe Principles, real or pretended, are moſt favourable to Monarchical Government; and this Temptation will naturally engage them to go greater Lengths than their Principles would otherwiſe carry them. Their Antagoniſts, who are diſappointed in their ambitious Aims, throw themſelves into the Party whoſe Principles incline them to be moſt jealous of Royal Power, and naturally carry thoſe Principles to a greater Length than ſound Politics will juſtify. Thus, the *Court* and *Country* Parties, which are the genuine Factions of the *Britiſh* Government, are a Kind of mixt Parties, and are influenced both by Principle and by Intereſt. The Heads of the Parties are commonly moſt governed by the latter Motive; the inferior Members of them by the former. I muſt be underſtood to mean this of Perſons who have Motives for taking Party on any Side. For, to tell the Truth, the greateſt Part are commonly Men who aſſociate themſelves they know not why; from Example, from Paſſion, from Idleneſs. But ſtill it is requiſite there be ſome Source of Diviſion, either in Principle or Intereſt; otherwiſe ſuch Perſons would not find Parties, to which they could aſſociate themſelves.

As to Eccleſiaſtical Parties; we may obſerve, that, in all Ages of the World, Prieſts have been Enemies to Liberty †, and 'tis certain, that this ſteady Conduct of

† This Propoſition is true, notwithſtanding, that in the early Times of the *Engliſh* Government, the Clergy were the great and principal Oppoſers of the Crown: But, at that Time, their Poſſeſſions

of theirs muſt have been founded on fixt Reaſons of Intereſt and Ambition. Liberty of Thinking, and of expreſſing our Thoughts, is always fatal to Prieſtly Power, and to thoſe pious Frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by an infallible Connexion, which is found among every Species of Liberty, this Privilege can never be enjoy'd, at leaſt, has never yet been enjoy'd, but in a free Government. Hence it muſt happen, that in ſuch a Government as that of *Britain*, that the eſtabliſh'd Clergy, while Things are in their natural Situation, will always be of the *Court*-Party; as, on the contrary, Diſſenters of all Kinds will be of the *Country*-Party; ſince they can never hope for that Toleration they ſtand in need of, but by Means of our free Government. All Princes, that have aimed at deſpotic Power, have known this Important Intereſt of gaining the eſtabliſh'd Clergy: As the Clergy, on their Side, have ſhewn a great Facility of entring into the Views of ſuch Princes. *Guſtavus Vaza* was, perhaps, the only ambitious Monarch, that ever depreſs'd the Church, at the ſame Time, that he diſcouraged Liberty. But the exorbitant Power of the Biſhops in *Sweden*, who, at that Time, overtop'd the Crown, along with their Attachment to a foreign Family, was the Reaſon of his embracing ſuch an unuſual Syſtem of Politics.

THIS Obſervation concerning the Propenſity of Prieſts to deſpotic Power, and to the Government of

Poſſeſſions were ſo immenſely great, that they compoſed a conſiderable Part of the Proprietors of *England*, and in many Conteſts were direct Rivals of the Crown.

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a ſingle Perſon, is not true with regard to one Sect only. The *Presbyterian* and *Calviniſtic* Clergy in *Holland* were always profeſs'd Friends to the Power of the Family of *Orange*; as the *Arminians*, who were eſteem'd Heretics, were always of the *Louveſtein* Faction, and zealous for Liberty. But if a Prince has the Choice of both, 'tis eaſy to ſee, that he will prefer the Epiſcopal to the Preſbyterian Form of Government; both becauſe of the greater Affinity betwixt Monarchy and Epiſcopacy, and becauſe of the Facility which a Prince finds, in ſuch a Government, of ruling the Clergy, by Means of their Eccleſiaſtical Superiors.

IF we conſider the firſt Riſe of Parties in *England*, during the Civil Wars, we ſhall find, that it was exactly conformable to this general Theory, and that the Species of the Government gave Birth to theſe Parties, by a regular and infallible Operation. The *Engliſh* Conſtitution, before that Time, had lain in a Kind of Confuſion; yet ſo, as that the Subjects poſſeſs'd many noble Privileges, which, though not, perhaps, exactly bounded and ſecur'd by Law, were univerſally deem'd, from long Poſſeſſion, to belong to them as their Birth-Right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, Prince aroſe, who eſteem'd all theſe Privileges to be Conceſſions of his Predeceſſors, revocable at Pleaſure; and, in Proſecution of this Principle, he openly acted in Violation of Liberty, during the Courſe of ſeveral Years. Neceſſity, at laſt, conſtrain'd him to call a Parliament: The Spirit of Liberty aroſe and ſpread itſelf: The Prince, being without any

Support, was obliged to grant every thing required of him: And his Enemies, jealous and implacable, ſet no Bounds to their Pretenſions. Here then begun thoſe Conteſts, in which it was no Wonder, that Men of that Age were divided into different Parties; ſince, even at this Day, the Impartial are at a Loſs to decide concerning the Juſtice of the Quarrel. The Pretenſions of the Parliament, if yielded to, broke the Balance of our Conſtitution, by rendering the Government almoſt intirely Republican. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ſtill in Danger of deſpotic Power, from the ſettled Principles and inveterate Habits of the King, which had plainly appear'd in every Conceſſion that he had been conſtrain'd to make to his People. In this Queſtion, ſo delicate and uncertain, Men naturally fell to the Side which was moſt conformable to their uſual Principles; and thoſe, who were the moſt paſſionate Favourers of Monarchy declar'd for the King, as the zealous Friends of Liberty ſided with the Parliament. The Hopes of Succeſs being nearly equal on both Sides, *Intereſt* had little Influence in this Conteſt: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely Parties of Principle; neither of which diſown'd either Monarchy or Liberty; but the former Party inclin'd moſt to the Republican Part of our Government, and the latter to the Monarchical. In which Reſpect they may be conſidered as Court and Country-Party enflam'd into a Civil War, by an unhappy Concurrence of Circumſtances, and by the turbulent Spirit of the Age. The Commonwealth's Men, and the Partizans of deſpotic Power, lay conceal'd in both Parties, and form'd but an inconſiderable Part of them.

THE Clergy had concurr'd, in a ſhameleſs Manner, with the King's arbitrary Deſigns, according to their uſual Maxims in ſuch Caſes: And, in Return, were allow'd to perſecute their Adverſaries, whom they call'd Heretics and Schiſmatics. The eſtabliſh'd Clergy were Epiſcopal; the Non-conformiſts Presbyterian: So that all Things concurr'd to throw the former, without Reſerve, into the King's Party; and the latter into that of the Parliament. The *Cavaliers* being the Court-Party, and the *Round-heads* the Country-Party, the Union was infallible betwixt the former and the eſtabliſh'd Prelacy, and betwixt the latter and Presbyterian Non-conformiſts. This Union is ſo natural, according to the general Principles of Politics, that it requires ſome very extraordinary Situation of Affairs to break it.

EVERY one knows the Event of this Quarrel; fatal to the King firſt, and to the Parliament afterwards. After many Confuſions and Revolutions, the Royal Family was at laſt reſtor'd, and the Government eſtabliſh'd on the ſame Footing as before. *Charles* II. was not made wiſer by the dreadful Example of his Father; but proſecuted the ſame Meaſures, tho' at firſt, with more Secrecy and Caution. New Parties aroſe, under the Appellations of WHIG and TORY, which have continued ever ſince to confound and diſtract our Government. What the Nature is of theſe Parties, is, perhaps, one of the moſt difficult Queſtions that can be met with, and is a Proof, that Hiſtory may contain Problems, as uncertain as any that are to be found in the moſt abſtract Sciences.

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We have ſeen the Conduct of theſe two Parties, during the Courſe of Seventy Years, in a vaſt Variety of Circumſtances, poſſeſs'd of Power, and depriv'd of it, during Peace and during War: We meet with Perſons, who profeſs themſelves of one Side or t'other, every Hour, in Company, in our Pleaſures, in our ſerious Occupations: We ourſelves are conſtrain'd, in a Manner, to take Party; and living in a Country of the higheſt Liberty, every one may openly declare all his Sentiments and Opinions: And yet we are at a Loſs to tell the Nature, Pretenſions, and Principles of the two Parties. The Queſtion is, perhaps, in itſelf, ſomewhat difficult; but has been render'd more ſo, by the Prejudices and Violence of Party.

WHEN we compare the Parties of *Whig* and *Tory*, to thoſe of *Round-head* and *Cavalier*, the moſt obvious Difference, that appears betwixt them, conſiſts in the Doctrines of *paſſive Obedience*, and *indefeaſible Right*, which were but little heard of among the *Cavaliers*, but became the univerſal Doctrine, and were eſteem'd the true Characteriſtic of a *Tory*. Were theſe Principles puſh'd into their moſt obvious Conſequences, they imply a formal Renunciation of all our Liberties, and an Avowal of abſolute Monarchy; ſince nothing can be a greater Abſurdity than a limited Power, which muſt not be reſiſted, even when it exceeds its Limitations. But as the moſt rational Principles are often but a weak Counterpoiſe to Paſſion; 'tis no Wonder, that theſe abſurd Principles, *ſufficient*, according to a juſtly celebrated † Author, *to ſhock the common Senſe of*

† Diſſertation on Parties, *Letter* 2d.

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a HOTTENTOT or SAMOIEDE, were found too weak for that Effect. The *Tories*, as Men, were Enemies to Oppreſſion; and alſo, as *Engliſhmen*, they were Enemies to deſpotic Power. Their Zeal for Liberty, was, perhaps, leſs fervent than that of their Antagoniſts; but was ſufficient to make them forget all their general Principles, when they ſaw themſelves openly threatned with a Subverſion of the ancient Government. From theſe Sentiments aroſe the *Revolution*; an Event of mighty Conſequence, and the firmeſt Foundation of *Britiſh* Liberty. The Conduct of the *Tories*, during that Event, and after it, will afford us a true Inſight into the Nature of that Party.

IN the *firſt* Place, They appear to have had the Sentiments of true *Britons* in their Affection to Liberty, and in their determin'd Reſolution not to ſacrifice it to any abſtract Principles whatſoever, or to any imaginary Rights of Princes. This Part of their Character might juſtly have been doubted of before the *Revolution*, from the obvious Tendency of their avow'd Principles, and from their almoſt unbounded Compliances with a Court, that made little Secret of its arbitrary Deſigns. The *Revolution* ſhew'd them to have been, in this Reſpect, nothing but a genuine *Court-Party*, ſuch as might be expected in a *Britiſh* Government: That is, *Lovers of Liberty, but greater Lovers of Monarchy*. It muſt, however, be confeſt, that they carry'd their monarchical Principles further, even in Practice, but more ſo in Theory, than was, in any Degree, conſiſtent with a limited Government.

Secondly, NEITHER their Principles nor Affections concurr'd, entirely or heartily, with the Settlement made at the *Revolution*, or with that which has ſince taken Place. This Part of their Character may ſeem contradictory to the former; ſince any other Settlement, in thoſe Circumſtances of the Nation, muſt probably have been dangerous, if not fatal to Liberty. But the Heart of Man is made to reconcile Contradictions; and this Contradiction is not greater than that betwixt *Paſſive Obedience*, and the *Reſiſtance* employ'd at the *Revolution*. A *Tory*, therefore, ſince the *Revolution*, may be defin'd in a few Words to be *a Lover of Monarchy, tho' without abandoning Liberty; and a Partizan of the Family of* STUART. As a *Whig* may be defin'd to be *a Lover of Liberty, tho' without renouncing Monarchy; and a Friend to the Settlement in the* Proteſtant *Line* *.

THESE

* The celebrated Writer above-cited has aſſerted, that the REAL Diſtinction betwixt *Whig* and *Tory* was loſt at the *Revolution*, and that ever ſince they have continued to be mere *perſonal* Parties, like the *Guelfs* and *Ghibbellines*, after the Emperors had loſt all Authority in *Italy*. Such an Opinion, were it received, would turn our whole Hiſtory into an Ænigma.

I ſhall firſt mention, as a Proof of a real Diſtinction betwixt theſe Parties, what every one may have obſerv'd or heard concerning the Conduct and Converſation of all his Friends and Acquaintance on both Sides. Have not the *Tories* always bore an avowed Affection to the Family of *Stuart*, and have not their Adverſaries always oppoſed with Vigour the Succeſſion of that Family?

The *Tory* Principles are confeſſedly the moſt favourable to Monarchy. Yet the *Tories* have almoſt always oppoſed the Court

THESE different Views, with regard to the Settlement of the Crown, are accidental, but natural Additions to the Principles of the *Court* and *Country* Parties, which are the genuine Parties of the *Britiſh*

Court theſe fifty Years; nor were they cordial Friends to King *William*, even when employ'd by him. Their Quarrel, therefore, cannot be ſuppoſed to have lain with the Throne, but with the Perſon who ſat on it.

They concurr'd heartily with the Court during the four laſt Years of Queen *Anne*. But is any one at a Loſs to find the Reaſon?

The Succeſſion of the Crown in the *Britiſh* Government is a Point of too great Conſequence to be abſolutely indifferent to Perſons, who concern themſelves, in any Degree, about the Fortune of the Public; much leſs can it be ſuppos'd, that the *Tory* Party, who never valu'd themſelves upon Moderation, could maintain a *Stoical* Indifference in a Point of ſo great Importance. Were they, therefore, zealous for the Houſe of *Hanover?* Or was there any thing, that kept an oppoſite Zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly appear, but Prudence, and a Senſe of Decency?

'Tis monſtrous to ſee an eſtabliſh'd Epiſcopal Clergy in declar'd Oppoſition to the Court, and a Non-conformiſt Preſbyterian Clergy in Conjunction with it. What can produce ſuch an unnatural Conduct in both? Nothing, but that the former have eſpouſed Monarchical Principles too high for the preſent Settlement, which is founded on Principles of Liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the Prevalence of thoſe high Principles, adhere to that Party, from whom they have Reaſon to expect Liberty and Toleration.

The different Conduct of the two Parties, with regard to foreign Politics, is alſo a Proof to the ſame Purpoſe. *Holland* has always been moſt favour'd by one, and *France* by the other. In ſhort, the Proofs of this Kind ſeem ſo palpable and evident, that 'tis almoſt needleſs to collect them.

Government. A paſſionate Lover of Monarchy is apt to be diſpleaſed at any Change of the Succeſſion; as favouring too much of a Commonwealth: A paſſionate Lover of Liberty is apt to think that every Part of the Government ought to be ſubordinate to the Intereſts of Liberty. 'Tis however remarkable, that though the Principles of *Whig* and *Tory* be both of them of a Compound Nature; yet the Ingredients, which predominated in both, were not correſpondent to each other. A *Tory* loved Monarchy, and bore an Affection to the Family of *Stuart*; but the latter Affection was the predominant Inclination of the Party. A *Whig* loved Liberty, and was a Friend to the Settlement in the *Proteſtant* Line; but the Love of Liberty was profeſſedly his predominant Inclination. The *Tories* have frequently acted as Republicans, where either Policy or Revenge has engag'd them to that Conduct; and there were none of that Party, who, upon the Suppoſition, that they were to be diſappointed in their Views with regard to the Succeſſion, would not have deſired to impoſe the ſtricteſt Limitations on the Crown, and to bring our Form of Government as near Republican as poſſible, in order to depreſs the Family, that, according to their Apprehenſion, ſucceeded without any juſt Title. The *Whigs*, 'tis true, have alſo taken Steps dangerous to Liberty, under Colour of ſecuring the Succeſſion and Settlement of the Crown, according to their Views: But as the Body of the Party had no Paſſion for that Succeſſion, otherwiſe than as the Means of ſecuring Liberty, they have been betray'd into theſe Steps by Ignorance or Frailty, or the Intereſt of their Leaders.

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The Succeſſion of the Crown was, therefore, the chief Point with the *Tories*: The Security of our Liberties with the *Whigs*. Nor is this ſeeming Irregularity at all difficult to be accounted for, by our preſent Theory. *Court* and *Country* Parties are the true Parents of *Tory* and *Whig*. But 'tis almoſt impoſſible, that the Attachment of the *Court* Party to Monarchy ſhould not degenerate into an Attachment to the Monarch; there being ſo cloſe a Connexion betwixt them, and the latter being ſo much the more natural Object. How eaſily does the Worſhip of the Divinity degenerate into a Worſhip of the Idol? The Connexion is not ſo great betwixt Liberty, the Divinity of the old *Country* Party or *Whigs*, and any Monarch or Royal Family; nor is it ſo reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that, in that Party, the Worſhip can ſo eaſily be transferr'd from the one to the other. Tho' even that would be no great Miracle.

'Tis difficult to penetrate into the Thoughts and Sentiments of any particular Man; but 'tis almoſt impoſſible to diſtinguiſh thoſe of a whole Party, where it often happens, that no two Perſons agree preciſely in the ſame Way of thinking. Yet I will venture to affirm, that it was not ſo much PRINCIPLE, or an Opinion of indefeazible Right, that attach'd the *Tories* to the ancient Royal Family, as AFFECTION, or a certain Love and Eſteem for their Perſons. The ſame Cauſe divided *England* formerly betwixt the Houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, and *Scotland*, betwixt the Families of *Bruce* and *Baliol*; in an Age, when political Diſputes were but little in Faſhion, and when

political *Principles* muſt of Courſe have had but little Influence on Mankind. The Doctrine of paſſive Obedience is ſo abſurd in itſelf, and ſo oppoſite to our Liberties, that it ſeems to have been chiefly left to Pulpit-Declaimers, and to their deluded Followers among the Mob. Men of better Senſe were guided by *Affection*; and as to the Leaders of this Party, 'tis probable, that *Intereſt* was their chief Motive, and that they acted more contrary to their private Sentiments, than the Leaders of the oppoſite Party. Tho' 'tis almoſt impoſſible to maintain with Zeal the Right of any Perſon or Family, without acquiring a Good-will to them, and changing the *Principle* into *Affection*; yet this is leſs natural to People of an elevated Station and liberal Education, who have had ample Opportunity of obſerving the Weakneſs, Folly, and Arrogance of Monarchs, and have found them to be nothing ſuperior, if not rather inferior, to the reſt of Mankind. The *Intereſt*, therefore, of being Heads of a Party does often, with ſuch People, ſupply the Place both of *Principle* and *Affection*.

SOME, who will not venture to aſſert, that the *real* Difference betwixt *Whig* and *Tory* was loſt at the *Revolution*, ſeem inclin'd to think, that the Difference is now aboliſh'd, and that Affairs are ſo far returned to their natural State, that there are at preſent no other Parties amongſt us but *Court* and *Country*; that is, Men, who by Intereſt or Principle are attach'd either to Monarchy or to Liberty. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that the *Tory* Party ſeem, of late, to have decay'd much in their Numbers; ſtill more in their Zeal; and

and I may venture to ſay, ſtill more in their Credit and Authority. There are few Men of Knowledge or Learning, at leaſt, few Philoſophers, ſince Mr. *Locke* has wrote, who would not be aſham'd to be thought of that Party; and in almoſt all Companies the Name of OLD WHIG is mention'd as an unconteſtable Appellation of Honour and Dignity. Accordingly, the Enemies of the Miniſtry, as a Reproach, call the Courtiers, the true *Tories*; and as an Honour, denominate the Gentlemen in the *Oppoſition* the true *Whigs*. The *Tories* have been ſo long oblig'd to talk in the Republican Stile, that they ſeem to have made Converts of themſelves by their Hypocriſy, and to have embrac'd the Sentiments, as well as Language of their Adverſaries. There are, however, very conſiderable Remains of that Party in *England*, with all their old Prejudices; and a Proof, that *Court* and *Country* are not our only Parties, is, that almoſt all the Diſſenters ſide with the Court, and the lower Clergy, at leaſt, of the Church of *England*, with the Oppoſition. This may convince us, that ſome Byaſs ſtill hangs upon our Conſtitution, ſome extrinſic Weight, which turns it from its natural Courſe, and cauſes a Confuſion in our Parties.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, that we never had any *Tories* in *Scotland*, according to the proper Signification of the Word, and that the Diviſion of Parties in this Country was really into *Whigs* and *Jacobites*. A *Jacobite* ſeems to be a *Tory*, who has no Regard to the Conſtitution, but is either a zealous Partizan of abſolute Monarchy, or at leaſt

willing to ſacrifice our Liberties to the obtaining the Succeſſion in that Family to which he is attach'd. The Reaſon of the Difference betwixt *England* and *Scotland*, I take to be this: Our political and our religious Diviſions in this Country, have been, ſince the *Revolution*, regularly correſpondent to each other. The *Preſbyterians* were all *Whigs* without Exception: Thoſe who favour'd *Epiſcopacy*, of the oppoſite Party. And as the Clergy of the latter Sect were turn'd out of their Churches at the *Revolution*, they had no Motive for making any Compliances with the Government in their Oaths or Forms of Prayers, but openly avowed the higheſt Principles of their Party; which is the Cauſe, why their Followers have been more bare-fac'd and violent than their Brethren of the *Tory* Party in *England*.

ESSAY XII.

Of SUPERSTITION *and* ENTHUSIASM.

THAT the Corruption of the beſt Things produces the worſt, is grown into a Maxim, and is commonly prov'd, among other Inſtances, by the pernicious Effects of *Superſtition* and *Enthuſiaſm*, the Corruptions of true Religion.

THESE two Species of falſe Religion, tho' both pernicious, are yet of a very different, and even of a contrary Nature. The Mind of Man is ſubject to certain unaccountable Terrors and Apprehenſions, proceeding either from the unhappy Situation of private or public Affairs, from ill Health, from a gloomy and melancholy Diſpoſition, or from the Concurrence of all theſe Circumſtances. In ſuch a State of Mind, infinite unknown Evils are dreaded from unknown Agents; and where real Objects of Terror are wanting, the Soul, active to its own Prejudice, and foſtering its predominant Inclination, finds imaginary Ones, to whoſe Power and Malevolence it ſets no Limits. As theſe Enemies are entirely inviſible an unknown, the Methods taken to appeaſe them are equally

unaccountable, and conſiſt in Ceremonies, Obſervances, Mortifications, Sacrifices, Preſents, or in any Practice, however abſurd and frivolous, which either Folly or Knavery recommends to a blind and terrify'd Credulity. Weakneſs, Fear, Melancholy, along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of SUPERSTITION.

BUT the Mind of Man is alſo ſubject to an unaccountable Elevation and Preſumption, proceeding from proſperous Succeſs, from luxuriant Health, from ſtrong Spirits, or from a bold and confident Diſpoſition. In ſuch a State of Mind, the Imagination ſwells with great, but confus'd Conceptions, to which no ſublunary Beauties or Enjoyments can correſpond. Every thing mortal and periſhable vaniſhes as unworthy of Attention. And a full Range is given to the Fancy in the inviſible Regions or World of Spirits, where the Soul is at Liberty to indulge itſelf in every Imagination, that may beſt ſuit its preſent Taſte and Diſpoſition. Hence ariſe Raptures, Tranſports, and ſurprizing Flights of Fancy; and Confidence and Preſumption ſtill increaſing, theſe Raptures, being altogether unaccountable, and ſeeming quite beyond the Reach of our ordinary Faculties, are attributed to the immediate Inſpiration of that Divine Being who is the Object of Devotion. In a little Time, the inſpir'd Perſon comes to regard himſelf as the chief Favourite of the Divinity; and when this Frenzy once takes Place, which is the Summit of Enthuſiaſm, every Whimſy is conſecrated: Human Reaſon, and even Morality are rejected as fallacious Guides: And the

the Fanatick Madman delivers himſelf over, blindly, and without Reſerve, to the ſuppoſed Illapſes of the Spirit, and to Inſpirations from above. Hope, Pride, Preſumption, a warm Imagination, along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of ENTHUSIASM.

THESE two Species of falſe Religion might afford Occaſion to many Speculations; but I ſhall confine myſelf, at preſent, to a few Reflections concerning their different Influence on Government and Society.

MY firſt Reflection is, *That Superſtition is favourable to prieſtly Power, and Enthuſiaſm as much or rather more contrary to it, than ſound Reaſon and Philoſophy.* As Superſtition is founded on Fear, Sorrow, and a Depreſſion of Spirits, it repreſents the Perſon to himſelf in ſuch deſpicable Colours, that he appears unworthy, in his own Eyes, of approaching the Divine Preſence, and naturally has Recourſe to any other Perſon, whoſe Sanctity of Life, or, perhaps, Impudence and Cunning, have made him be ſuppoſed to be more favoured by the Divinity. To him the Superſtitious entruſt their Devotions: To his Care they recommend their Prayers, Petitions, and Sacrifices: And, by his Means, hope to render their Addreſſes acceptable to their incenſed Deity. Hence the Origin of * PRIESTS, who may juſtly be regarded as one of the

* By *Prieſts*, I here mean only the Pretenders to Power and Dominion, and to a ſuperior Sanctity of Character, diſtinct

the groſſeſt Inventions of a timorous and abject Superſtition, which, ever diffident of itſelf, dares not offer up its own Devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itſelf to the Divinity, by the Mediation of his ſuppoſed Friends and Servants. As Superſtition is a conſiderable Ingredient in almoſt all Religions, even the moſt fanatical; there being nothing but Philoſophy able to conquer entirely theſe unaccountable Terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almoſt every Sect of Religion there are Prieſts to be found: But the ſtronger Mixture there is of Superſtition, the higher is the Authority of the Prieſthood. Modern Judaiſm and Popery, eſpecially the latter, being the moſt barbarous and abſurd Superſtitions that have yet been known in the World, are the moſt enſlav'd by their Prieſts. As the Church of *England* may juſtly be ſaid to retain a ſtrong Mixture of Popiſh Superſtition, it partakes alſo, in its original Conſtitution, of a Propenſity to Prieſtly Power and Dominion; particularly in the Reſpect it exacts to the Prieſt. And though, according to the Sentiments of that Church, the Prayers of the Prieſt muſt be accompanied with thoſe of the Laity; yet is he the Mouth of the Congregation, his Perſon is ſacred, and without his Preſence few would think their public Devotions, or the Sacraments, and other Rites, acceptable to the Divinity.

from Virtue and good Morals. Theſe are very different from *Clergymen*, who are ſet apart, *by the Laws*, to the Care of ſacred Matters, and to the conducting our publick Devotions with greater Decency and Order. There is no Rank of Men more to be reſpected than the latter.

ON the other Hand, it may be obſerved, that all Enthuſiaſts have been free from the Yoke of Eccleſiaſtics, and have expreſt a great Independence in their Devotion; with a Contempt of Forms, Traditions, and Authorities. The *Quakers* are the moſt egregious, though, at the ſame Time, the moſt innocent, Enthuſiaſts that have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only Sect, that have never admitted Prieſts amongſt them. The *Independents*, of all the *Engliſh* Sectaries, approach neareſt to the *Quakers* in Fanaticiſm, and in their Freedom from Prieſtly Bondage. The *Presbyterians* follow after, at an equal Diſtance in both theſe Particulars. In ſhort, this Obſervation is founded on the moſt certain Experience; and will alſo appear to be founded on Reaſon, if we conſider, that as Enthuſiaſm ariſes from a preſumptuous Pride and Confidence, it thinks itſelf ſufficiently qualified to *approach* the Divinity, without any human Mediator. Its rapturous Devotions are ſo fervent, that it even imagines itſelf *actually* to *approach* him by the Way of Contemplation and inward Converſe; which makes it neglect all thoſe outward Ceremonies and Obſervances, to which the Aſſiſtance of the Prieſts appears ſo requiſite in the Eyes of their ſuperſtitious Votaries. The Fanatic conſecrates himſelf, and beſtows on his own Perſon a ſacred Character, much ſuperior to what Forms and ceremonious Inſtitutions can confer on any other.

MY *ſecond* Reflection with regard to theſe Species of falſe Religion is, that Religions, which partake of Enthu-

Enthuſiaſm are, on their firſt Riſe, much more furious and violent than thoſe which partake of Superſtition; but in a little Time become much more gentle and moderate. The violence of this Species of Religion, when excited by Novelty, and animated by Oppoſition, appears from numberleſs Inſtances; of the *Anabaptiſts* in *Germany*, the *Camiſars* in *France*, the *Levellers* and other Fanaticks in *England*, and the *Covenanters* in *Scotland*. As Enthuſiaſm is founded on ſtrong Spirits, and a preſumptuous Boldneſs of Character, it naturally begets the moſt extreme Reſolutions; eſpecially after it riſes to that Height as to inſpire the deluded Fanaticks with the Opinion of Divine Illuminations, and with a Contempt of the common Rules of Reaſon, Morality and Prudence.

'Tis thus Enthuſiaſm produces the moſt cruel Deſolations in human Society: But its Fury is like that of Thunder and Tempeſt, which exhauſt themſelves in a little Time, and leave the Air more calm and ſerene than before. When the firſt Fire of Enthuſiaſm is ſpent, Men naturally, in ſuch fanatical Sects, ſink into the greateſt Remiſsneſs and Coolneſs in Sacred Matters; there being no Body of Men amongſt them, endow'd with ſufficient Authority, whoſe Intereſt is concerned to ſupport the religious Spirit. Superſtition, on the contrary, ſteals in gradually and inſenſibly; renders Men tame and ſubmiſſive; is acceptable to the Magiſtrate, and ſeems inoffenſive to the People: Till at laſt the Prieſt, having firmly eſtabliſh'd his Authority, becomes the Tyrant and Diſturber

ſturber of human Society, by his endleſs Contentions, Perſecutions, and religious Wars. How ſmoothly did the *Romiſh* Church advance in their Acquiſition of Power? But into what diſmal Convulſions did they throw all *Europe*, in order to maintain it? On the other Hand, our Sectaries, who were formerly ſuch dangerous Bigots, are now become our greateſt Free-thinkers; and the *Quakers* are, perhaps, the only regular Body of *Deiſts* in the Univerſe, except the *Literati*, or Diſciples of *Confucius* in *China*.

MY *third* Obſervation on this Head is, that Superſtition is an Enemy to Civil Liberty, and Enthuſiaſm a Friend to it. As Superſtition groans under the Dominion of the Prieſts, and Enthuſiaſm is deſtructive of all Eccleſiaſtical Power, this ſufficiently accounts for the preſent Obſervation. Not to mention, that Enthuſiaſm, being the Infirmity of bold and ambitious Tempers, is naturally accompanied with a Spirit of Liberty; as Superſtition, on the contrary, renders Men tame and abject, and fits them for Slavery. We learn from the *Engliſh* Hiſtory, that, during the Civil Wars, the *Independents* and *Deiſts*, tho' the moſt oppoſite in their religious Principles; yet were united in their political Ones, and were alike paſſionate for a Commonwealth. And ſince the Origin of *Whig* and *Tory*, the Leaders of the *Whigs* have either been *Deiſts* or profeſt *Latitudinarians* in their Principles; that is, Friends to Toleration, and indifferent to any particular Sect of *Chriſtians*: While the Sectaries, who have all a ſtrong Tincture of Enthuſiaſm, have always, without Exception, concurr'd with that Party,

in

in the Defence of Civil Liberty. The Reſemblance in their Superſtitions long united the High-Church *Tories* and the *Roman Catholicks*, in the Support of Prerogative and Kingly Power; tho' Experience of the tolerating Spirit of the *Whigs* ſeems of late to have reconcil'd the *Catholics* to that Party.

THE *Moliniſts* and *Janſeniſts* in *France* have a thouſand unintelligible Diſputes, which are not worthy the Attention of a Man of Senſe: But what principally diſtinguiſhes theſe two Sects, and alone merits our Attention, is the different Spirit of their Religion. The *Moliniſts*, conducted by the *Jeſuites*, are great Friends to Superſtition, rigid Obſervers of external Forms and Ceremonies, and devoted to the Authority of the Prieſts, and to Tradition. The *Janſeniſts* are Enthuſiaſts, and zealous Promoters of the paſſionate Devotion, and of the inward Life; little influenc'd by Authority; and, in a Word, but Half Catholics. The Conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing Reaſoning. The *Jeſuites* are the Tyrants and the Slaves of the Court: And the *Janſeniſts* preſerve alive the ſmall Sparks of the Love of Liberty, which are to be found in the *French* Nation.

ESSAY XIII.

Of AVARICE.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that Comic Writers exaggerate every Character, and draw their Fop, or Coward with ſtronger Features than are any where to be met with in Nature. This moral Kind of Painting for the Stage has been often compar'd to the Painting for Cupolas and Ceilings, where the Colours are overcharg'd, and every Part is drawn exceſſively large, and beyond Nature. The Figures ſeem monſtrous and diſproportion'd, when ſeen too nigh; but become natural and regular, when ſet at a Diſtance, and placed in that Point of View, in which they are intended to be ſurvey'd. After the ſame Manner, when Characters are exhibited in theatrical Repreſentations, the Want of Reality ſets the Perſonages at a Diſtance from us; and rendering them more cold and unentertaining, makes it neceſſary to compenſate, by the Force of Colouring, what they want in Subſtance. Thus, we find in common Life, that when a Man once allows himſelf to depart from Truth in his Narrations, he never can keep within the Bounds of Probability; but adds ſtill ſome new Circumſtance to render his Stories more marvellous, and to ſatisfy his Imagination. Two

Men

Men in Buckram Suits became eleven to Sir *John Falſtaff* before the End of his Story.

THERE is only one Vice, which may be found in Life with as ſtrong Features, and as high a Colouring, as need be employ'd by any Satyriſt or Comic Poet; and that is AVARICE. Every Day we meet with Men of immenſe Fortunes, without Heirs, and on the very Brink of the Grave, who refuſe themſelves the moſt common Neceſſaries of Life, and go on heaping Poſſeſſions on Poſſeſſions, under all the real Preſſures of the ſevereſt Poverty. An old Uſurer, ſays the Story, lying in his laſt Agonies, was preſented by the Prieſt with the Crucifix to worſhip. He opens his Eyes a Moment before he expires, conſiders the Crucifix, and cries, *Theſe Jewels are not true; I can only lend ten Piſtoles upon ſuch a Pledge.* This was probably the Invention of ſome Epigrammatiſt; and yet every one, from his own Experience, may be able to recollect almoſt as ſtrong Inſtances of Perſeverance in Avarice. 'Tis commonly reported of a famous Miſer in this City, that finding himſelf near Death, he ſent for ſome of the Magiſtrates, and gave them a Bill of an hundred Pounds, payable after his Deceaſe; which Sum he intended ſhould be diſpoſed of in charitable Uſes; but ſcarce were they gone, when he orders them to be called back, and offers them ready Money, if they would abate five Pounds of the Sum. Another noted Miſer in the North, intending to defraud his Heirs, and leave his Fortune to the building an Hoſpital, protracted the drawing of his Will from Day to Day; and 'tis thought, that if thoſe intereſted in it had

had not paid for the Drawing of it, he had died inteſtate. In ſhort, none of the moſt furious Exceſſes of Love and Ambition are in any Reſpect to be compared to the Extremes of Avarice.

THE beſt Excuſe that can be made for Avarice is, that it generally prevails in old Men, or in Men of cold Tempers, where all the other Affections are extinct; and the Mind being incapable of remaining without ſome Paſſion or Purſuit, at laſt finds out this monſtrous unreaſonable one, which ſuits the Coldneſs and Inactivity of its Temper. At the ſame Time, it ſeems very extraordinary, that ſo froſty, ſpiritleſs a Paſſion ſhould be able to carry us farther than all the Warmth of Youth and Pleaſure. But if we look more narrowly into the Matter, we ſhall find, that this very Circumſtance renders the Explication of the Caſe more eaſy. When the Temper is warm, and full of Vigour, it naturally ſhoots out more Ways than one, and produces inferior Paſſions to counter-balance, in ſome Degree, its predominant Inclination. 'Tis impoſſible for a Perſon of that Temper, however bent on any Purſuit, to be depriv'd of all Senſe of Shame, or Regard to the Sentiments of Mankind. His Friends muſt have ſome Influence over him: And other Conſiderations are apt to have their Weight. All this ſerves to reſtrain him within ſome Bounds. But 'tis no Wonder the avaritious Man, being, from the Coldneſs of his Temper, without regard to Reputation, to Friendſhip, or to Pleaſure, ſhould be carried ſo far by his prevailing Inclination, and ſhould diſplay his Paſſion in ſuch ſurprizing Inſtances.

ACCORD-

ACCORDINGLY we find no Vice ſo irreclaimable as Avarice: And tho' there ſcarcely has been a Moraliſt or Philoſopher, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, who has not levell'd a Stroke at it, we hardly find a ſingle Inſtance of any Perſon's being cur'd of it. For this Reaſon, I am more apt to approve of thoſe, who attack it with Wit and Humour, than of thoſe who treat it in a ſerious Manner. There being ſo little Hopes of doing Good to the People infected with this Vice, I would have the reſt of Mankind, at leaſt, diverted by our Manner of expoſing it: As indeed there is no Kind of Diverſion, of which they ſeem ſo willing to partake.

AMONG the Fables of *Monſieur de la Motte*, there is one levell'd againſt Avarice, which ſeems to me more natural and eaſy, than moſt of the Fables of that ingenious Author. A Miſer, ſays he, being dead, and fairly interred, came to the Banks of the *Styx*, deſiring to be ferry'd over along with the other Ghoſts. *Charon* demands his Fare, and is ſurpriz'd to ſee the Miſer, rather than pay it, throw himſelf into the River, and ſwim over to the other Side, notwithſtanding all the Clamour and Oppoſition that could be made to him. All Hell was in an Uproar; and each of the Judges was meditating ſome Puniſhment, ſuitable to a Crime of ſuch dangerous Conſequence to the infernal Revenues. Shall he be chain'd to the Rock along with *Prometheus*? Or tremble below the Precipice in Company with the *Danaides*? Or aſſiſt *Siſyphus* in rolling his Stone? No, ſays *Minos*, none of theſe.

We

We muſt invent ſome ſeverer Puniſhment. Let him be ſent back to the Earth, to ſee the Uſe his Heirs are making of his Riches.

I HOPE it will not be interpreted as a Deſign of ſetting myſelf in Oppoſition to this famous Author, if I proceed to deliver a Fable of my own, which is intended to expoſe the ſame Vice of Avarice. The Hint of it was taken from theſe Lines of Mr. *Pope*,

Damn'd to the Mines, an equal Fate betides
The Slave that digs it, and the Slave that hides.

OUR old Mother Earth once lodg'd an Indictment againſt AVARICE before the Courts of Heaven, for her wicked and malicious Counſel and Advice, in tempting, inducing, perſuading, and traiterouſly ſeducing the Children of the Plaintiff to commit the deteſtable Crime of Parricide upon her, and, mangling her Body, ranſack her very Bowels for hidden Treaſure. The Indictment was very long and verboſe; but we muſt omit a great Part of the Repetitions and Synonymous Terms, not to tire our Reader too much with our Tale. *Avarice*, being call'd before *Jupiter* to anſwer to this Charge, had not much to ſay in her own Defence. The Injury was clearly prov'd upon her. The Fact, indeed, was notorious, and the Injury had been frequently repeated. When therefore the Plaintiff demanded Juſtice, *Jupiter* very readily gave Sentence in her Favour; and his Decree was to this Purpoſe, That ſince Dame *Avarice*, the Defendant, had thus grievouſly injur'd Dame *Earth*, the

the Plaintiff, ſhe was hereby ordered to take that Treaſure, of which ſhe had felonioufly robb'd the ſaid Plaintiff, by ranſacking her Boſom, and in the ſame Manner, as before, opening her Boſom, reſtore it back to her, without Diminution or Retention. From this Sentence, it ſhall follow, ſays *Jupiter* to the By-ſtanders, That, in all future Ages, the Retainers of *Avarice* ſhall bury and conceal their Riches, and thereby reſtore to the Earth what they took from her.

ESSAY XIV.

Of the DIGNITY *of* HUMAN NATURE.

THERE are certain Sects, which ſecretly form themſelves in the learned World, as well as in the political; and tho' ſometimes they come not to an open Rupture, yet they give a different Turn to the Ways of thinking of thoſe who have taken Party on either Side. The moſt remarkable of this Kind are the Sects, that are founded on the different Sentiments with regard to the *Dignity of human Nature*; which is a Point that ſeems to have divided Philoſophers and Poets, as well as Divines, from the Beginning of the World to this Day. Some exalt our Species to the Skies, and repreſent Man as a Kind of human Demi-God, that derives his Origin from Heaven, and retains evident Marks of his Lineage and Deſcent. Others inſiſt upon the blind Sides of human Nature, and can diſcover nothing, except Vanity, in which Man ſurpaſſes the other Animals, whom he affects ſo much to deſpiſe. If an Author poſſeſſes the Talent of Rhetorick, and Declamation, he commonly takes Party with the former: If his Turn lies towards Irony and Ridicule, he naturally throws himſelf into the other Extreme.

I AM far from thinking, that all thoſe, who have depreciated Human Nature, have been Enemies to Virtue, and have expoſed the Frailties of their Fellow-Creatures with any bad Intention. On the contrary, I am ſenſible, that a very delicate Senſe of Virtue, eſpecially when attended with ſomewhat of the *Miſanthrope*, is apt to give a Man a Diſguſt of the World, and to make him conſider the common Courſe of Human Affairs with too much Spleen and Indignation. I muſt, however, be of Opinion, that the Sentiments of thoſe, who are inclined to think favourably of Mankind, are much more advantageous to Virtue, than the contrary Principles which give us a mean Opinion of our Nature. When a Man is poſſeſs'd of a high Notion of his Rank and Character in the Creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will ſcorn to do a baſe or vicious Action, which might ſink him below that Figure which he makes in his own Imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our polite and faſhionable Moraliſts inſiſt upon this Topic, and endeavour to repreſent Vice as unworthy of Man, as well as odious in itſelf.

WOMEN are generally much more flatter'd in their Youth than Men; which may proceed from this Reaſon, among others, that their chief Point of Honour is conſider'd as much more difficult than ours, and requires to be ſupported by all that decent Pride, which can be inſtill'd into them.

WE find very few Diſputes that are not founded on ſome Ambiguity in the Expreſſion; and I am perſuaded, that the preſent Diſpute concerning the Dignity of Human Nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to conſider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this Controverſy.

THAT there is a natural Difference betwixt Merit and Demerit, Virtue and Vice, Wiſdom and Folly, no reaſonable Man will deny: But yet 'tis evident, that in affixing the Term, which denotes either our Approbation or Blame, we are commonly more influenced by Compariſon than by any fixt unalterable Standard in the Nature of Things. In like Manner, Quantity, and Extenſion, and Bulk, are by every one acknowledg'd to be real Things: But when we call any Animal *great* or *little*, we always form a ſecret Compariſon betwixt that Animal and others of the ſame Species; and 'tis that Compariſon which regulates our Judgment concerning its Greatneſs. A Dog and a Horſe may be of the very ſame Size, while the one is admir'd for the Greatneſs of its Bulk, and the other for the Smallneſs. When I am preſent, therefore, at any Diſpute, I always conſider with myſelf, whether or not it be a Queſtion merely of Compariſon that is the Subject of the Diſpute; and if it be, whether the Diſputants compare the ſame Objects together, or talk of Things that are widely different. As the latter is commonly the Caſe, I have long ſince learnt to neglect ſuch Diſputes as manifeſt Abuſes of Lei-

ſure, the moſt valuable Preſent that could be made to Mortals.

In forming our Notions of Human Nature, we are very apt to make a Compariſon betwixt Men and Animals, which are the only Creatures endowed with Thought that fall under our Senſes. Certainly this Compariſon is very favourable to Mankind. On the one Hand we ſee a Creature, whoſe Thoughts are not limited by any narrow Bounds, either of Place or Time; who carries his Reſearches into the moſt diſtant Regions of this Globe, and beyond this Globe, to the Planets and Heavenly Bodies; looks backward to conſider the firſt Origin of Human Race; caſts his Eyes forward to ſee the Influence of his Actions upon Poſterity, and the Judgments that will be form'd of his Character a thouſand Years hence; a Creature, that traces Cauſes and Effects to a great Length and Intricacy; extracts general Principles from particular Appearances; improves upon his Diſcoveries; corrects his Miſtakes; and makes his very Errors profitable. On the other Hand, we are preſented with a Creature the very reverſe of this; limited in its Obſervations and Reaſonings to a few ſenſible Objects that ſurround it; without Curioſity, without Foreſight; blindly conducted by Inſtinct, and arriving in a very ſhort Time at its utmoſt Perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a ſingle Step. What a wide Difference is there betwixt theſe Creatures! And how exalted a Notion muſt we entertain of the former, in Compariſon of the latter!

THERE are two Means commonly employ'd to deſtroy this Concluſion: *Firſt*, By making an unfair Repreſentation of the Caſe, and inſiſting only upon the Weakneſſes of Human Nature. And *ſecondly*, By forming a new and ſecret Compariſon betwixt Man and Beings of the moſt perfect Wiſdom. Among the other Excellencies of Man, there is this remarkable, that he can form a Notion of Perfections much beyond what he has Experience of in himſelf; and is not limited in his Conception of Wiſdom and Virtue. He can eaſily exalt his Notions, and conceive a Degree of Wiſdom, which, when compar'd to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cauſe the Difference betwixt that and the Sagacity of Animals, in a Manner, to diſappear and vaniſh. Now this being a Point, in which all the World is agreed, that Human Underſtanding falls infinitely ſhort of perfect Wiſdom: 'Tis proper we ſhould know when this Compariſon takes Place, that we may not diſpute, where there is no real Difference in our Sentiments. Man falls much ſhorter of perfect Wiſdom, and even of his own Ideas of perfect Wiſdom, than Animals do of Man; but yet the latter Difference is ſo conſiderable, that nothing but a Compariſon with the former, can make it appear of little Moment.

'TIS alſo very uſual to *compare* one Man with another; and finding very few that we can call *wiſe* or *virtuous*, we are apt to entertain a contemptible Notion of our Species in general. That we may be ſenſible

ſible of the Fallacy of this Way of Reaſoning, we may obſerve, that the Honourable Appellations of Wiſe and Virtuous, are not annexed to any particular Degree of thoſe Qualities of *Wiſdom* and *Virtue*; but ariſe altogether from the Compariſon we make betwixt one Man and another. When we find a Man, who arrives at ſuch a Pitch of Wiſdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wiſe Man: So that to ſay, there are few wiſe Men in the World, is really to ſay nothing; ſince 'tis only by their Scarcity, that they merit that Appellation. Were the loweſt of our Species as wiſe as *Tully*, or my Lord *Bacon*, we ſhould ſtill have Reaſon to ſay, that there are few wiſe Men. For in that Caſe we ſhould exalt our Notions of Wiſdom, and would not pay a ſingular Honour to any one, that was not ſingularly diſtinguiſhed by his Talents. In like Manner, I have heard it obſerv'd by thoughtleſs People, that there are few Women poſſeſt of Beauty, in Compariſon of thoſe who want it; not conſidering, that we beſtow the Epithet of *Beautiful* only on ſuch as poſſeſs a Degree of Beauty, that is common to them with a few. The ſame Degree of Beauty in a Woman is call'd Deformity, which is treated as real Beauty in one of our Sex.

As 'tis uſual, in forming a Notion of our Species, to *compare* it with the other Species above or below it, or to compare the Individuals of the Species among themſelves; ſo we often compare together the different Motives or actuating Principles of Human Nature, in order to regulate our Judgment concerning it. And indeed, this is the only Kind of Compariſon that

that is worth our Attention, or decides any thing in the preſent Queſtion. Were the ſelfiſh and vicious Principles of Human Nature ſo much predominant above the ſocial and virtuous, as is aſſerted by ſome Philoſophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible Notion of Human Nature. I may, perhaps, treat more fully of this Subject in ſome future Eſſay. In the mean Time, I ſhall obſerve, what has been prov'd beyond Queſtion by ſeveral great Moraliſts of the preſent Age, that the ſocial Paſſions are by far the moſt powerful of any, and that even all the other Paſſions receive from them their chief Force and Influence. Whoever deſires to ſee this Queſtion treated at large, with the greateſt Force of Argument and Eloquence, may conſult my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Enquiry concerning Virtue.

IN my Opinion, there are two Things which have led aſtray thoſe Philoſophers, that have inſiſted ſo much on the Selfiſhneſs of Man. In the *firſt* Place, they found, that every Act of Virtue or Friendſhip was attended with a ſecret Pleaſure: From whence they concluded, that Friendſhip and Virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the Fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous Sentiment or Paſſion produces the Pleaſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a Pleaſure in doing good to my Friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the Sake of that Pleaſure.

IN the *ſecond* Place, it has always been found, that virtuous Men are far from being indifferent to Praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a Set of

vain-glorious Men, that had nothing in View but the Applauſes of others. But this alſo is a Fallacy. 'Tis very unjuſt in the World, when they find any Tincture of Vanity in a laudable Action, to depreciate it upon that Account, or aſcribe it entirely to that Motive. The Caſe is not the ſame with Vanity, as with other Paſſions. Where Avarice or Revenge enters into any ſeemingly virtuous Action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natural to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating Principle. But Vanity is ſo nearly ally'd to Virtue, and to love the Fame of virtuous Actions approaches ſo near the Love of virtuous Actions for their own Sake, that theſe Paſſions are more capable of Mixture, than any other Kinds of Affection; and 'tis almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome Degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this Paſſion for Glory is always warp'd and varied according to the particular Taſte or Sentiment of the Mind on which it falls. *Nero* had the ſame Vanity in driving a Chariot, that *Trajan* had in governing the Empire with Juſtice and Ability. To love the Glory of virtuous Actions is a ſure Proof of the Love of virtuous Actions.

ESSAY XV.

Of LIBERTY *and* DESPOTISM.

THOSE who employ their Pens on political Subjects, free from Party-Rage, and Party-Prejudices, cultivate a Science, which, of all others, contributes moſt both to public Utility, and to the private Satisfaction of thoſe who addict themſelves to the Study of it. I am apt, however, to entertain a Suſpicion, that the World is ſtill too young to fix many general ſtable Truths in Politics, which will remain true to the lateſt Poſterity. We have not as yet had Experience of above three thouſand Years; ſo that not only the Art of Reaſoning is ſtill defective in this Science, as well as in all others, but we even want ſufficient Materials upon which we can reaſon. 'Tis not fully known, what Degrees of Refinement, either in Virtue or Vice, human Nature is ſuſceptible of; nor what may be expected of Mankind from any great Revolution in their Education, Cuſtoms, or Principles. *Machiavel* was certainly a great Genius; but having confin'd his Study to the furious and tyrannical Governments of ancient Times, or the little diſorderly Principalities of *Italy*, his Reaſonings, eſpecially

upon Monarchical Government, have been found extremely defective; and there ſcarce is any Maxim in his *Prince*, which ſubſequent Experience has not entirely refuted. *A weak Prince*, ſays he, *is incapable of receiving good Counſel; for if he conſult with ſeveral, he will not be able to chooſe among their different Counſels. If he abandon himſelf to one, that Miniſter may, perhaps, have Capacity; but he will not be long a Miniſter: He will be ſure to diſpoſſeſs his Maſter, and place himſelf and his own Family upon the Throne.* I mention this, among innumerable Inſtances, of the Errors of that Politician, proceeding, in a great Meaſure, from his having liv'd in too early an Age of the World, to be a good Judge of political Truth. Almoſt all the Princes of *Europe* are at preſent govern'd by their Miniſters, and have been ſo for near two Centuries; and yet no ſuch Event has ever happen'd, or can poſſibly happen. *Sejanus* might project the dethroning the *Cæſars*; but *Fleury*, tho' ever ſo vicious, could not, while in his Senſes, entertain the leaſt Hopes of diſpoſſeſſing the *Bourbons*.

TRADE was never eſteem'd an Affair of State, 'till within the laſt Century; nor is there any ancient Writer on Politics, who has made mention of it. Even the *Italians* have kept a profound Silence with regard to it; though it has now excited the chief Attention, as well of Miniſters of State, as of ſpeculative Reaſoners. The great Opulence, Grandeur, and military Atchievements of the two Maritime Powers, ſeem firſt to have inſtructed Mankind in the vaſt Importance of an extenſive Commerce.

HAVING

HAVING, therefore, intended in this Eſſay to have made a full Compariſon of Liberty and Deſpotiſm, and to have ſhewn the Advantages and Diſadvantages of each, I began to entertain a Suſpicion, that no Man in this Age was ſufficiently qualified for ſuch an Undertaking; and that whatever any one ſhould advance on that Head would, in all Probability, be refuted by further Experience, and be rejected by Poſterity. Such mighty Revolutions have happened in human Affairs, and ſo many Events have ariſen, contrary to the Expectation of the Ancients, that they are ſufficient to beget the Suſpicion of ſtill further Changes.

IT had been obſerved by the Ancients, that all the Arts and Sciences aroſe among free Nations; and, that the *Perſians* and *Egyptians*, notwithſtanding all their Eaſe, Opulence and Luxury, made but faint Efforts towards a Reliſh in thoſe finer Pleaſures, which were carried to ſuch Perfection by the *Greeks*, amidſt continual Wars, attended with Poverty, and the greateſt Simplicity of Life and Manners. It had alſo been obſerv'd, that as ſoon as the *Greeks* loſt their Liberty, tho' they encreaſed mightily in Riches, by Means of the Conqueſts of *Alexander*; yet the Arts, from that Moment, declin'd among them, and have never ſince been able to raiſe their Head in that Climate. Learning was tranſplanted to *Rome*, the only free Nation at that Time in the Univerſe; and having met with ſo favourable a Soil, it made prodigious Shoots for above a Century; till the Decay of Liberty

produced alſo the Decay of Letters, and ſpread a total Barbarity over the World. From theſe two Experiments, of which each was double in its Kind, and ſhew'd the Fall of Learning in Deſpotic Governments, as well as its Riſe in popular Ones, *Longinus* thought himſelf ſufficiently juſtified, in aſſerting, that the Arts and Sciences could never flouriſh, but in a free Government: And in this Opinion, he has been follow'd by ſeveral eminent Writers * in our own Country, who either confin'd their View merely to ancient Facts, or entertain'd too great a Partiality in Favour of that Form of Government, which is eſtabliſh'd amongſt us.

But what would theſe Writers have ſaid, to the Inſtances of modern *Rome* and of *Florence?* Of which the former carried to Perfection all the finer Arts of Sculpture, Painting and Muſic, as well as Poetry, tho' they groan'd under Slavery, and under the Slavery of Prieſts: While the latter made the greateſt Progreſs in the Arts and Sciences, after they began to loſe their Liberty by the Uſurpations of the Family of the *Medicis*. *Arioſto*, *Taſſo*, *Galilæo*, no more than *Raphael*, and *Michael Angelo*, were not born in Republics. And tho' the *Lombard* School was famous as well as the *Roman*, yet the *Venetians* have had the ſmalleſt Share in its Honours, and ſeem rather inferior to the other *Italians*, in their Genius for the Arts and Sciences. *Rubens* eſtabliſh'd his School at *Antwerp*, not at *Amſterdam*; *Dreſden*, not *Hamburgh*, is the Centre of Politeneſs in *Germany*.

But the moſt eminent Inſtance of the flouriſhing of Learning in deſpotic Governments, is that of

* Mr. *Addiſon* and Lord *Shaftsbury*.

France,

FRANCE, which never enjoy'd any Shadow of Liberty, and yet has carried the Arts and Sciences nearer Perfection than any other Nation of the Univerſe. The *Engliſh* are, perhaps, better Philoſophers; the *Italians* better Painters and Muſicians; the *Romans* were better Orators: But the *French* are the only People, except the *Greeks*, who have been at once Philoſophers, Poets, Orators, Hiſtorians, Painters, Architects, Sculptors, and Muſicians. With regard to the Stage, they have far excell'd the *Greeks*: And, in common Life, have, in a great Meaſure, perfected that Art, the moſt uſeful and agreeable of any, *l'Art de Vivre*, the Art of Society and Converſation.

If we conſider the State of the Sciences and polite Arts in our own Country, *Horace*'s Obſervation, with regard to the *Romans*, may, in a great Meaſure, be applied to the *Britiſh*,

-------- *Sed in longum tamen ævum*
Manſerunt, hodieqae manent veſtigia ruris.

THE Elegance and Propriety of Stile have been very much neglected among us. We have no Dictionary of our Language, and ſcarce a tolerable Grammar. The firſt polite Proſe we have, was wrote by Dr. *Swift*. As to *Sprat*, *Locke*, and even *Temple*, they knew too little of the Rules of Art to be eſteem'd very elegant Writers. The Proſe of *Bacon*, *Harrington* and *Milton*, is altogether ſtiff and pedantic; tho' their Senſe be excellent. Men, in this Country, have been ſo much occupied in the Grand Diſputes of *Religion*, *Politics* and *Philoſophy*, that they had no Re-

liſh for the minute Obſervations of Grammar and Criticiſm. And tho' this Turn of Thinking muſt have conſiderably improv'd our Senſe and our Talent of Reaſoning beyond thoſe of other Nations; it muſt be confeſt, that even in thoſe Sciences abovementioned, we have not any Standard-Book, which we can tranſmit to Poſterity: And the utmoſt we have to boaſt of, are a few Eſſays towards a more juſt Philoſophy; which, indeed, promiſe very much, but have not, as yet, reach'd any Degree of Perfection.

It has become an eſtabliſh'd Opinion, that Commerce can never flouriſh but in a free Government; and this Opinion ſeems to have been founded on a longer and larger Experience than the foregoing, with Regard to the Arts and Sciences. If we trace Commerce in its Progreſs thro' *Tyre*, *Athens*, *Syracuſe*, *Carthage*, *Venice*, *Florence*, *Genoa*, *Antwerp*, *Holland*, *England*, &c. we ſhall always find it to have fixt its Seat in free Governments. The three greateſt trading Towns now in the World, are *London*, *Amſterdam*, and *Hamburgh*; all free Cities, and Proteſtant Cities; that is, enjoying a double Liberty. It muſt, however, be obſerv'd, that the great Jealouſy entertain'd of late, with regard to the Commerce of *France*, ſeems to prove, that this Maxim is no more certain and infallible, than the foregoing, and that the Subjects of abſolute Princes may become our Rivals in Commerce, as well as in Learning.

Durst I deliver my Opinion in an Affair of ſo much Uncertainty, I would aſſert, that, notwithſtanding the

the Efforts of the *French*, there is ſomething pernicious to Commerce inherent in the very Nature of abſolute Government, and inſeparable from it: Tho' the Reaſon I would aſſign for this Opinion, is ſomewhat different from that which is commonly inſiſted on. Private Property ſeems to me fully as ſecure in a civiliz'd *European* Monarchy, as in a Republic; nor is any Danger ever apprehended, in ſuch a Government, from the Violence of the Sovereign; no more than we commonly apprehend Danger from Thunder, or Earthquakes, or any Accident the moſt unuſual and extraordinary. Avarice, the Spur of Induſtry, is ſo obſtinate a Paſſion, and works its Way thro' ſo many real Dangers and Difficulties, that 'tis not likely it will be ſcarr'd by an imaginary Danger, which is ſo ſmall, that it ſcarce admits of Calculation. Commerce therefore, in my Opinion, is apt to decay in abſolute Governments, not becauſe it is there leſs *ſecure*, but becauſe it is leſs *honourable*. A Subordination of Ranks is abſolutely neceſſary to the Support of Monarchy. Birth, Titles, and Place, muſt be honour'd above Induſtry and Riches. And while theſe Notions prevail, all the conſiderable Traders will be tempted to throw up their Commerce, in order to purchaſe ſome of thoſe Employments, to which Privileges and Honours are annex'd.

SINCE I am upon this Head of the Alterations that Time has produc'd, or may produce in Politics, I muſt obſerve, that all Kinds of Government, free and deſpotic, ſeem to have undergone, in modern Times, a great Change to the better, with regard both

both to foreign and domeſtic Management. The *Balance of Power* is a Secret in Politics fully known only to the preſent Age; and I muſt add, that the internal POLICE of the State has alſo receiv'd great Improvements within the laſt Century. We are inform'd by *Salluſt*, that *Catiline*'s Army was much augmented by the Acceſſion of the Highwaymen about *Rome*; tho' I believe, that all of that Profeſſion, who are at preſent diſpers'd over *Europe*, would not amount to a Regiment. In *Cicero*'s Pleadings for *Milo*, I find this Argument, among others, made Uſe of to prove, that his Client had not aſſaſſinated *Clodius*. Had *Milo*, ſays he, intended to have kill'd *Clodius*, he had not attack'd him in the Day-time, and at ſuch a Diſtance from the City: He had Way-laid him at Night, near the Suburbs, where it might have been pretended, that he was killed by Robbers; and the Frequency of the Accident would have favour'd the Deceit. This is a ſurprizing Proof of the looſe Police of *Rome*, and of the Number and Force of theſe Robbers; ſince *Clodius* † was at that Time attended with thirty Slaves, who were compleatly arm'd, and ſufficiently accuſtomed to Blood and Danger in the frequent Tumults excited by that ſeditious Tribune.

BUT tho' all Kinds of Government be much improv'd in modern Times, yet Monarchical Government ſeems to have receiv'd the moſt conſiderable Improvements. It may now be affirm'd of civiliz'd Mo-

† *Vide Aſc. Ped. in Orat. pro Milone.*

narchies,

narchies, what was formerly ſaid in Praiſe of Republics alone, *that they are a Government of Laws, not of Men.* They are found ſuſceptible of Order, Method, and Conſtancy, to a ſurprizing Degree. Property is there ſecure; Induſtry encourag'd; the Arts flouriſh; and the Prince lives ſecure among his Subjects, like a Father among his Children. It muſt, however, be confeſt, that tho' Monarchical Governments have approach'd nearer to popular Ones, in Gentleneſs and Stability; yet they are ſtill much inferior. Our modern Education and Cuſtoms inſtil more Humanity and Moderation than the ancient; but have not as yet been able to overcome entirely the Diſadvantages of that Form of Government.

BUT here I muſt beg Leave to advance a Conjecture, which ſeems to me very probable, but which Poſterity alone can fully judge of. I am apt to think, that in Monarchical Governments there is a Source of Improvement, and in Popular Governments a Source of Degeneracy, which in Time will bring theſe Species of Government ſtill nearer an Equality. The greateſt Abuſes, which ariſe in *France*, the moſt perfect Model of pure Monarchy, proceed not from the Number or Weight of the Taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free Countries; but from the expenſive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate Method of levying them, by which the Induſtry of the Poor, eſpecially of the Peaſants and Farmers, is, in a great Meaſure, diſcourag'd, and Agriculture render'd a beggarly and a ſlaviſh Employment. But to whoſe Advantage do theſe Abuſes ſerve? If to that of the Nobility, they might

might be eſteem'd inherent in that Form of Government; ſince the Nobility are the true Supports of Monarchy; and 'tis natural their Intereſt ſhould be more conſulted, in ſuch a Conſtitution, than that of the People. But the Nobility are, in Reality, the principal Loſers by this Oppreſſion; ſince it ruins their Eſtates, and beggars their Tenants. The only Gainers by it are the *Finançiers*, a Race of Men deſpiſed and hated by the Nobility and the whole Kingdom. If a Prince or a Miniſter, therefore, ſhould ariſe, endow'd with ſufficient Diſcernment to know his own and the public Intereſt, and with ſufficient Force of Mind to break thro' ancient Cuſtom, we might expect to ſee theſe Abuſes remedied; in which Caſe, the Difference betwixt their abſolute Government and our free one, would be more nominal than real.

THE Source of Degeneracy, that may be remark'd in free Governments, conſiſts in the Practice of contracting Debt, and mortgaging the public Revenues, by which Taxes may, in Time, become altogether intolerable, and all the Property of the State be brought into the Hands of the Public. This Practice is of modern Date. The *Athenians*, tho' govern'd by a Republic, paid near two hundred *per Cent.* for thoſe Sums of Money, which any emergent Occaſion made it neceſſary for them to borrow; as we learn from *Xenophon* *. Among the Moderns, the *Dutch* firſt introduced the

* Κτῆσιν δὲ ἀπ' ἀδείας ἂν ἔτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο ὥσπερ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν. ---------- οἱ δέ γε

the Practice of borrowing great Sums at low Intereſt, and have well nigh ruined themſelves by it. Abſolute Princes have alſo contracted Debt; but as an abſolute Prince may play the Bankrupt when he pleaſes, his People can never be oppreſt by his Debts. In popular Governments, the People, and chiefly thoſe who have the higheſt Offices, being always the public Creditors, 'tis impoſſible the State can ever make Uſe of this Remedy, which, however it may be ſometimes neceſſary, is always cruel and barbarous. This, therefore, ſeems to be an Inconvenience, that nearly threatens all free Governments; eſpecially our own, at the preſent Juncture of Affairs. And what a ſtrong Motive is this, to increaſe our Frugality of the public Money; leſt, for want of it, we be reduced by the Multiplicity of Taxes, to curſe our free Government, and wiſh ourſelves in the ſame State of Servitude with all the Nations that ſurround us.

πλείσοι Αθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν, οἱ γὰρ μνᾶν προτελέσαντες, ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μναῖν πρόσοδον ἕξυσι ---- ὁδόκει τῶν ἀνθροπίνων ἀσφαλέστατον τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον ἔιναι. ΞΕΝ. ΠΟΡΟΙ.

ESSAY

ESSAY XVI.

Of ELOQUENCE.

THOSE, who conſider the Periods and Revolutions of human Kind, as repreſented in Hiſtory, are entertain'd with a Spectacle full of Pleaſure and Variety, and ſee, with Surprize, the Manners, Cuſtoms, and Opinions of the ſame Species ſuſceptible of ſuch prodigious Changes in different Periods of Time. It may, however, be obſerv'd, that in *civil* Hiſtory there is found a much greater Uniformity than in the Hiſtory of Learning and Science, and that the Wars, Negotiations and Politics of one Age reſemble more thoſe of another, than the Taſte, Wit, and ſpeculative Principles. Intereſt and Ambition, Honour and Shame, Friendſhip and Enmity, Gratitude and Revenge, are the prime Movers in all public Tranſactions; and theſe Paſſions are of a very ſtubborn and intractable Nature, in Compariſon of the Sentiments and Underſtanding, which are eaſily varied by Education and Example. The *Goths* were much more inferior to the *Romans*, in Taſte and Science, than in Courage and Virtue.

BUT not to compare together Nations ſo widely different, that they may almoſt be eſteem'd of a different Species; it may be obſerv'd, that even this latter Period of human Learning, is, in many Reſpects, conſiderably different from the ancient; and that if we be ſuperior in Philoſophy, we are ſtill, notwithſtanding all our Refinements, much inferior in Eloquence.

IN ancient Times no Performance was thought to require ſo great a Genius and Capacity, as that of ſpeaking in Public; and ſome eminent Writers have pronounc'd the Talents, even of a great Poet or Philoſopher, to be of an inferior Nature to thoſe requiſite for ſuch an Undertaking. *Greece* and *Rome* produc'd, each of them, but one accompliſh'd Orator; and whatever Praiſes the other celebrated Speakers might merit, they were ſtill eſteem'd much inferior to thoſe two great Heroes of Eloquence. 'Tis obſervable, that the ancient Critics could ſcarce find two Orators, in any Age, that deſerv'd to be plac'd preciſely in the ſame Rank, and poſſeſs'd the ſame Degree of Merit. *Calvus*, *Cælius*, *Curio*, *Hortenſius*, *Cæſar* roſe one above another: But the greateſt of that Age was inferior to *Cicero*, the moſt eloquent Speaker that had ever appear'd in *Rome*. Thoſe of fine Taſte, however, pronounc'd this Judgment of the *Roman* Orator, as well as of the *Grecian*, that both of them ſurpaſs'd in Eloquence all that had ever appear'd, but that they were far from reaching the Perfection of their Art, which was infinite, and not only exceeded human

Force

Force to attain, but alſo human Imagination to conceive. *Cicero* declares himſelf diſſatisfy'd with his own Performances; nay, even with thoſe of *Demoſthenes*. *Ita ſunt avidæ & capaces meæ aures*, ſays he, *& ſemper aliquid immenſum, infinitumque deſiderant.*

THESE Circumſtances alone are ſufficient to make us apprehend the wide Difference betwixt ancient and modern Eloquence, and let us ſee how much the latter is inferior to the former. Of all the polite and learned Nations, *Britain* alone poſſeſſes a popular Government, or admits into the Legiſlature ſuch numerous Aſſemblies as can be ſuppos'd to lie under the Dominion of Eloquence. But what has *Britain* to boaſt of in this Particular? In enumerating all the great Men, that have done Honour to our Country, we exult in our Poets and Philoſophers: But what Orators are ever mention'd? Or where are the Monuments of their Genius to be met with? There are found, indeed, in our Hiſtories, the Names of ſeveral, who directed the Reſolutions of our Parliament: But neither themſelves nor others have taken the Pains to preſerve their Speeches; and the Authority they poſſeſs'd ſeems to have been owing to their Experience, Wiſdom, or Power, more than to their Talents for Oratory. At preſent, there are above half a dozen Speakers in the two Houſes, who, in the Judgment of the Public, have reach'd very near the ſame Pitch of Eloquence; and no Man pretends to give any one the Preference to the reſt. This ſeems to me a certain Proof, that none of them have attain'd much beyond a Mediocrity in their Art, and that the Species of Eloquence they aſpire

to,

to, gives no Exerciſe to the ſublimer Faculties of the Mind, but may be reach'd by ordinary Talents and a ſlight Application. A hundred Cabinet-makers in *London* can work a Table or a Chair equally well; but no one Poet can write Verſes with ſuch Spirit and Elegance as Mr. *Pope*.

WE are told, that when *Demoſthenes* was to plead, all the ingenious Men flock'd to *Athens* from the moſt remote Parts of *Greece*, as to the moſt celebrated Spectacle of the World †. At *London*, you may ſee Men ſauntering in the Court of Requeſts, while the moſt important Debate is carrying on in the two Houſes; and many do not think themſelves ſufficiently compenſated, for the loſing of their Dinners, by all the Eloquence of our moſt celebrated Speakers. When old *Cibber* is to act, the Curioſity of the Public is more excited, than when our prime Miniſter is to defend himſelf from a Motion for his Removal or Impeachment.

EVEN a Perſon unacquainted with the noble Remains of ancient Orators, may judge, from a few Strokes, that the Stile or Species of their Eloquence was infinitely more ſublime than that which modern

† Ne illud quidem intelligunt, non modo ita memoriæ proditum eſſe, ſed ita neceſſe fuiſſe, cum *Demoſthenes* dicturus eſſet, ut concurſus, audiendi cauſa, ex tota *Græcia* fierent. At cum iſti *Attici* dicunt, non modo a corona (quod eſt ipſum miſerabile) ſed etiam ab advocatis relinquuntur.

Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

Orators

Orators aſpire to. How abſurd would it appear, in our temperate and calm Speakers, to make uſe of an *Apoſtrophe*, like that noble one of *Demoſthenes*, ſo much celebrated by *Quinctilian* and *Longinus*, when, juſtifying the unſucceſsful Battle of *Chæronea*, he breaks out, *No, my Fellow-Citizens, No: You have not err'd. I ſwear by the* Manes *of thoſe Heroes, who fought for the ſame Cauſe in the Plains of* MARATHON *and* PLATÆA. Who could now endure ſuch a bold and poetical Figure, as that which *Cicero* employs, after deſcribing in the moſt tragical Terms the Crucifixion of a *Roman* Citizen. *Should I paint the Horrors of this Scene, not to* Roman *Citizens, not to the Allies of our State, not to thoſe who have ever heard of the* Roman *Name, not even to Men, but to Brute-Creatures; or, to go farther, ſhould I lift up my Voice, in the moſt deſolate Solitude, to the Rocks and Mountains, yet ſhould I ſurely ſee thoſe rude and inanimate Parts of Nature mov'd with Horror and Indignation at the Recital of ſo enormous an Action* †. With what a Blaze of Eloquence muſt ſuch a Sentence be ſurrounded to give it Grace, or cauſe it to make any Impreſſion on the Hearers! And what noble Art and ſublime Talents are requiſite to arrive, by juſt Degrees, at a Sentiment ſo bold and exceſſive: To inflame

† *The Original is*; Quod ſi hæc non ad cives Romanos, non ad aliquos amicos noſtræ civitatis, non ad eos qui populi Romani nomen audiſſent; denique, ſi non ad homines, veram ad beſtias; aut etiam, ut longius progrediar, ſi in aliqua deſertiſſima ſolitudine, ad ſaxa & ad ſcopulos hæc conqueri & deplorare vellem, tamen omnia muta atque inanima, tanta & tam indigna rerum atrocitate commoverentur. Cic. in Ver.

the Audience, ſo as to make them accompany the Speaker in ſuch violent Paſſions, and ſuch elevated Conceptions: And to conceal, under a Torrent of Eloquence, the Artifice, by which all this is effectuated!

SUITABLE to this Vehemence of Thought and Expreſſion, was the Vehemence of Action, obſerved in the ancient Orators. The *ſupploſio pedis*, or ſtamping with the Foot, was one of the moſt uſual and moderate Geſtures they made uſe of †; tho' that is now eſteem'd too violent, either for the Senate, Bar, or Pulpit, and is only admitted into the Theatre, to accompany the moſt violent Paſſions, that are there repreſented.

I AM ſomewhat at a Loſs to what Cauſe we may aſcribe ſo ſenſible a Decline of Eloquence in latter Ages. The Genius of Mankind, at all Times, is, perhaps, equal: The Moderns have applied themſelves, with great Induſtry and Succeſs, to all the other Arts and Sciences: And one of the moſt learned Nations of the Univerſe poſſeſſes a popular Government; which ſeems requiſite for the full Diſplay of theſe noble Talents: But notwithſtanding all theſe Advantages, our Progreſs in Eloquence is very incon-

† Ubi dolor? Ubi ardor animi, qui etiam ex infantium ingeniis elicere voces & querelas ſolet? nulla perturbatio animi, nulla corporis; frons non percuſſa, non femur; pedis (*quod minimum eſt*) nulla ſupploſio. Itaque tantum abfuit ut inflammares noſtros animos; ſomnum iſto loco vix tenebamus.

Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

ſiderable,

ſiderable, in Compariſon of the Advances we have made in all the other Parts of Learning.

SHALL we aſſert, that the Strains of ancient Eloquence are unſuitable to our Age, and not to be imitated by modern Orators? Whatever Reaſons may be made Uſe of to prove this, I am perſuaded they will be found, upon Examination, to be unſound and unſatisfactory.

Firſt, IT may be ſaid, that in ancient Times, during the flouriſhing Period of the *Greek* and *Roman* Learning, the municipal Laws, in every State, were but few and ſimple, and the Deciſion of Cauſes was, in a great Meaſure, left to the Equity and common Senſe of the Judges. The Study of the Laws was not then a laborious Occupation, which requir'd the Drudgery of a whole Life to finiſh it, and was utterly incompatible with every other Study or Profeſſion. The great Stateſmen and Generals among the *Romans* were all Lawyers; and *Cicero*, to ſhew the Facility of this Science, declares, that, in the midſt of all his Occupations, he would undertake, in a few Days, to make himſelf a compleat Civilian. Now, where a Pleader addreſſes himſelf to the Equity of his Judges, he has much more Room to diſplay his Eloquence, than where he muſt draw his Arguments from ſtrict Laws, Statutes and Precedents. In the former Caſe, many Circumſtances muſt be taken in, many perſonal Conſiderations regarded; and even Favour and Inclination, which it belongs to the Orator, by his Art and Eloquence, to conciliate, may be diſguis'd under the Appear-

Appearance of Equity. But, how ſhall a modern Lawyer have Leiſure to quit his laborious Occupation, in order to gather thē Flowers of *Parnaſſus?* Or, what Opportunity ſhall he have of diſplaying them, amidſt the rigid and ſubtile Arguments, Objections and Replies, which he is obliged to make Uſe of? The greateſt Genius, and greateſt Orator, who ſhould pretend to plead before the *Chancellor*, after a Month's Study of the Laws, would only labour to make himſelf ridiculous.

I AM ready to own, that this Circumſtance, of the Multiplicity and Intricacy of Laws, is a Diſcouragement to Eloquence in modern Times: But I aſſert, that it will not account intirely for the Decline of that noble Art. It may baniſh Oratory from *Weſtminſter-Hall*, but not from either of the Houſes of Parliament. Among the *Athenians*, the *Areopagites* expreſly forbad all Allurements of Eloquence; nor do we find, in the *Greek* Orations wrote in the *judiciary* Form, ſuch a bold and rhetorical Stile as appears in the *Roman*. But to what a Pitch did the *Athenians* carry their Eloquence in the *deliberative* Kind, when Affairs of State were canvaſt, and the Liberty, Happineſs, and Honour of the Nation were the Subjects of Debate? Diſputes of this Nature elevate the Genius above all others, and give the fulleſt Scope to Eloquence; and ſuch Diſputes are very frequent in this Nation.

Secondly, IT may be pretended, that the Decline of Eloquence is owing to the ſuperior good Senſe of

the Moderns, who reject, with Diſdain, all thoſe rhetorical Tricks, which may be employ'd to ſeduce the Judges, and will admit of nothing but ſolid Argument in any Debate or Deliberation. If a Man be accus'd of Murder, the Fact muſt be prov'd by Witneſſes and Evidence; and the Laws will afterwards determine the Puniſhment of the Criminal. It would be ridiculous to deſcribe, in ſtrong Colours, the Horror and Cruelty of the Action: To introduce the Relations of the Dead; and, at a Signal, make them throw themſelves at the Feet of the Judges, imploring Juſtice with Tears and Lamentations: And ſtill more ridiculous would it be, to employ a Painter to draw a Picture repreſenting the bloody Deed, in order to move the Judges by the Diſplay of ſo tragical a Spectacle: Tho' we know, that this poor Artifice was ſometimes practiſed by the Pleaders of Old. Now, baniſh the Pathetic from public Diſcourſes, and you reduce the Speakers merely to modern Eloquence; that is, to Good-Senſe, deliver'd in proper Expreſſions.

PERHAPS it may be acknowledg'd, that our modern Cuſtoms, or our ſuperior Good-Senſe, if you will, ſhould make our Orators more cautious and reſerv'd than the ancient, in attempting to inflame the Paſſions, or elevate the Imagination of their Audience: But I ſee no Reaſon, why it ſhould make them deſpair abſolutely of ſucceeding in that Attempt. It ſhould make them redouble their Art, not abandon it intirely. The ancient Orators ſeem alſo to have been on their Guard againſt this Jealouſy of their Audience;

dience; but they took a different Way of eluding it †. They hurry'd away with ſuch a Torrent of Sublime and Pathetic, that they left their Hearers no Leiſure to perceive the Artifice, by which they were deceiv'd. Nay, to conſider the Matter aright, they were not deceiv'd by any Artifice. The Orator, by the Force of his own Genius and Eloquence, firſt inflam'd himſelf with Anger, Indignation, Pity, Sorrow; and then communicated thoſe impetuous Movements to his Audience.

DOES any Man pretend to have more good Senſe than *Julius Cæſar?* Yet that haughty Conqueror, we know, was ſo ſubdu'd by the Charms of *Cicero*'s Eloquence, that he was, in a Manner, conſtrain'd to change his ſettled Purpoſe and Reſolution, and to abſolve a Criminal, whom, before that Orator appear'd, he was determin'd to condemn.

Thirdly, IT may be pretended, that the Diſorders of the ancient Governments, and the enormous Crimes, of which the Citizens were often guilty, afforded much ampler Matter for Eloquence than can be met with among the Moderns. Were there no *Verres* or *Catiline*, there would be no *Cicero*. But that this Reaſon can have no great Influence, is evident: 'Twould be eaſy to find a *Philip* in modern Times; but where ſhall we find a *Demoſthenes?*

WHAT remains, then, but that we lay the Blame on the Want of Genius, or of Judgment in our Speak-

† *Longinus*, Cap. 15.

ers, who either found themſelves incapable of reaching the Heights of ancient Eloquence, or rejected all ſuch Endeavours, as unſuitable to the Spirit of modern Aſſemblies? A few ſucceſsful Attempts of this Nature might rouze up the Genius of the Nation, excite the Emulation of the Youth, and accuſtom our Ears to a more ſublime and more pathetic Elocution, than what we have been hitherto entertain'd with. There is certainly ſomething accidental in the firſt Riſe and the Progreſs of the Arts in any Nation. I doubt if a very ſatisfactory Reaſon can be given, why ancient *Rome*, while it receiv'd all its Arts from *Greece*, could attain only to a Taſte or Reliſh of Statuary, Painting and Architecture, without reaching the Practice of theſe noble Arts: While modern *Rome* has been excited, by a few Remains found among the Ruins of Antiquity, and has carried theſe Arts to the greateſt Perfection. Had ſuch a cultivated Genius as my Lord *Bolingbroke* ariſen during the Civil Wars, when Liberty began to be fully eſtabliſh'd, and popular Aſſemblies to enter into all the moſt material Points of Government, I am perſuaded ſo illuſtrious an Example would have given a quite different Turn to *Britiſh* Eloquence, and made us reach the Perfection of the ancient Model. Our Orators would then have done Honour to their Country, as well as our Poets and Philoſophers, and *Britiſh Ciceros* have appear'd as well as *Britiſh Platos* and *Virgils*.

I HAVE confeſt that there is ſomething accidental in the Origin and Progreſs of the Arts in any Nation; and yet I cannot forbear thinking, that if the other

other learned and polite Nations of *Europe* had poſſeſt the ſame Advantages of a popular Government, they would probably have carried Eloquence to a greater Height than it has yet reach'd in *Britain*. The *French* Sermons, eſpecially thoſe of *Flechier* and *Bourdaloüe*, are much ſuperior to the *Engliſh* in this Particular; and in *Flechier* there are many Strokes of the moſt ſublime Poetry. His Funeral Sermon on the *Marechal de Turenne* is a good Inſtance. None but private Cauſes, in that Country, are ever debated before their Parliament or Courts of Judicature; but notwithſtanding this Diſadvantage, there appears a Spirit of Eloquence in many of their Lawyers, which, with proper Cultivation and Encouragement, might riſe to the greateſt Heights. The Pleadings of *Patru* are very elegant, and give us room to imagine what ſo fine a Genius could have perform'd in Queſtions concerning public Liberty or Slavery, Peace or War, who exerts himſelf with ſuch Succeſs, in Debates concerning the Price of an old Horſe, or a goſſiping Story of a Quarrel betwixt an Abbeſs and her Nuns. For, 'tis remarkable, that this polite Writer, tho' eſteem'd by all the Men of Wit in his Time, was never employ'd in the moſt conſiderable Cauſes of their Courts of Judicature, but liv'd and dy'd in Poverty: From an ancient Prejudice induſtriouſly propagated by the Dunces in all Countries, *That a Man of Genius is unfit for Buſineſs*. The Diſorders produced by the Miniſtry of *Cardinal Mazarine*, made the Parliament of *Paris* enter into the Diſcuſſion of public Affairs; and during that ſhort Interval, there appear'd many Symptoms of the Revival of ancient Eloquence. The *Avocat-General*,

Talon, in an Oration, invok'd on his Knees the Spirit of St. *Loüis* to look down with Compaſſion on his divided and unhappy People, and to inſpire them, from above, with the Love of Concord and Unanimity †. The Members of the *French* Academy have attempted to give us Models of Eloquence in their Harangues at their Admittance: But, having no Subject to diſcourſe upon, they have run altogether into a fulſome Strain of Panegyric and Flattery, the moſt barren of all Subjects. Their Stile, however, is commonly, on theſe Occaſions, very elevated and ſublime, and might reach the greateſt Heights, were it employ'd on a Subject more favourable and engaging.

THERE are ſome Circumſtances in the *Engliſh* Temper and Genius, which are diſadvantageous to the Progreſs of Eloquence, and render all Attempts of that Kind more dangerous and difficult among them than among any other Nation in the Univerſe. The *Engliſh* are conſpicuous for *Good-ſenſe*, which makes them very jealous of any Attempts to deceive them by the Flowers of Rhetoric and Elocution. They are alſo peculiarly *modeſt*; which makes them conſider it as a Piece of Arrogance to offer any thing but Reaſon to public Aſſemblies, or attempt to guide them by Paſſion or Fancy. I may, perhaps, be allow'd to add, that the People in general are not remarkable for Delicacy of Taſte, or for Senſibility to the Charms of the Muſes. Their *muſical Parts*, to uſe the Expreſſion of a noble Author, are but indifferent. Hence

† *De Ret*'s Memoirs.

their

their Comic Poets, to move them, muſt have Recourſe to Obſcenity; their Tragic Poets to Blood and Slaughter: And hence their Orators, being depriv'd of any ſuch Reſource, have abandoned altogether the Hopes of moving them, and have confin'd themſelves to plain Argument and Reaſoning.

THESE Circumſtances, join'd to particular Accidents, may, perhaps, have retarded the Growth of Eloquence in this Kingdom; but will not be able to prevent its Succeſs, if ever it appear amongſt us: And one may ſafely pronounce, that this is a Field in which the moſt flouriſhing Lawrels may yet be gather'd, if any Youth of accompliſh'd Genius, thoroughly acquainted with all the polite Arts, and not ignorant of public Buſineſs, ſhould appear in Parliament, and accuſtom our Ears to an Eloquence more commanding and pathetic. And to confirm me in this Opinion, there occur two Conſiderations, the one deriv'd from ancient, the other from modern Times.

'TIS ſeldom or never found, when a falſe Taſte in Poetry or Eloquence prevails among any People, that it has been preferr'd to a true, upon Compariſon and Reflection. It commonly prevails merely from Ignorance of the true, and from the want of perfect Models, to lead Men into a juſter Apprehenſion, and more refin'd Reliſh of thoſe Productions of Genius. When *theſe* appear, they ſoon unite all Suffrages in their Favour, and, by their natural and powerful Charms, gain over, even the moſt prejudic'd, to the Love and Admiration of them. The Principles of

every Paſſion, and of every Sentiment, is in every Man; and when you touch them properly, they riſe to Life, and warm the Heart, and convey that Satisfaction by which a Work of Genius is diſtinguiſh'd from the adulterate Beauties of a capricious Wit and Fancy. And if this Obſervation be true, with regard to all the liberal Arts, it muſt be peculiarly ſo, with regard to Eloquence; which, being merely calculated for the Public, and for Men of the World, cannot, with any Pretext of Reaſon, appeal from the People to more refin'd Judges; but muſt ſubmit to the public Verdict, without Reſerve or Limitation. Whoever, upon Compariſon, is deem'd by the People the greateſt Orator, ought moſt certainly to be pronounc'd ſuch, by Men of Science and Erudition. And tho' an indifferent Orator may triumph for a long Time, and be eſteem'd altogether perfect by the Vulgar, who are ſatisfy'd with his Accompliſhments, and know not in what he is defective: Yet, whenever the true Genius appears, *he* draws to him the Attention of every one, and immediately appears ſuperior to his Rival.

Now, to judge, by this Rule, ancient Eloquence, that is, the ſublime and paſſionate, is of a much juſter Taſte than the modern, or the argumentative and rational; and, if properly executed, will always have more Command and Authority over Mankind. We are ſatisfy'd with our Mediocrity, becauſe we have had no Experience of any thing better: But the Ancients had Experience of both, and, upon Compariſon, gave the Preference to that Kind, of which they have left us ſuch applauded Models. For, if I am not miſtaken,

ſtaken, our modern Eloquence is of the ſame Stile or Species with that which ancient Critics denominated *Attic* Eloquence, that is, calm, elegant, and ſubtile, which inſtructed the Reaſon more than affected the Paſſions, and never rais'd its Tone above Argument or common Diſcourſe. Such was the Eloquence of *Lyſias* among the *Athenians*, and of *Calvus* among the *Romans*. Theſe were eſteem'd in their Time; but when compar'd with *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero*, were eclips'd like a Taper when ſet in the Rays of a meridian Sun. Thoſe latter Orators poſſeſs'd the ſame Elegance, and Subtility, and Force of Argument, with the former; but what render'd them chiefly admirable, was that Pathetic and Sublime, which, on proper Occaſions, they threw into their Diſcourſe, and by which they commanded the Reſolutions of their Audience.

OF this Species of Eloquence we have ſcarce had any Inſtances in *Britain*, at leaſt in our public Speakers. In our Writers, we have had ſome Inſtances, which have met with great Applauſe, and might aſſure our ambitious Youth of equal or ſuperior Glory in Attempts for the Revival of ancient Eloquence. My Lord *Bolingbroke*'s Productions contain a Force and Energy and Sublime, which our Orators ſcarce ever aim at; tho' 'tis evident, that ſuch an elevated Stile has much better Grace in a Speaker than in a Writer, and is aſſur'd of a more prompt and more aſtoniſhing Succeſs. 'Tis there ſeconded by the Graces of Voice and Action: The Movements are mutually communicated by Sympathy, betwixt the Orator and the Audience: And the very Aſpect of a large Aſſembly, attentive to the

Diſcourſe of one Man, muſt inſpire him with a peculiar Elevation, ſufficient to give a Propriety to the ſtrongeſt Figures and Expreſſions. 'Tis true, there is a great Prejudice againſt *Set Speeches*; and a Man can ſcarce eſcape Ridicule, who repeats a Diſcourſe, as a School-boy does his Leſſon, and takes no Notice of any thing that has been advanc'd in the Courſe of the Debate. But where is the Neceſſity of falling into this Abſurdity? A public Speaker muſt know beforehand the Queſtion under Debate. He may compoſe all the Arguments, Objections, and Anſwers, ſuch as he thinks will be moſt proper for his Diſcourſe. If any thing new occur, he may ſupply it from his Invention; nor will the Difference be very apparent betwixt his elaborate and his extemporary Compoſitions. The Mind naturally continues with the ſame *Impetus* or *Force*, which it has acquir'd by its Motion; as a Veſſel, once impell'd by the Oars, carries on its Courſe for ſome Time, even when the Original Impulſe is ſuſpended.

Cicero De Oratore. L. 1. - 153.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, that even tho' our modern Orators ſhould not elevate their Stile, or aſpire to a Rivalſhip with the Ancient; yet there is a material Defect in moſt of their Speeches, which they might correct, without departing from that compos'd Air of Argument and Reaſoning, to which they limit their Ambition. Their great Affectation of extemporary Diſcourſes has made them reject all Order and Method, which ſeems ſo requiſite to Argument, and without which 'tis ſcarce poſſible to produce an intire Conviction in the Mind. 'Tis not,

that I would recommend many formal Diviſions in a public Diſcourſe, unleſs the Subject very evidently offer them: But 'tis eaſy, without this Formality, to obſerve a Method, and make that Method conſpicuous to the Hearers, who will be infinitely pleas'd to ſee the Arguments riſe naturally from one another, and will retain a more thorough Perſuaſion, than can ariſe from the ſtrongeſt Reaſons, which are thrown together in Confuſion.

ESSAY XVII.

Of the RISE *and* PROGRESS *of the* ARTS *and* SCIENCES.

THERE is not a Matter of greater Nicety, in our Enquiries concerning human Affairs, than to diſtinguiſh exactly what is owing to *Chance*, and what proceeds from *Cauſes*; nor is there any thing, in which an Author is more apt to deceive himſelf, by falſe Subtilties and Refinements. To ſay, that any Event is deriv'd from Chance, cuts ſhort all farther Enquiry concerning it, and leaves the Writer in the ſame State of Ignorance with all the reſt of Mankind. But when the Event is ſuppoſed to proceed from certain and ſtable Cauſes, he may then diſplay his Ingenuity, in aſſigning theſe Cauſes; and as a Man of any Subtility can never be at a Loſs in this Particular, he has thereby an Opportunity of ſwelling his Volumes, and diſcovering his Profound Knowledge, in obſerving what eſcapes the Vulgar and Ignorant.

THE diſtinguiſhing betwixt Chance and Cauſes muſt depend upon every particular Man's Sagacity, in conſidering every particular Incident. But, if I were to aſſign any general Rule to help us in applying this

this Diſtinction, it would be the following, *What depends upon a few Perſons is, in a great Meaſure, to be aſcrib'd to Chance, or ſecret and unknown Cauſes: What ariſes from a great Number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known Cauſes.*

THERE may two very natural Reaſons be aſſign'd for this Rule. *Firſt*, If you ſuppoſe a Dye to have any Byaſs, however ſmall, to a particular Side, this Byaſs, though, perhaps, it may not appear in a few Throws, will certainly prevail in a great Number, and will caſt the Balance intirely to that Side. In like Manner, when any *Cauſes* beget a particular Inclination or Paſſion, at a certain Time, and among a certain People; tho' many Individuals may eſcape the Contagion, and be rul'd by Paſſions peculiar to themſelves; yet the Multitude will certainly be infected with the common Paſſion, and be govern'd by it in all their Actions.

Secondly, THOSE Principles or Cauſes, which are fitted to operate on a Multitude, are always of a groſſer and more ſtubborn Nature, leſs ſubject to Accidents, and leſs influenc'd by Whim and private Fancy, than thoſe which operate on a few only. The latter are commonly ſo delicate and refin'd, that the ſmalleſt Incident in the Health, Education, or Fortune of particular Perſons, is ſufficient to divert their Courſe, and retard their Operation, nor is it poſſible to reduce them to any general Maxims or Obſervations. Their Influence at one Time, will never aſſure us concerning their Influence at another; even tho' all the general Circumſtances ſhould be the ſame in both Caſes.

TO

To judge by this Rule, the domeſtic and the gradual Revolutions of a State, muſt be a more proper Subject of Reaſoning and Obſervation, than the foreign and the momentary, which are commonly produc'd by ſingle Perſons, and are more influenc'd by Whim, Folly, or Caprice, than by general Paſſions and Intereſts. The Depreſſion of the Lords, and Riſe of the Commons in *England*, after the Statute of Alienations, and the Increaſe of Trade and Induſtry, are more eaſily accounted for by general Principles, than the Depreſſion of the *Spaniſh*, and Riſe of the *French* Monarchy, after the Death of *Charles Quint*. Had *Harry* IV. Cardinal *Richelieu*, and *Loüis* XIV. been *Spaniards*; and *Philip* II, III, and IV, and *Charles* II, been *Frenchmen*, the Hiſtory of theſe two Nations had been intirely revers'd.

For the ſame Reaſon, 'tis more eaſy to account for the Riſe and Progreſs of Commerce in any Kingdom, than for that of Learning; and a State, that ſhould apply itſelf to the Encouragement of the one, would be much more aſſur'd of Succeſs, than one which ſhould cultivate the other. Avarice, or the Deſire of Gain, is an univerſal Paſſion, that operates at all Times, in all Places, and upon all Perſons: But Curioſity, or the Love of Knowledge, has but a very limited Influence, and requires Youth, Leiſure, Education, Genius, and Example, to make it govern any Perſon. You will never want Bookſellers, while there are Buyers of Books: But there may frequently be Readers, where there are no Authors. Multitudes of People, Ne-

Neceſſity and Liberty, have begot Commerce in *Holland:* But Study and Application have not produc'd any eminent Writers.

WE may, therefore, conclude, that there is no Subject, wherein we muſt proceed with more Caution, than in tracing the Hiſtory of the Arts and Sciences; leſt we aſſign Cauſes that never exiſted, and reduce what is merely contingent to ſtable and univerſal Principles. Thoſe, who cultivate the Sciences in any State, are always few in Number: The Paſſion, that governs them, limited: Their Taſte and Judgment tender and eaſily perverted: And their Application diſturb'd with the ſmalleſt Accident. Chance, therefore, or ſecret and unknown Cauſes, muſt have a great Influence on the Riſe and Progreſs of all the refin'd Arts.

BUT there is a Reaſon, which induces me not to aſcribe the Matter altogether to Chance. Tho' the Perſons, that cultivate the Sciences with ſuch aſtoniſhing Succeſs, as to attract the Admiration of Poſterity, be always few, in all Nations and all Ages; 'tis impoſſible but a Share of the ſame Spirit and Genius muſt be antecedently diffus'd thro' the People among whom they ariſe, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earlieſt Infancy, the Taſte and Judgment of thoſe eminent Writers. The Maſs cannot be altogether inſipid, from which ſuch refin'd Spirits are extracted †. *There is a God within us,* ſays *Ovid, who*

† Eſt Deus in nobis; agitante caleſcimus illo:
Impetus hic, ſacræ ſemina mentis habet.
Ovid. Faſt. Lib. I.

breathes

breathes that Divine Fire, by which we are animated. Poets, in all Ages, have advanc'd this Claim to Inſpiration. There is not, however, any thing ſupernatural in the Caſe. Their Fire is not kindled from Heaven. It only runs along the Earth; is caught from one Breaſt to another; and burns brighteſt, where the Materials are beſt prepar'd, and moſt happily diſpos'd. The Queſtion, therefore, concerning the Riſe and Progreſs of the Arts and Sciences, is not altogether a Queſtion concerning the Taſte, Genius, and Spirit of a few, but concerning thoſe of a whole People; and may, therefore, be accounted for, in ſome Meaſure, by general Cauſes and Principles. I grant, that a Man, who ſhould enquire why ſuch a particular Poet, as *Homer*, for Inſtance, exiſted in ſuch a Place, at ſuch a Time, would throw himſelf Head-long into Chimæra, and could never treat of ſuch a Subject, without a Multitude of falſe Subtilties and Refinements. He might as well pretend to give a Reaſon, why ſuch particular Generals, as *Fabius* and *Scipio*, liv'd in *Rome* at ſuch a Time, and why *Fabius* came into the World before *Scipio*. For ſuch Incidents as thoſe, no other Reaſon can be given but that of *Horace*.

Scit genius, natale comes, qui temperat aſtrum,
Naturæ Deus humanæ, mortalis in unum ——
— Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus & ater.

But, I am perſuaded, that in many Caſes very good Reaſons might be given, why ſuch a particular Nation is more polite and learned, at a particular Time,

Time, than any of its Neighbours. At leaſt, this is ſo curious a Subject, that 'tis a Pity to abandon it intirely, before we have found, whether or not it be ſuſceptible of Reaſoning, and can be reduc'd to any general Principles. I ſhall, therefore, proceed to deliver a few Obſervations on this Subject, which I ſubmit, with entire Deference, to the Cenſure and Examination of the Learned.

MY firſt Obſervation is, *That it is impoſſible for the Arts and Sciences to ariſe, at firſt, among any People, unleſs that People enjoy the Bleſſing of a free Government.*

IN the firſt Ages of the World, when Men are, as yet, barbarous and ignorant, they ſeek for no farther Security againſt mutual Violence and Injuſtice, than the Choice of ſome Rulers, few or many, in whom they place an implicite Confidence, without providing any Security, by Laws or political Inſtitutions, againſt the Violence and Injuſtice of theſe Rulers. If the Authority be center'd in a ſingle Perſon, and if the People, by Conqueſt or Generation, increaſe to a great Multitude, the Monarch, finding it impoſſible, in his own Perſon, to execute every Office of Sovereignty, in every Place, muſt delegate his Authority to inferior Magiſtrates, who preſerve Peace and Order in their particular Diſtricts. As Experience and Education have not yet refin'd the Wits of Men to any conſiderable Degree, the Prince, who is himſelf unreſtrain'd, never dreams of reſtraining his Miniſters, but delegates his full Authority to every one, whom he ſets over any Portion of the People. All general Laws

are

are attended with Inconveniencies, when apply'd to particular Caſes; and it requires great Penetration and Experience, both to perceive that theſe Inconveniencies are fewer than what reſult from full diſcretionary Powers in every Magiſtrate; and alſo, to diſcern what general Laws are, upon the Whole, attended with feweſt Inconveniencies. This is a Matter of ſo great Difficulty, that Men may have made ſome Advances, even in the ſublime Arts of Poetry and Eloquence, where a Rapidity of Genius and Imagination aſſiſts their Progreſs, before they have arriv'd at any great Refinements in their Municipal Laws, where frequent Trials, and diligent Obſervation can alone direct their Improvements. It is not, therefore, to be ſuppos'd, that a barbarous Monarch, unreſtrain'd and uninſtructed, will ever become a Legiſlator, or think of reſtraining his *Baſhas* in every Province, or even his *Cadis* in every Village. We are told, that the late *Czar*, tho' actuated with a noble Genius, and ſmit with the Love and Admiration of *European* Arts; yet profeſs'd an Eſteem for the *Turkiſh* Policy in this Particular, and approv'd of the ſummary Deciſions of Cauſes, which are practiſed in that barbarous Monarchy, where the Judges are not reſtrain'd by any Methods, Forms, or Laws. He did not perceive, how contrary ſuch a Practice would have been to all his other Endeavours for refining his People. Deſpotic Power, in all Caſes, is ſomewhat oppreſſive and debaſing; but 'tis altogether ruinous and intolerable, when contracted into a ſmall Compaſs; and becomes ſtill worſe, when the Perſon, who poſſeſſes it, knows that the Time of his Authority is limited and uncertain. *Ha-*

bet

bet ſubjectos tanquam ſuos; viles, ut alienos *. He governs the Subjects with full Authority, as if they were his own; and with Negligence or Tyranny, as belonging to another. A People govern'd after ſuch a Manner are *Slaves*, in the full and proper Senſe of the Word; and 'tis impoſſible they can ever aſpire to any Refinements of Taſte or Reaſon. They dare not ſo much as pretend to enjoy the Neceſſaries of Life, in Plenty or Security.

TO expect, therefore, that the Arts and Sciences ſhould ever take their *firſt* Riſe in a Monarchy, is to expect a Contradiction. Before theſe Refinements have been ſtudy'd, the Monarch is ignorant and barbarous; and, not having Knowledge ſufficient to make him ſenſible of the Neceſſity of balancing his Government upon general Laws, he delegates his full Powers to all inferior Magiſtrates. This barbarous Policy debaſes the People, and for ever prevents all Improvement. Were it poſſible, that, before Science was known in the World, a Monarch could poſſeſs ſo much Wiſdom as to become a Legiſlator, and govern his People by Law, not by the arbitrary Will of their Fellow-ſubjects, it might be poſſible for that Species of Government to be the firſt Nurſery of Arts and Sciences. But in that Suppoſition there ſeems to be a manifeſt Repugnancy.

'TIS poſſible, that a Republic, in its Infant-ſtate, may be ſupported by as few Laws as a barbarous Monarchy, and may entruſt as unlimited an Authority to

* *Tacit.* Hiſt. Lib. 1.

its

its Magiſtrates or Judges. But, beſides that the frequent Elections of theſe Magiſtrates by the People, are a conſiderable Check upon their Authority; 'tis unavoidable, but, in a Tract of Time, the Neceſſity of reſtraining the Magiſtrates, in order to preſerve Liberty, muſt at laſt appear, and give Riſe to general Laws and Statutes. The *Roman* Conſuls, for ſome Time, decided all Cauſes, without being confin'd by any poſitive Laws, till the People, bearing this Yoke with Impatience, created the *Decemvirs*, who promulgated the *twelve Tables*; a Body of Laws, which, though, perhaps, they were not equal in Bulk to one *Engliſh* Act of Parliament, were the only written Rules that regulated Property and Puniſhment, for ſome Ages, in that famous Republic. They were, however, ſufficient, along with the Forms of a free Government, to ſecure the Lives and Properties of the Citizens; to exempt one Man from the Dominion of another; and to protect every one from the Violence or Tyranny of his Fellow Citizens. In ſuch a Situation the Sciences may raiſe their Heads, and flouriſh: But never can have Being amidſt ſuch a Scene of Oppreſſion and Slavery, as always reſults from barbarous Monarchies, where the People alone are reſtrain'd by the Authority of the Magiſtrates, and the Magiſtrates are not reſtrain'd by any Law or Statute. An unlimited Deſpotiſm of this Nature, while it exiſts, effectually ſtops all Improvement, and keeps Men from attaining that Knowledge, which is requiſite to inſtruct them in the Advantages ariſing from a better Police, and more moderate Authority.

HERE then are the Advantages of Republics. Tho' a Republic ſhou'd be barbarous, it neceſſarily, by an infallible Operation, gives Riſe to LAW, even before Mankind have made any conſiderable Advances in the other Sciences. From Law ariſes Security: From Security Curioſity: And from Curioſity Knowledge. The latter Steps of this Progreſs may be more accidental; but the former are altogether neceſſary. A Republic, without Laws, can never have any Duration. On the contrary, in a Monarchical Government, Law ariſes not neceſſarily from the Forms of the Government. Monarchy, when abſolute, contains even ſomething repugnant to Law. Great Wiſdom and Reflection can alone reconcile them. But ſuch a Degree of Wiſdom can never be expected, before the greater Refinements and Improvements of human Reaſon. Theſe Refinements require Curioſity, Security and Law. The *firſt* Growth, therefore, of the Arts and Sciences can never be expected in deſpotic Governments.

ACCORDING to the neceſſary Progreſs of Things, Law muſt precede Science. In Republics Law may precede Science, and may ariſe from the very Nature of the Government. In Monarchies it ariſes not from the Nature of the Government, and cannot precede Science. An abſolute Prince, that is barbarous, renders all his Miniſters and Magiſtrates as abſolute as himſelf: And there needs no more to prevent, for ever, all Induſtry, Curioſity and Science.

THERE

THERE are other Cauſes, which diſcourage the Riſe of the refin'd Arts in deſpotic Governments; tho' I take the want of Laws, and the Delegation of full Powers to every petty Magiſtrate, to be the principal. Eloquence certainly ariſes more naturally in popular Governments: Emulation too, in every Accompliſhment, muſt be there more animated and enliven'd: And Genius and Capacity have a fuller Scope and Career. All theſe Cauſes render free Governments the only proper *Nurſery* for the Arts and Sciences.

THE ſecond Obſervation I ſhall make on this Head, is, *That nothing is more favourable to the Riſe of Politeneſs and Learning, than a Number of neighbouring independent States connected together by Commerce and Policy.* The Emulation, which naturally riſes among thoſe neighbouring States, is an obvious Source of Improvement: But what I wou'd chiefly inſiſt on is the Stop, that ſuch limited Territories give both to *Power* and to *Authority*.

EXTENDED Governments, where a ſingle Perſon has great Influence, become immediately deſpotic; but ſmall ones change naturally into Commonwealths. A large Government is accuſtom'd by Degrees to Tyranny; becauſe each Act of Violence is at firſt perform'd upon a Part, which, being diſtant from the Majority, is not taken Notice of, nor excites any violent Ferment. Beſides, a large Government, tho' the whole be diſcontented, may, by a little

tle Art, be kept in Obedience; becauſe each Part, being ignorant of the Reſolutions of the reſt, is afraid to begin any Commotion or Inſurrection. Not to mention, that there is a ſuperſtitious Reverence for Princes, which Mankind naturally fall into when they do not often ſee the Prince, and when many of them become not acquainted with him, ſo as to find him but a Man. And as large States can afford a great Expence, in order to ſupport the Pomp of Majeſty, this is a Kind of Faſcination on Mankind, and naturally contributes to the enſlaving of them.

IN a ſmall Government, any Act of Oppreſſion is immediately known thro' the whole: The Murmurs and Diſcontents, proceeding from it, are eaſily communicated: And the Indignation riſes the higher, that the Subjects are not apt to apprehend, in ſuch States, that the Diſtance is very wide betwixt themſelves and their Sovereign. "The greateſt Enemies "to the Glory of Heroes, ſays a certain Writer, are "their *Valet de Chambres*." Tis certain, that Admiration and Acquaintance are altogether incompatible with Regard to any mortal Creature. *Antigonus*, being complimented by his Flatterers, as a Deity, and as the Son of that glorious Planet, which illuminates the Univerſe. *Upon that Head*, ſays he, *you may conſult the Perſon that empties my cloſe Stool.* Sleep and Love convinc'd *Alexander*, that he was not a God: But I ſuppoſe thoſe who attended him daily, cou'd have given many other ſtill more convincing Proofs of his Humanity, in the numberleſs Weakneſſes to which he was ſubject.

BUT

But the Diviſions into ſmall States are favourable to Learning, by ſtopping the Progreſs of *Authority*, as well as that of *Power*. Reputation is often as great a Faſcination upon Mankind as Sovereignty, and is equally deſtructive to the Freedom of Thought and Examination. But where a Number of neighbouring States have a great Intercourſe of Arts and Commerce, their mutual Jealouſy keeps them from receiving too lightly the Law from each other, in Matters of Taſte or of Reaſoning, and makes them examine every Work of Art with the greateſt Care and Accuracy. The Contagion of popular Opinion ſpreads not ſo eaſily from one Place to another. It readily receives a Check in ſome State or other, where it concurs not with the prevailing Prejudices. And nothing but Nature or Reaſon can force its Way thro' all Obſtacles, and unite the moſt rival Nations into an Eſteem and Admiration of it.

GREECE was a Cluſter of little Principalities, which ſoon became Republics; and being united both by their near Neighbourhood, and by the Ties of the ſame Language and Intereſt, they entered into the cloſeſt Intercourſe of Commerce and of Learning. There concurred a happy Climate, a fertile Soil, and a moſt harmonious and comprehenſive Language; ſo that every Circumſtance, among that People, ſeemed to favour the Riſe of the Arts and Sciences. Each City produced its ſeveral Artiſts and Philoſophers, who refus'd to yield the Preference to thoſe of the neighbouring Republics: Their Debates and Conten-

tions ſharpen'd the Wits of Men: A Variety of Objects was preſented to the Judgment, while each challeng'd the Preference to the reſt: And the Sciences, not being dwarf'd by the Reſtraint of Authority, were enabled to make ſuch conſiderable Shoots, as are, even at this Time, the Objects of our Admiration. After the *Roman Chriſtian* or *Catholic* Church had ſpread itſelf over the civiliz'd World, and had engroſt all the Learning of the Times, being really one large State within itſelf, and united under one Head; this Variety of Sects immediately diſappear'd, and the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy was alone admitted into all the Schools, to the utter Depravation of every Kind of Learning. But Mankind having, at Length, thrown off this Yoke, Affairs are now returned nearly to the ſame Situation as before, and *Europe* is at preſent a Copy at large, of what *Greece* was formerly a Pattern in Miniature. We have ſeen the Advantage of this Situation in ſeveral Inſtances. What check'd the Progreſs of the *Carteſian* Philoſophy, to which the *French* Nation ſhew'd ſuch a ſtrong Propenſity towards the End of the laſt Century, but the Oppoſition made to it by the other Nations of *Europe*, who ſoon diſcover'd the weak Sides of that Philoſophy? The ſevereſt Scrutiny, that *Newton*'s Theory has undergone, proceeded not from his Countrymen but Foreigners; and if it can overcome the Obſtacles it meets with at preſent in all Parts of *Europe*, it will probably go down triumphant to the lateſt Poſterity. The *Engliſh* are become ſenſible of the ſcandalous Licentiouſneſs of their Stage, from the Example of the *French* Decency and Morals. The

French are convinc'd, that their Theatre has become ſomewhat effeminate, by too much Love and Gallantry, and begin to approve of the more maſculine Taſte of ſome of their neighbouring Nations.

In *China* there ſeems to be a pretty conſiderable Stock of Politeneſs and Science, which, in the Courſe of ſo many Centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into ſomething more perfect and finiſh'd, than what has yet ariſen from them. But *China* is one vaſt Empire, ſpeaking one Language, govern'd by one Law, and ſympathizing in the ſame Manners. The Authority of any Teacher, ſuch as *Confucius*, was propagated eaſily from one Corner of the Empire to another. None had the Courage to reſiſt the Torrent of popular Opinion. And Poſterity were not bold enough to diſpute what had been univerſally receiv'd by their Anceſtors. This ſeems to be one natural Reaſon, why the Sciences have made ſo ſlow a Progreſs in that mighty Empire*.

If

* If it be aſkt how we can reconcile to the foregoing Principles the Happineſs, Riches, and good Police of the *Chineſe*, who have always been govern'd by a ſole Monarch, and can ſcarce form an Idea of a free Government; I would anſwer, that tho' the *Chineſe* Government be a pure Monarchy, it is not, properly ſpeaking, abſolute. This proceeds from a Peculiarity of the Situation of that Country: They have no Neighbours, except the *Tartars*, from whom they were, in ſome Meaſure, ſecur'd, at leaſt ſeem'd to be ſecur'd, by their famous Wall, and by the great Superiority of their Numbers. By this Means, military Diſcipline has always been much neglected amongſt them; and their ſtanding Forces are mere Militia,

IF we conſider the face of the Globe, *Europe*, of all the four Parts of the World, is the moſt broken by Seas, Rivers, and Mountains; and *Greece* of all Countries of *Europe*. Hence theſe Regions were naturally divided into ſeveral diſtinct Governments. And hence the Sciences aroſe in *Greece*; and *Europe* has been hitherto the moſt conſtant Habitation of them.

I HAVE ſometimes been inclin'd to think, that Interruptions in the Periods of Learning, were they not attended with ſuch a Deſtruction of ancient Books, and the Records of Hiſtory, wou'd be rather favourable to the Arts and Sciences, by breaking the Progreſs of Authority, and dethroning the tyrannical Uſurpers over human Reaſon. In this Particular, they have the ſame Influence, as Interruptions in political Governments and Societies. Conſider the ſlaviſh Submiſſion of the ancient Philoſophers to the ſeveral Maſters in each School, and you'll be convinc'd, that

tia, of the worſt kind, ; and unfit to ſuppreſs any general Inſurrection in Countries ſo extremely populous. The Sword, therefore, may properly be ſaid to be always in the Hands of the People, which is a ſufficient Reſtraint upon the Monarch, and obliges him to lay his *Mandarins* or Governors of Provinces under the Reſtraint of general Laws, in order to prevent thoſe Rebellions, which we learn from Hiſtory to have been ſo frequent and dangerous in that Government. Perhaps, a pure Monarchy of this Kind, were it fitted for Defence againſt foreign Enemies, would be the beſt of all Governments, as having both the Tranquillity attending Kingly Power, and the Moderation and Liberty of popular Aſſemblies.

no good cou'd ever be expected from a hundred Centuries of ſuch a ſervile Philoſophy. Even the *Eclectics*, who aroſe about the Age of *Auguſtus*, notwithſtanding their profeſſing to chuſe freely what pleas'd them from every different Sect, were yet, in the main, as ſlaviſh and dependent as any of their brethren; ſince they ſought for Truth, not in Nature, but in the ſeveral Schools; where they ſuppos'd ſhe muſt neceſſarily be found, tho' not united in a Body, yet diſpers'd in Parts. Upon the Revival of Learning, thoſe Sects of *Stoics* and *Epicureans*, *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans* cou'd never regain any Credit or Authority; and, at the ſame Time, by the Example of their Fall, kept Men from ſubmitting, with ſuch blind Deference, to thoſe new Sects, which have attempted to gain an Aſcendant over them.

THE *third* Obſervation I ſhall form on this Head, of the Riſe and Progreſs of the Arts and Sciences, is, *That tho' the only proper* Nurſery *of theſe noble Plants be a free Government, yet they may be tranſplanted into any Government; and that a Republic is moſt favourable to the Growth of the Sciences, and a civiliz'd Monarchy to that of the polite Arts.*

To balance a large State or Society, whether Monarchical or Republican, on general Laws, is a Work of ſo great Difficulty, that no human Genius, however comprehenſive, is able, by the mere dint of Reaſon and Reflection, to effectuate it. The Judgments of many muſt unite in this Work: Experience muſt guide their Labour: Time muſt bring it to Perfecti-

on:

on: And the feeling of Inconveniencies muſt correct the Miſtakes, which they inevitably fall into, in their frequent Trials and Experiments. Hence the Impoſſibility appears, that this Undertaking ſhould be begun and carried on in any Monarchy; ſince ſuch a Form of Government, before it be civiliz'd, knows no other Secret in Policy, than that of entruſting unlimited Powers with every Governor or Magiſtrate, and ſubdividing the People into ſo many Claſſes and Orders of Slavery. From ſuch a Situation, no Improvements can ever be expected in the Sciences, in the liberal Arts, in Laws, and ſcarce in the manual Arts or Manufactures. The ſame Barbarity and Ignorance, with which the Government commences, is propagated to all Poſterity, and can never come to a Period by the Efforts or Ingenuity of ſuch unhappy Slaves.

BUT tho' LAW, the Source of all Security and Happineſs, ariſes late in any Government, and is the ſlow Product of Order and of Liberty, it is not preſerv'd with the ſame Difficulty, that it is produc'd; but when it has once taken Root, is a hardy Plant, which will ſcarce ever periſh thro' the ill Culture of Men, or the Rigour of the Seaſons. The Arts of Luxury, and much more the liberal Arts, which depend on a refin'd Taſte or Sentiment, are eaſily loſt; becauſe they are always reliſh'd by a few only, whoſe Leiſure, Fortune and Genius fit them for ſuch Amuſements. But what is profitable to every Mortal, and in common Life, when once it is diſcover'd, can ſcarce ever periſh, but by the total Subverſion of

Society, and by ſuch furious Inundations of barbarous Invaders, as obliterate all Memory of former Arts and Civility. Imitation alſo is apt to tranſport theſe coarſer and more uſeful Arts from one Climate to another, and make them precede the refin'd Arts in their Progreſs; tho' perhaps they ſprung after them in their firſt Riſe and Propagation. From theſe Cauſes proceed civiliz'd Monarchies, where the Arts of Government, firſt invented in free States, are preſerv'd, to the mutual Advantage and Security of Sovereign and Subject.

However perfect, therefore, the Monarchical Form may appear to ſome Politicians, it owes all it's Perfection to the Republican; nor is it poſſible, thata pure Deſpotiſm, eſtabliſh'd among a barbarous People, can ever, by its native Force and Energy, refine and poliſh itſelf. It muſt borrow its Laws, and Methods, and Inſtitutions, and conſequently its Stability and Order, from free Governments. Theſe Advantages are the ſole Growth of Republics. The extenſive Deſpotiſm of a barbarous Monarchy, by entering into the Detail of the Government, as well as into the principal Points of Adminiſtration, for ever prevents all ſuch Improvements.

In a civiliz'd Monarchy, the Prince alone is unreſtrain'd in the Exerciſe of his Authority, and poſſeſſes alone a Power, which is not bounded by any Thing but Cuſtom, Example, and the Senſe of his own Intereſt. Every Miniſter or Magiſtrate, however eminent, muſt ſubmit to the general Laws, which govern

govern the whole Society, and muſt exert the Authority delegated to him after the Manner, which is preſcrib'd. The People depend on none but their Sovereign, for the Security of their Property. He is ſo far remov'd from them, and is ſo much exempt from private Jealouſies or Intereſts, that this Dependence is not felt. And thus a Species of Government ariſes, to which, in a high political Rant, we may give the Name of *Tyranny*, but which, by a juſt and prudent Adminiſtration, may afford ſufficient Security to the People, and may fulfil almoſt every End of political Society.

BUT tho' in a civiliz'd Monarchy, as well as in a Republic, the People have ſufficient Security for the Enjoyment of their Property; yet in both theſe Forms of Government, thoſe who poſſeſs the ſupreme Authority have the Diſpoſal of many Honours and Advantages, which ſufficiently excite the Ambition and Avarice of Mankind. The only Difference is, that in a Republic, the Candidates for Offices muſt look downwards, to gain the Suffrages of the People; in a Monarchy, muſt turn their Attention upwards, to court the good Graces and Favour of the Great. To be ſucceſsful in the former Way, 'tis neceſſary for a Man to make himſelf *uſeful*, by his Induſtry, Capacity, or Knowledge: To be proſperous in the latter Way, 'tis requiſite for him to render himſelf *agreeable*, by his Wit, Complaiſance, or Civility. A ſtrong Genius ſucceeds beſt in Republics: A refined Taſte in Monarchies. And conſequently the Sciences are

the more natural Growth of the one, and the polite Arts of the other.

NOT to mention, that Monarchies, receiving their chief Stability from a ſuperſtitious Reverence to Prieſts and Princes, have always abridg'd the Liberty of Reaſoning, with Regard to Religion and Politics, and conſequently Metaphyſics and Morals. All theſe form the moſt conſiderable Branches of Science. Mathematics and natural Philoſophy, which are the only ones that remain, are not half ſo valuable.

THERE is a very great Connection among all the Arts, that contribute to Pleaſure; and the ſame Delicacy of Taſte, which enables us to make Improvements in one, will not allow the others to remain altogether rude and barbarous. Amongſt all the Arts of Converſation, no one pleaſes more than mutual Deference and Civility, which leads us to reſign our own Inclinations to thoſe of our Companion, and to curb and conceal that Preſumption and Arrogance ſo natural to the Mind of Man. A good-natur'd Man, that is well educated, practiſes this Civility to every Mortal, without Premeditation or Intereſt: But, in order to render that valuable Quality general among any People, it ſeems neceſſary to aſſiſt the natural Diſpoſitions by ſome general Motive. Where Power riſes upwards from the People to the Great, as in all Republics, ſuch Refinements of Civility are apt to be little practis'd; ſince the whole State are, by that Means, brought near to a Level, and every Member

ber of it is render'd, in a great Meaſure, independent of another. The People have the Advantage, by the Authority of their Suffrages: The Great, by the Superiority of their Station. But in a civiliz'd Monarchy, there is a long Train of Dependence from the Prince to the Peaſant, which is not great enough to render Property precarious, or depreſs the Minds of the People; but is ſufficient to beget in every one an Inclination to pleaſe his Superiors, and form himſelf upon thoſe Models, which are moſt acceptable to People of Condition and Education. Politeneſs of Manners, therefore, ariſes moſt naturally in Monarchies and Courts; and where that flouriſhes, none of the liberal Arts will be altogether neglected or deſpis'd.

THE Republics in *Europe* are at preſent noted for Want of Politeneſs. *The good Manners of a* Swiſs *civiliz'd in* Holland *, is another Expreſſion for Ruſticity among the *French*. The *Engliſh* fall under the ſame Cenſure, notwithſtanding their Learning and Genius. And if the *Venetians* be an Exception to the Rule, they owe it, perhaps, to their Communication with the other *Italians*, moſt of whoſe Governments beget a Dependence more than ſufficient for the civilizing their Manners.

'TIS difficult to pronounce any Judgment concerning the Refinements of the ancient Republics in this Particular: But I am apt to ſuſpect, that the Arts

* *C'eſt la politeſſe d'un Suiſſe*
En Hollande civiliſé. Rouſſeau.

of Converſation were not brought ſo near Perfection amongſt them as the Arts of Writing and Compoſition. The Scurrility of the Ancients, in many Inſtances, is quite ſhocking, and exceeds all Belief. Their Vanity alſo is often not a little offenſive; as well as the common Licentiouſneſs and Immodeſty of their Stile, *Quicunque impudicus, adulter, ganeo, manu, ventre*, pene, *bona patria laceraverat*, ſays *Salluſt* in one of the graveſt and moſt moral Paſſages of his Hiſtory. *Nam fuit ante Helenam Cunnus teterrima belli cauſa*, is an Expreſſion of *Horace*, in tracing the Origin of moral Good and Evil. *Ovid* and *Lucretius* † are almoſt as licentious in their Stile as my Lord *Rocheſter*; tho' the former were fine Gentlemen and delicate Writers, and the latter was an abandon'd and ſhameleſs Profligate. *Juvenal* inculcates Modeſty with great Zeal; but ſets a very bad Example of it, if we conſider the Impudence of his Expreſſions.

I SHALL alſo be ſo bold, as to affirm, That among the Ancients, there was not much Delicacy of Breeding, or that polite Deference and Reſpect, which Civility obliges us either to expreſs or counterfeit towards the Perſons we converſe with. *Cicero* was certainly one of the politeſt Gentlemen of his

† This Poet recommends a very extraordinary Cure for Love, and what one expects not to meet with in ſo elegant and philoſophical a Poem. It ſeems to have been the Original of ſome of Dr. *Swift*'s beautiful and cleanly Images. See *Lib.* IV. 1165. The elegant *Catullus* and *Phædrus* fall under the ſame Cenſure.

Age;

Age; and yet I muſt confeſs I have frequently been ſhockt with the poor Figure under which he repreſents his Friend *Atticus*, in thoſe Dialogues, wherein he himſelf is introduc'd as a Speaker. That learned and virtuous *Roman*, whoſe Dignity, tho' he was only a private Gentleman, was inferior to that of no one in *Rome*, is there ſhewn in rather a more pitiful Light than *Philalethes*'s Friend in our modern Dialogues. He is a humble Admirer of the Orator, pays him frequent Compliments, and receives his Inſtructions, with all the Deference that a Scholar owes to his Maſter. Even *Cato* is treated in a very Cavalier-manner in the Dialogues *de finibus*. And 'tis remarkable, that *Cicero*, being a great Sceptic in Matters of Religion, and unwilling to determine any Thing on that Head among the different Sects of Philoſophy, introduces his Friends diſputing concerning the Being and Nature of the Gods, while he is only a Hearer; becauſe, forſooth, it would have been an Impropriety for ſo great a Genius as himſelf, had he ſpoke, not to have ſaid ſomething deciſive on the Subject, and have carried every Thing before him, as he always does on other Occaſions. There is alſo a Spirit of Dialogue obſerv'd in the charming Books *de Oratore*, and a tolerable Equality maintain'd among the Speakers: But then theſe Speakers are the great Men of the Age preceding the Author, and he recounts the Conference as only from Hearſay.

'TIS but a very indifferent Compliment, which *Horace* pays to his Friend *Groſphus*, in the Ode ad-

dreſt to him. *No one, ſays he, *is happy in every Reſpect. And I may perhaps enjoy ſome Advantages, which you are depriv'd of. You poſſeſs great Riches: Your bellowing Herds cover the* Silician *Plains: Your Chariot is drawn by the fineſt Horſes: And you are array'd in the richeſt Purple. But the indulgent Fates, with a ſmall Inheritance, have given* ME *a fine Genius, and have endow'd me with a Contempt for the malignant Judgments of the Vulgar. Phædrus* ſays to his Patron, *Eutychus, If you deſign to read my Works, I ſhall be pleas'd: If not, I ſhall, at leaſt, have the Advantage of pleaſing Poſterity* †. I am apt to think, that a modern Poet wou'd not have been guilty of ſuch an Impropriety as that which may be obſerv'd in *Virgil*'s Addreſs to *Auguſtus*, when, after a great deal of extravagant Flattery, and after having deify'd the Emperor, according to the Cuſtom of thoſe Times, he, at laſt, places this God on the ſame Le-

* ——— *Nihil eſt ab omni*
Parte beatum.
Abſtulit clarum cita mors Achillem,
Longa Tithonum minuit ſenectus,
Et mihi forſan, tibi quod negarit,
Porriget hora.
Te greges centum, Siculæque circum
Mugiunt vaccæ: tibi tollit, hinni-
Tum apta quadrigis equa: te bis Afro
Murice tinctæ.
Veſtiunt lanæ: mihi parva rura, &
Spiritum Græiæ tenuem Camœnæ
Parca non mendax dedit & malignum
Spernere vulgus. Lib. 2. Ode 16.

† *Quem ſi leges, lætabor; ſin autem minus, habebunt certe quo ſe oblectent poſteri.*

vel

vel with himſelf. * *By your gracious Nod*, ſays he, *render my undertaking proſperous; and taking Pity*, along with me, *of the Swains ignorant of Huſbandry, beſtow your favourable Influence on this Work.* Had Men, in that Age, been accuſtom'd to obſerve ſuch Niceties, a Writer ſo delicate as *Virgil* would certainly have given a different Turn to this Sentence. The

* *Ignaroſque viæ* mecum *miſeratus agreſtes*
Ingredere, & votis jam nunc aſſueſce vocari.

One would not ſay to a Prince or great Man, *When you and I were in ſuch a Place, we ſaw ſuch a Thing happen.* But *when you were in ſuch a Place, I attended on you: And ſuch a Thing happen'd.*

Here I cannot forbear mentioning a Piece of Delicacy obſerv'd in *France*, which ſeems to me exceſſive and ridiculous. You muſt not ſay, *That is a very fine Dog, Madam.* But, *Madam, that is a very fine Dog.* They think it indecent, that thoſe Words, *Dog* and *Madam* ſhould be coupled together in the Sentence; tho' they have no Reference to each other in the Senſe.

After all, I acknowledge, that this Reaſoning from ſingle Paſſages of ancient Authors may ſeem fallacious; and that the foregoing Arguments cannot have great Force, but with thoſe who are well acquainted with theſe Authors, and know the Truth of the general Poſition, For inſtance, what Abſurdity would it be to aſſert, that *Virgil* underſtood not the Force of the Terms he employs, and could not chuſe his Epithets with Propriety? becauſe in the following Lines, addreſt alſo to *Auguſtus*, he has fail'd in that Particular, and has aſcrib'd to the *Indians* a Quality, which ſeems, in a Manner, to turn his Hero into Ridicule.

——— *Et te, maxime Cæſar,*
Qui nunc extremis Aſiæ jam victor in oris
Imbellem *avertis Romanis arcibus Indum,*

Georg. Lib. II.

Court

Court of *Auguſtus*, however polite, had not yet, it ſeems, wore off the Manners of the Republic.

CARDINAL *Wolſey* apologiz'd for his famous Piece of Inſolence, in ſaying, EGO ET REX MEUS, *I and my King*, by obſerving, that this Expreſſion was exactly conformable to the *Latin* Idiom, and that a *Roman* always nam'd himſelf before the Perſon to whom, or of whom he ſpake. Yet this ſeems to have been an Inſtance of Want of Civility among that People. The Ancients made it a Rule, That the Perſon of the greateſt Dignity ſhould be mention'd firſt in the Diſcourſe; inſomuch, that we find, the Spring of a Quarrel and Jealouſy betwixt the *Romans* and *Ætolians*, to have been a Poet's naming the *Ætolians* before the *Romans*, in celebrating a Victory gain'd by their united Arms over the *Macedonians* *.

IF the Superiority in Politeneſs ſhould be allow'd to modern Times, the modern Notions of *Gallantry* and *Honour*, the natural Product of Courts and Monarchies, will probably be aſſign'd as the Cauſes of this Refinement. No one denies theſe Inventions to be modern †: But ſome of the moſt zealous Partizans of the Ancients, have aſſerted them to be foppiſh and ridiculous, and a Reproach, rather than an Honour to the preſent Age ‡. It may here be proper to

* *Plut.* in vita Flaminini.

† In the *Self-Tormentor* of *Terence*, *Clinias*, whenever he comes to Town, inſtead of waiting on his Miſtreſs, ſends for her to come to him.

‡ My Lord *Shaftſbury*, ſee his *Moraliſts*,

examine this Queſtion, with regard both to Gallantry and Honour. We ſhall begin with Gallantry.

NATURE has implanted in all living Creatures an Affection betwixt the Sexes, which even in the fierceſt and moſt rapacious Animals, is not merely confin'd to the Satisfaction of the bodily Appetite, but begets a Friendſhip and mutual Sympathy, that runs thro' the whole Tenor of their Lives. Nay, it may farther be obſerv'd, that even in thoſe Species, where Nature confines the Indulgence of this Appetite to one Seaſon and to one Object, and forms a Kind of Marriage or Aſſociation betwixt a ſingle Male and Female, there is yet a viſible Complacency and Benevolence, which extends farther, and mutually ſoftens the Affections of the Sexes towards each other *. How much more muſt this have Place in Man, where the Confinement of the Appetite is not natural; but either proceeds accidentally from ſome ſtrong Charm of Love, or ariſes from Reflections on Duty and Convenience? Nothing, therefore, can proceed leſs from Affectation than the Paſſion of Gallantry. 'Tis *natural* in the higheſt Degree. Art and Education, in the moſt elegant Courts, make no more

* *Tutti gli altri animai, che ſono in terra,*
O che vivon quieti & ſtanno in pace;
O ſi vengon a riſſa, & ſi fan guerra,
A la femina il maſchio non la face.
L'orſa con l'orſo al boſco ſicura erra,
La Leoneſſa appreſſo il Leon giace.
Con Lupo vive il Lupa ſicura.
Ne la Giuvenca ha del Torel paura.

Arioſto Canto 5.

Altera-

Alteration on it, than on all the other laudable Paſſions. They only turn the Mind more towards it: They refine it; they poliſh it; and give it a proper Grace and Expreſſion.

But Gallantry is as *generous* as it is *natural*. To correct ſuch groſs Vices, as lead us to commit a real Injury to others, is the Part of Morals, and the Object of the moſt ordinary Education. Where *that* is not attended to, in ſome Degree, no human Society can ſubſiſt. But in order to render Converſation, and the Intercourſe of Minds more eaſy and agreeable, Good-manners have been invented, and have carry'd the Matter ſomewhat farther. Wherever Nature has given the Mind a Propenſity to any Vice, or to any Paſſion diſagreeable to others, refin'd Breeding has taught Men to throw the Byaſs on the oppoſite Side, and to preſerve, in all their Behaviour, the Appearance of Sentiments contrary to thoſe which they naturally incline to. Thus, as we are naturally proud and ſelfiſh, and apt to aſſume the Preference above others, a polite Man is taught to behave with Deference towards thoſe he converſes with, and to yield the Superiority to them in all the common Incidents of Society. In like Manner, wherever a Perſon's Situation may naturally beget any diſagreeable Suſpicion in him, 'tis the Part of Good-manners to prevent it, by a ſtudied Diſplay of Sentiments, directly contrary to thoſe which he is apt to be jealous of. Thus, old Men know their Infirmities, and are apt to dread Contempt from the Youth: Hence, well-educated Youth redouble the Inſtances of Reſpect and Defe-

rence to their Elders. Strangers and Foreigners are without Protection: Hence, in all polite Countries, they receive the higheſt Civilities, and are intitled to the firſt Place in every Company. A Man is Lord in his own Family, and his Gueſts are, in a Manner, ſubjected to his Authority: Hence, he is always the loweſt Perſon in the Company; attentive to the Wants of every one; and giving himſelf all the Trouble, in order to pleaſe, which may not betray too viſible an Affectation, or impoſe too much Conſtraint on his Gueſts. Gallantry is nothing but an Inſtance of the ſame generous and refin'd Behaviour. As Nature has given *Man* the Superiority above *Woman*, by endowing him with greater Strength both of Mind and Body, 'tis his Part to alleviate that Superiority, as much as poſſible, by the Generoſity of his Behaviour, and by a ſtudy'd Deference and Complaiſance for all her Inclinations and Opinions. Barbarous Nations diſplay this Superiority, by reducing their Females to the moſt abject Slavery; by confining them, by beating them, by ſelling them, by killing them. But the Male-Sex, among a polite People, diſcover their Authority in a more generous, tho' not a leſs evident Manner; by Civility, by Reſpect, by Complaiſance, and, in a Word, by Gallantry. In good Company, you need not aſk, Who is the Maſter of the Feaſt? The Man, who ſits in the loweſt Place, and who is always induſtrious in helping every one, is moſt certainly the Perſon. We muſt either condemn all ſuch Inſtances of Generoſity, as foppiſh and affected, or admit of Gallantry among the reſt. The ancient *Muſcovites* wedded their Wives with a Whip, inſtead

of

of a Wedding-Ring. The ſame People, in their own Houſes, took always the Precedency above Foreigners, even * foreign Ambaſſadors. Theſe two Inſtances of their Generoſity and Politeneſs are much of a Piece.

GALLANTRY is not leſs conſiſtent with *Wiſdom* and *Prudence*, than with *Nature* and *Generoſity*; and, when under proper Regulations, contributes, more than any other Invention, to the *Entertainment* and *Improvement* of the Youth of both Sexes. In all Vegetables, 'tis obſervable, that the Flower and the Seed are always connected together; and in like Manner, among every Species of Animals, Nature has founded on the Love betwixt the Sexes their ſweeteſt and beſt Enjoyment. But the Satisfaction of the bodily Appetite is not alone of great Value; and even in brute Creatures, we find, that their Play and Dalliance, and other Expreſſions of Fondneſs, form the greateſt Part of the Entertainment. In rational Creatures, we muſt certainly admit the Mind for a conſiderable Share. Were we to rob the Feaſt of all its Garniture of Reaſon, Diſcourſe, Sympathy, Friendſhip, and Gaiety, what remains would ſcarce be worth Acceptance, in the Judgment of the truly elegant and luxurious.

WHAT better School for Manners, than the Company of virtuous Women; where the mutual Endeavour to pleaſe muſt inſenſibly poliſh the Mind, where the Example of the Female Softneſs and Modeſty

* See, *Relation of three Embaſſies*, by Earl of *Carlile*.

muſt

muſt communicate itſelf to their Admirers, and where the Delicacy of that Sex puts every one on his Guard, leſt he give Offence by any Breach of Decency?

I MUST confeſs, That my own particular Choice rather leads me to prefer the Company of a few ſelect Companions, with whom I can, calmly and peaceably, enjoy the Feaſt of Reaſon, and try the Juſtneſs of every Reflection, whether gay or ſerious, that may occur to me. But as ſuch a delightful Society is not every Day to be met with, I muſt think, that mixt Companies, without the Fair-Sex, are the moſt inſipid Entertainment in the World, and deſtitute of Gaiety and Politeneſs, as much as of Senſe and Reaſon. Nothing can keep them from exceſſive Dulneſs but hard Drinking; a Remedy worſe than the Diſeaſe.

AMONG the Ancients, the Character of the Fair-Sex was conſidered as altogether domeſtic, nor were they regarded as Part of the polite World, or of good Company. This, perhaps, is the true Reaſon why the Ancients have not left us one Piece of Pleaſantry, that is excellent, (unleſs one may except the Banquet of *Xenophon*, and ſome Dialogues of *Lucian*) tho' many of their ſerious Compoſitions are altogether inimitable. *Horace* condemns the coarſe Railleries and cold Jeſts of *Plautus*: But, are his own much more entertaining? This, therefore, is one conſiderable Improvement, which the polite Arts have receiv'd from Gallantry, and from Courts, where it firſt aroſe.

THE

THE Point of *Honour* is a modern Invention, as well as *Gallantry*; and by ſome eſteem'd equally uſeful for the refining of Manners: But how it has contributed to that Effect, I am at a Loſs to determine. Converſation, among the greateſt Ruſtics, is not commonly infeſted with ſuch Rudeneſs as can give Occaſion to Duels, even according to the moſt refin'd Laws of this fantaſtic Honour; and, as to the other ſmaller Indecencies, which are the moſt offenſive, becauſe the moſt frequent, they can never be cur'd by the Practice of Duelling. But theſe Notions are not only *uſeleſs* but *pernicious*. By ſeparating the Man of Honour from the Man of Virtue, the greateſt Profligates have got ſomething to value themſelves upon, and have been able to keep themſelves in Countenance, tho' guilty of the moſt ſhameful and moſt dangerous Vices. They are Debauchees, Spendthrifts, and never pay a Farthing they owe: But they are Men of Honour; and therefore are to be receiv'd as Gentlemen in all Companies.

THERE are ſome of the Parts of modern Honour, which are the moſt eſſential Parts of Morality; ſuch as Fidelity, the obſerving Promiſes, and telling Truth. Theſe Points of Honour Mr. *Addiſon* had in his Eye, when he made *Juba* ſay,

Honour's a ſacred Tye, the Law of Kings,
The noble Mind's diſtinguiſhing Perfection,
That aids and ſtrengthens Virtue, when it meets her,
And imitates her Actions where ſhe is not:
It ought not to be ſported with.

Theſe

Theſe Lines are very beautiful: But I am afraid, that Mr. *Addiſon* has here been guilty of that Impropriety of Sentiment with which, on other Occaſions, he has ſo juſtly reproach'd our Poets. The Ancients certainly never had any Notion of *Honour* as diſtinct from *Virtue*.

BUT, to return from this Digreſſion, I ſhall advance it as a *fourth* Obſervation on this Head, of the Riſe and Progreſs of the Arts and Sciences, *That when the Arts and Sciences come to Perfection in any State, from that Moment they naturally, or rather neceſſarily decline, and ſeldom or never revive in that Nation, where they formerly flouriſh'd.*

IT muſt be confeſt, that this Maxim, tho' conformable to Experience, may, at firſt Sight, be eſteem'd very contrary to Reaſon. If the natural Genius of Mankind be the ſame in all Ages, and in almoſt all Countries, (as I am of Opinion it is) it muſt very much forward and cultivate this Genius, to be poſſeſt of exact Models in every Art, to regulate the Taſte, and fix the Objects of Imitation. The Models left us by the Ancients gave Birth to all the Arts about 200 Years ago, and have mightily advanc'd their Progreſs in every Country of *Europe*: Why had they not a like Effect during the Reign of *Trajan* and his Succeſſors, when they were much more entire, and were ſtill admir'd and ſtudy'd by the whole World? So late as the Emperor *Juſtinian*, the POET, by Way of Diſtinction, was underſtood, among the *Greeks*, to be *Homer*; among the *Romans*, *Virgil*. Such Admiration ſtill remain'd

main'd for theſe divine Geniuſes; tho' no Poet had appear'd for many Centuries, who could juſtly pretend to have imitated them.

A Man's Genius is always, in the Beginning of his Life, as much unknown to himſelf as to others; and 'tis only after frequent Trials, attended with Succeſs, that he dares think himſelf equal to thoſe Undertakings, in which they who have ſucceeded, have fixt the Admiration of Mankind. If his own Nation be already poſſeſt of many glorious Models of Eloquence, he naturally compares his own juvenile Exerciſes with theſe; and being ſenſible of the infinite Diſproportion betwixt them, is diſcourag'd from any further Attempts, and never dares aſpire to a Rivalſhip with thoſe Authors, whom he ſo much admires. A noble Emulation is the Source of every Excellence. Admiration and Modeſty naturally extinguiſh this Emulation. And no one is ſo liable to an Exceſs of Admiration and Modeſty, as a truly great Genius.

Next to Emulation, the greateſt Encourager of the noble Arts is Praiſe and Glory. A Writer is animated with new Force, when he hears the Applauſes of the World for his former Productions; and, being rouz'd by ſuch a Motive, he often reaches a Pitch of Perfection, which is equally ſurpriſing to himſelf and to his Readers. But when the Poſts of Honour are all occupy'd, his firſt Attempts are but coldly receiv'd by the Public, being compar'd to Productions, which are both in themſelves more excellent, and have already the Advantage of an eſtabliſh'd Reputation. Were

Moliere

Moliere or *Corneille* to bring upon the Stage at preſent their early Productions, which were formerly ſo well receiv'd, 'twould diſcourage the young Poets, to ſee the Indifference and Diſdain of the Public. The Ignorance of the Age alone could have given Admiſſion to the *Prince of Tyre*; but 'tis to that we owe *the Moor*: Had *every Man in his Humour* been rejected, we had never ſeen *Volpone*.

PERHAPS it may not be for the Advantage of any Nation, to have the Arts imported from their Neighbours in too great Perfection. This extinguiſhes Emulation, and ſinks the Ardour of the generous Youth. So many perfect Models of *Italian* Painting brought into *Great Britain*, inſtead of exciting our Artiſts, is the Cauſe of their ſmall Progreſs in that noble Art. The ſame, perhaps, was the Caſe of *Rome*, when it receiv'd the Arts from *Greece*. That Multitude of finiſh'd Productions in the *French* Language, diſperſt all over *Germany* and the *North*, hinder theſe Nations from cultivating their own Language, and keep them ſtill dependent on their Neighbours for thoſe elegant Entertainments.

'TIS true, the Ancients had left us Models in every Kind of Writing, which are highly worthy of Admiration. But beſides that they were wrote in Languages, which were known only to the Learned; beſides this, I ſay, the Compariſon is not ſo perfect nor intire betwixt modern Wits, and thoſe who liv'd in ſo remote an Age. Had *Waller* been born in *Rome*, during the Reign of *Tiberius*, his firſt Productions had been

been deſpis'd, when compar'd to the finiſh'd Odes of *Horace*. But in this Iſland the Superiority of the *Roman* Poet diminiſh'd nothing from the Fame of the *Engliſh*. We thought ourſelves ſufficiently happy, that our Climate and Language could produce but a faint Copy of ſo excellent an Original.

In ſhort, the Arts and Sciences, like ſome Plants, require a freſh Soil; and however rich the Land may be, and however you may recruit it by Art or Care, it will never, when once exhauſted, produce any thing that is perfect or finiſh'd in the Kind.

ESSAY XVIII.

The EPICUREAN †.

'TIS a great Mortification to the Vanity of Man, that his utmoſt Art and Induſtry can never equal the meaneſt of Nature's Productions, either for Beauty or Value. Art is only the Underworkman, and is employ'd to give a few Strokes of Embelliſhment to thoſe Pieces, which come from the Hand of the Maſter. Some of the Drapery may be of his Drawing; but he is not allow'd to touch the principal Figure. Art may make a Suit of Clothes: But Nature muſt produce a Man.

EVEN in thoſe Productions, which are commonly denominated Works of Art, we find, that the nobleſt of the Kind are beholden for their chief Beauty to the

† Or, the Man of Elegance and Pleaſure. The Intention of this and the three following Eſſays is not ſo much, to explain accurately the Sentiments of the ancient Sects of Philoſophy, as to deliver the Sentiments of Sects, that naturally form themſelves in the World, and entertain different Ideas of human Life and of Happineſs. I have given each of them the Name of the Philoſophical Sect, to which it bears the greateſt Affinity.

Force and happy Influence of Nature. To the *Oeſtrum* or *Verve* of the Poets, we owe whatever is admirable in their Productions. The greateſt Genius, where Nature at any Time fails him (for ſhe is not equal) throws aſide the Lyre, and hopes not, from the Rules of Art, to reach that Divine Harmony, which muſt proceed from her Inſpiration alone. How poor are thoſe Songs, where a happy flow of Fancy has not furniſh'd Materials for Art to embelliſh and refine!

But of all the fruitleſs Attempts of Art, no one is ſo ridiculous, as that which the ſevere Philoſophers have undertaken, the producing an *artificial Happineſs*, and making us be pleaſed by Rules of Reaſon, and by Reflection. Why did none of them claim the Reward, which *Xerxes* promis'd to any one, that could invent a new Pleaſure. Unleſs, perhaps, they invented ſo many Pleaſures for their own Uſe, that they deſpis'd Riches, and ſtood in no Need of any Pleaſures, which the Rewards of that Monarch could procure them. I am apt, indeed, to think, that they were not willing to furniſh the Court of *Perſia* with a new Pleaſure, by preſenting it with ſo new and unuſual an Object of Ridicule. Their Speculations, when confin'd to Theory, and gravely deliver'd in the Schools of *Greece*, might excite Admiration in their ignorant Pupils: But the attempting to reduce ſuch Principles to Practice would ſoon betray their Abſurdity.

You pretend to make me happy by Reaſon, and by Rules of Art. You muſt, then, create me anew by Rules of Art. For on my inward Frame and Structure

Structure does my Happineſs depend. But you want Power to effectuate this; and Skill too, I am afraid: Nor can I entertain a leſs Opinion of Nature's Wiſdom than of yours. And let her conduct the Machine, which ſhe has ſo wiſely fram'd. I find, that I ſhould only ſpoil it by my tampering.

To what Purpoſe ſhould I pretend to regulate, refine, or invigorate any of thoſe Springs or Principles, which Nature has implanted in me? Is this the Road by which I muſt reach Happineſs? But Happineſs implies Eaſe, Contentment, Repoſe and Pleaſure; not Watchfulneſs, Care, and Fatigue. The Health of my Body conſiſts in the Facility with which all its Operations are performed. The Stomach digeſts the Aliments: The Heart circulates the Blood: The Brain ſeparates and refines the Spirits: And all this without my concerning myſelf in the Matter. When by my Will alone I can ſtop the Blood, as it runs with Impetuoſity along its Canals, then may I hope to change the Courſe of my Sentiments and Paſſions. In vain ſhould I ſtrain my Faculties, and endeavour to receive Pleaſure from an Object, which is not fitted by Nature to affect my Organs with Delight. I may give myſelf Pain by my fruitleſs Endeavours, but ſhall never reach any Pleaſure.

AWAY then with all thoſe vain Pretences of making ourſelves happy within ourſelves, of feaſting on our own Thoughts, of being ſatisfy'd with the Conſciouſneſs of Well-doing, and of deſpiſing all Aſſiſtance and all Supplies from external Objects. This is the Voice

of PRIDE, not of NATURE. And 'twere well, if even this Pride could ſupport itſelf, and communicate a real *inward* Pleaſure, however melancholy or ſevere. But this impotent Pride can do no more than regulate the *Outſide*; and with infinite Pains and Attention compoſe the Language and Countenance to a Philoſophical Dignity, in order to deceive the ignorant Vulgar. The Heart, mean while, is empty of all Enjoyment: And the Mind, unſupported by its proper Objects, ſinks down into the deepeſt Sorrow and Melancholy. Miſerable, but vain Mortal! Thy Mind be happy within itſelf! With what Reſources is it endow'd to fill ſo immenſe a Void, and ſupply the Place of all thy bodily Senſes and Faculties? Can thy Head ſubſiſt without thy other Members? In ſuch a Situation,

What fooliſh Figure muſt it make?
Do nothing elſe but ſleep *and* ake.

Into ſuch a Lethargy, or ſuch a Melancholy, muſt thy Mind be plung'd, when depriv'd of foreign Occupations and Enjoyments.

KEEP me, therefore, no longer in this violent Conſtraint. Confine me not within myſelf; but point out to me thoſe Objects and Pleaſures, which afford the chief Enjoyment. But why do I apply to you, proud and ignorant Sages, to ſhew me the Road to Happineſs? Let me conſult my own Paſſions and Inclinations. In them muſt I read the Dictates of Nature; not in your frivolous Diſcourſes.

BUT

BUT ſee, propitious to my Wiſhes, the divine, the amiable * PLEASURE, the ſupreme Love of GODS and Men, advances towards me. At her Approach, my Heart beats with genial Heat, and every Senſe and every Faculty is diſſolv'd in Joy; while ſhe pours around me all the Embelliſhments of the Spring, and all the Treaſures of the Autumn. The Melody of her Voice charms my Ears with the ſofteſt Muſic, as ſhe invites me to partake of thoſe delicious Fruits, which, with a Smile that diffuſes a Glory on the Heavens and the Earth, ſhe preſents to me. The ſportive *Cupids*, that attend her, or fan me with their odoriferous Wings, or pour on my Head the moſt fragrant Oils, or offer me their ſparkling Nectar in golden Goblets. O! for ever let me ſpread my Limbs on this Bed of Roſes, and thus, thus feel the delicious Moments, with ſoft and downy Steps, glide along. But cruel Chance! Whither do you fly ſo faſt? Why do my ardent Wiſhes, and that Load of Pleaſures, which you labour under, rather haſten than retard your unrelenting Pace? Suffer me to enjoy this ſoft Repoſe, after all my Fatigues in Search of Happineſs. Suffer me to ſatiate myſelf with theſe Delicacies, after the Pains of ſo long and ſo fooliſh an Abſtinence.

BUT 'twill not do. The Roſes have loſt their Hue: The Fruit its Flavour: And that delicious Wine, whoſe Fumes, ſo late, intoxicated all my

* *Dia voluptas.* LUCRET.

Senſes with ſuch Delight, does now in vain ſollicit the ſated Palate. *Pleaſure* ſmiles at my Languor. She beckens to her Siſter, *Virtue*, to come to her Aſſiſtance. The gay, the frolic *Virtue* hears her Voice, and brings along the whole Troop of my jovial Friends. Welcome, thrice Welcome, my ever dear Companions, to theſe ſhady Bowers, and to this luxurious Repaſt. Your Preſence has reſtor'd to the Roſe its Hue, and to the Fruit its Flavour. The Vapours of this ſprightly Nectar do now again play round my Heart; while you partake of my Delights, and diſcover in your chearful Looks, the Pleaſure you receive from my Happineſs and Satisfaction. The like do I receive from yours; and encourag'd by your joyous Preſence, ſhall again renew the Feaſt, with which, from too much Enjoyment, my Senſes were well-nigh ſated; while the Mind kept not pace with the Body, nor afforded Relief to her o'er-burthen'd Partner.

In our chearful Diſcourſes, better than in the formal Reaſonings of the Schools, is true Wiſdom to be found. In our friendly Endearments, better than in the hollow Debates of Stateſmen and pretended Patriots, does true Virtue diſplay itſelf. Forgetful of the paſt, ſecure of the future, let us here enjoy the preſent; and while we yet poſſeſs a Being, let us fix ſome Good, beyond the Power of Fate or Fortune. To-morrow will bring its own Pleaſures along with it: But ſhould it diſappoint our fond Wiſhes, we ſhall at leaſt enjoy the Pleaſure of reflecting on the Pleaſures of To-day.

FEAR not, my Friends, that the barbarous Diſſonance of *Bacchus*, and of his Revellers, ſhould break in upon this Entertainment, and confound us with their horrid Diſcord. The ſprightly Muſes wait around; and with their charming Symphony, ſufficient to ſoften the Wolves and Tygers of the Savage Deſert, inſpire a ſoft Joy into every Boſom. Peace, Harmony, and Concord reign in this Retreat; nor is the Silence ever broke but by the Muſic of our Songs, or the chearful Accents of our friendly Voices.

BUT hark! the Favourite of the Muſes, the gentle *Damon*, ſtrikes the Lyre; and while he accompanies its harmonious Notes with his more harmonious Song, he inſpires us with the ſame happy Debauch of Fancy, by which he is himſelf tranſported. "Ye favour'd "of Heaven †, he ſings, while the wanton Spring "pours upon you all her blooming Honours, let not "*Glory* ſeduce you, with her deluſive Blaze, to paſs "in Perils and Dangers this delicious Seaſon, this "Prime of Life. Wiſdom points out to you the "Road to Pleaſure: Nature too beckens to you to "follow her in that ſmooth and flowry Path. Will "you ſhut your Ears to their commanding Voice? "Will you harden your Heart to their ſoft Allure-"ments? Oh, deluded Mortals, thus to loſe your

† An Imitation of the *Syrens* Song in *Taſſo*.

O Giovinetti, mentre Aprile & Maggio
V' ammantan di fiorite & verdi ſpoglie, &c.

Giureſalemme liberata, *Canto* 14.

" Youth; thus to throw away ſo invaluable a Preſent,
" to trifle with ſo periſhing a Bleſſing. Contemplate
" well your Recompence. Conſider that Glory,
" which ſo allures your proud Hearts, and ſeduces
" you with your own Praiſes. 'Tis an Eccho, a
" Dream, nay the Shadow of a Dream, which is diſ-
" ſipated by every Wind, and loſt by every contrary
" Breath of the ignorant and ill-judging Multitude.
" You fear not, that even Death itſelf will raviſh it
" from you. But behold! while you are yet alive,
" Calumny bereaves you of it, Ignorance neglects it;
" Nature enjoys it not; Fancy alone, renouncing
" every Pleaſure, receives this airy Recompence,
" empty and unſtable as itſelf."

THUS the Hours paſs unperceiv'd along, and lead in their wanton Train all the Pleaſures of Senſe, and all the Joys of Harmony and Friendſhip. Smiling *Innocence* cloſes the Proceſſion; and while ſhe preſents herſelf to our raviſh'd Eyes, ſhe embelliſhes the whole Scene, and renders the View of theſe Pleaſures as tranſporting, after they have paſt us, as when, with laughing Countenances, they were yet advancing towards us.

BUT the Sun has ſunk below the Horizon; and Darkneſs ſtealing ſilently upon us, has now bury'd all Nature in an univerſal Shade. " Rejoice, my Friends;
" continue your Repaſt, or change it for ſoft Repoſe.
" Tho' abſent, your Joy or your Tranquillity ſhall
" ſtill be mine." *But whither do you go? Or what new Pleaſures call you from our Society? Is there aught agreeable without your Friends? And can aught pleaſe,*

in

in which we partake not? "Yes, my Friends; the "Joy, which I now ſeek, admits not of your Parti- "cipation. Here alone I wiſh your Abſence: And "here alone can I find a ſufficient Compenſation for "the Loſs of your Society."

BUT I have not advanc'd far thro' the Shades of the thick Wood, which ſpreads a double Night around me, e're, methinks, I perceive thro' the Gloom, the charming *Cælia*, the Miſtreſs of my Wiſhes, who wanders impatient thro' the Grove, and preventing the appointed Hour, ſilently chides my tardy Steps. But the Joy, which ſhe receives from my Preſence, beſt pleads my Excuſe; and diſſipating every anxious and every angry Thought, leaves room for nought but mutual Joy and Rapture. With what Words, my fair one, ſhall I expreſs my Tenderneſs, or deſcribe the Emotions which now warm my tranſported Boſom! Words are too faint to deſcribe my Love; and if, alas! you feel not the ſame Flame within you, in vain ſhall I endeavour to convey to you a juſt Conception of it. But your every Word and every Motion ſuffice to remove this Doubt; and while they expreſs your Paſſion, ſerve alſo to enflame mine. How amiable this Solitude, this Silence, this Darkneſs! No Objects now importune the raviſh'd Soul. The Thought, the Senſe, all full of nothing but our mutual Happineſs, do wholly poſſeſs the Mind, and convey a Pleaſure, which deluded Mortals vainly ſeek for in every other Enjoyment. ——

BUT why does your Boſom heave with theſe Sighs, while Tears bathe your glowing Cheeks? Why di-

ſtract your Heart with ſuch vain Anxieties? Why ſo often aſk me, *How long my Love ſhall yet endure?* Alas, my *Cælia*, Can I reſolve this Queſtion? *Do I know how long my Life ſhall yet endure?* But does this alſo diſturb your tender Breaſt? And is the Image of our frail Mortality for ever preſent with you, to throw a Damp on your gayeſt Hours, and poiſon even thoſe Joys which Love inſpires. Conſider rather, that if Life be frail, if youth be tranſitory, we ſhould well employ the preſent Moment, and loſe no Part of ſo periſhable an Exiſtence. Yet a little Moment, and *theſe* ſhall be no more. We ſhall be, as if we had never been. Not a Memory of us be left upon Earth; and even the fabulous Shades below will not afford us a Habitation. Our fruitleſs Anxieties, our vain Projects, our uncertain Speculations ſhall all be ſwallow'd up and loſt. Our preſent Doubts, concerning the original Cauſe of all Things, muſt never, alas! be reſolv'd. This alone we may be certain of, that if any governing Mind preſide over the Univerſe, he muſt be pleas'd to ſee us fulfil the Ends of our Being, and enjoy that Pleaſure, for which alone we were created. Let this Reflection give Eaſe to your anxious Thoughts; but do not render your Joys too ſerious, by dwelling for ever upon it. 'Tis ſufficient, once for all, to be acquainted with this Philoſophy, in order to give an unbounded Looſe to Love and Jollity, and remove all the Scruples of a vain Superſtition: But while Youth and Paſſion, my Fair-one, prompt our eager Deſires, we muſt find gayer Subjects of Diſcourſe, to intermix with theſe amorous Careſſes.

ESSAY XIX.

The STOIC †.

THERE is this obvious and material Difference in the Conduct of Nature, with regard to Man and other Animals, that having endow'd the former with a ſublime celeſtial Spirit, and having given him an Affinity with ſuperior Beings, ſhe allows not ſuch noble Faculties to lye lethargic or idle; but urges him, by Neceſſity, to employ, on every Emergence, his utmoſt *Art* and *Induſtry*. Brute Creatures have many of their Neceſſities ſupply'd by Nature, being cloath'd and arm'd by this beneficent Parent of all Things; And where their own *Induſtry* is requiſite on any Occaſion, Nature, by implanting Inſtincts, ſtill ſupplies them with the *Art*, and guides them to their Good, by her unerring Precepts. But Man, expos'd naked and indigent to the rude Elements, riſes ſlowly from that helpleſs State, by the Care and Vigilance of his Parents; and having attain'd his utmoſt Growth and Perfection, reaches only a Capacity of ſubſiſting, by his own Care and Vigilance. Every thing is ſold to Skill and Labour; and where Nature furniſhes the

† Or the Man of Action and Virtue.

Materials, they are ſtill rude and unfiniſh'd, till Induſtry, ever active and intelligent, refines them from their brute State, and fits them for human Uſe and Convenience.

Acknowledge, therefore, O Man, the Beneficence of Nature: For ſhe has given thee that Intelligence which ſupplies all thy Neceſſities. But let not Indolence, under the falſe Appearance of Gratitude, perſuade thee to reſt contented with her Preſents. Wou'd'ſt thou return to the raw Herbage for thy Food, to the open Sky for thy Covering, and to Stones and Clubs for thy Defence againſt the ravenous Animals of the Deſert? Then return alſo to thy ſavage Manners, to thy timorous Superſtition, to thy brutal Ignorance; and ſink thyſelf below thoſe Animals, whoſe Condition thou admireſt, and wou'd'ſt ſo fondly imitate.

Thy kind Parent, Nature, having given thee Art and Intelligence, has fill'd the whole Globe with Materials for theſe Talents to work upon: Hearken to her Voice, which ſo plainly tells thee, that thou thyſelf ſhou'd'ſt alſo be the Object of thy Induſtry, and that by Art and Attention thou can'ſt alone acquire that Ability, which will raiſe thee to thy proper Station in the Univerſe. Behold this Artizan, who converts a rude and ſhapeleſs Stone into a noble Metal; and molding that Metal by his cunning Hands, creates, as it were by Magic, every Weapon for his Defence, and every Utenſil for his Convenience. He has not this Skill from Nature: Uſe and Practice have taught it

it him: And if thou wou'dſt emulate his Succeſs, thou muſt follow his laborious Footſteps.

BUT while thou *ambitiouſly* aſpireſt to the perfecting thy bodily Powers and Faculties, wou'd'ſt thou *meanly* neglect thy Mind, and from a prepoſterous Sloth, leave it ſtill rude and uncultivated, as it came from the Hands of Nature? Far be ſuch Folly and Negligence from every rational Being. If Nature has been frugal in her Gifts and Endowments, there is the more Need of Art to ſupply her Defects. If ſhe has been generous and liberal, know that ſhe ſtill expects Induſtry and Application on our Part, and revenges herſelf in Proportion to our negligent Ingratitude. The richeſt Genius, like the moſt fertile Soil, when uncultivated, ſhoots up into the rankeſt Weeds; and inſtead of Vines and Olives for the Pleaſure and Uſe of Man, produces to its ſlothful Owner the moſt abundant Crop of Poiſons.

THE great End of all human Induſtry, is the Attainment of Happineſs. For this were Arts invented, Sciences cultivated, Laws ordain'd, and Societies modell'd, by the profoundeſt Wiſdom of Patriots and Legiſlators. Even the lonely Savage, who lyes expos'd to the Inclemency of the Elements, and the Fury of wild Beaſts, forgets not, for a Moment, this grand Object of his Being. Ignorant as he is of every Art of Life, he keeps ſtill in View the End of all thoſe Arts, and eagerly ſeeks for Felicity amidſt that Darkneſs with which he is inviron'd. But as much as the wildeſt Savage is inferior to the poliſh'd Citizen, who

under

under the Protection of Laws, enjoys every Convenience that Induſtry has invented; ſo much is this Citizen himſelf inferior to the Man of Virtue, and the true Philoſopher, who governs his Appetites, ſubdues his Paſſions, and has learn'd, from Reaſon, to ſet a juſt Value on every Purſuit and Enjoyment. For is there an Art and Apprenticeſhip requiſite for every other Attainment? And is there no Art of Life, no Rule, no Precepts to direct us in this principal Concern? Can no particular Pleaſure be attain'd without Skill; and can the whole be regulated without Reflection or Intelligence, by the blind Guidance of Appetite and Inſtinct? Surely then no Miſtakes are ever committed in this Affair; but every Man, however diſſolute and negligent, proceeds in the Purſuit of Happineſs, with as unerring a Motion, as that which the celeſtial Bodies obſerve, when, conducted by the Hand of the Almighty, they roll along the etherial Plains. But if Miſtakes be often, be inevitably committed, let us regiſter theſe Miſtakes; let us conſider their Cauſes; let us weigh their Importance; let us enquire for their Remedies. When from this we have fix'd all the Rules of Conduct, we are *Philoſophers*: When we have reduc'd theſe Rules to Practice, we are *Sages*.

Like many ſubordinate Artiſts, employ'd to form the ſeveral Wheels and Springs of a Machine: Such are thoſe who excel in all the particular Arts of Life. *He* is the Maſter Workman, who puts thoſe ſeveral Parts together, moves them according to juſt Harmony and Proportion, and produces true Felicity as the Reſult of their conſpiring Order.

While

WHILE you have ſuch an alluring Object in View, ſhall that Labour and Attention, which is requiſite to the attaining your End, ever ſeem burdenſome and that intolerable? Know, that this Labour itſelf is the chief Ingredient of the Felicity to which you aſpire, and that every Enjoyment ſoon becomes inſipid and diſtaſteful, when not acquir'd by Travel and Fatigue. See the hardy Hunters riſe from their downy Couches, ſhake off the Slumbers that ſtill weigh down their heavy Eye-lids, and, e'er *Aurora* has yet cover'd the Heavens with her flaming Mantle, haſten to the Foreſt. They leave behind, in their own Houſes, and in the neighbouring Plains, Animals of every Kind, whoſe Fleſh furniſhes the moſt delicious Fare, and which offer themſelves to the fatal Stroke. Laborious Man diſdains ſo eaſy a Purchaſe. He ſeeks for a Prey, that hides itſelf from his Search, or flies from his Purſuit, or defends itſelf from his Violence. Having exerted in the Chace every Paſſion of the Mind, and every Member of the Body, he then finds the Charms of Repoſe, and with Joy compares its Pleaſures to thoſe of his engaging Labours.

AND can vigorous Induſtry give Pleaſure to the Purſuit even of the moſt worthleſs Prey, which frequently eſcapes our Toils? And cannot the ſame Induſtry render the Cultivation of our Mind, the moderating of our Paſſions, the enlightening of our Reaſon, an agreeable Occupation; while we are every Day ſenſible of our Progreſs, and behold our inward Features and Countenance brightening inceſſantly with

new Charms? Begin by curing yourſelf of this lethargic Indolence; the Taſk is not difficult: You need but taſte the Sweets of honeſt Labour. Proceed to learn the juſt Value of every Purſuit; Long Study is not requiſite: Compare, tho' but for once, the Mind to the Body, Virtue to Fortune, and Glory to Pleaſure, you will then perceive the Advantages of Induſtry: You will then be ſenſible what are the proper Objects of your Induſtry.

In vain do you ſeek Repoſe from Beds of Roſes: In vain do you hope for Enjoyment from the moſt delicious Wines and Fruits. Your Indolence itſelf becomes a Fatigue: Your Pleaſure itſelf creates Diſguſt. The Mind, unexercis'd, finds every Delight inſipid and loathſome; and e'er yet the Body, full of noxious Humours, feels the Torment of its multiply'd Diſeaſes, your nobler Part is ſenſible of the invading Poiſon, and ſeeks in vain to relieve its Anxiety by new Pleaſures, which ſtill augment the fatal Malady.

I need not tell you, that by this eager Purſuit of Pleaſure, you more and more expoſe yourſelf to Fortune and Accidents, and rivet your Affections on external Objects, which Chance may, in a Moment, raviſh from you. I ſhall ſuppoſe, that your indulgent Stars favour you ſtill with the Enjoyment of your Riches and Poſſeſſions. I prove to you, that even in the midſt of your luxurious Pleaſures, you are unhappy; and that, by too much Indulgence, you are incapable of enjoying what proſperous Fortune ſtill allows you to poſſeſs.

BUT ſurely the Inſtability of Fortune is a Conſideration not to be over-look'd or neglected. Happineſs cannot poſſibly exiſt, where there is no Security; and Security can have no Place, where Fortune has any Dominion. Tho' that unſtable Deity ſhould not exert her Rage againſt you, the Dread of it would ſtill torment you; would diſturb your Slumbers, haunt your Dreams, and throw a Damp on the Jollity of your moſt delicious Banquets.

THE Temple of Wiſdom is ſeated on a Rock, above the Rage of the fighting Elements, and inacceſſible to all the Malice of Man. The rolling Thunder breaks below; and thoſe more terrible Inſtruments of human Fury reach not to ſo ſublime a Height. The Sage, while he breathes that ſerene Air, looks down with Pleaſure, mixt with Compaſſion, on the Errors of miſtaken Mortals, who blindly ſeek for the true Path of Life, and purſue Riches, Nobility, Honour, or Power for genuine Felicity. The greateſt Part he beholds diſappointed of their fond Wiſhes: Some lament, that having once poſſeſs'd the Object of their Deſires, it is raviſh'd from them by envious Fortune: And all complain, that even their own Vows, tho' granted, cannot give them Happineſs, or relieve the Anxiety of their diſtracted Minds.

BUT does the Sage preſerve himſelf always in this philoſophic Indifference, and reſt contented with lamenting the Miſeries of Mankind, without ever imploying himſelf for their Relief? Does he conſtantly indulge

indulge this ſevere Wiſdom, which, by pretending to elevate him above human Accidents, does in Reality harden his Heart, and render him careleſs of the Intereſts of Mankind, and of Society? No: he knows, that in this ſullen *Apathy*, neither true Wiſdom nor true Happineſs is to be found. He feels too ſtrongly the Charm of the ſocial Affections ever to counteract ſo ſweet, ſo natural, ſo virtuous a Propenſity. Even when, bath'd in Tears, he laments the Miſeries of human Race, of his Country, of his Friends, and unable to give Succour, can only relieve them by Compaſſion; he yet rejoices in the generous Diſpoſition, and feels a Satisfaction ſuperior to that of the moſt indulg'd Senſe. So engaging are the Sentiments of Humanity, that they brighten up the very Face of Sorrow, and operate like the Sun, which ſhining on a duſky Cloud or falling Rain, paints on them the moſt glorious Colours that are to be found in the whole Circle of Nature.

BUT 'tis not here alone, that the ſocial Virtues diſplay their Energy. With whatever Ingredient you mix them, they are ſtill predominant. As Sorrow cannot overcome them, ſo neither can ſenſual Pleaſure obſcure them. The Joys of Love, however furious and tumultuous, baniſh not the tender Sentiments of Sympathy and Affection. They even derive their chief Influence from that generous Paſſion; and when preſented alone, afford nothing to the unhappy Mind but Laſſitude and Diſguſt. Behold this ſprightly Debauchee, who profeſſes a Contempt of all other Pleaſures but thoſe of Wine and Jollity: Separate him from his Com-

Companions, like a Spark from a Fire, where before it contributed to the general Blaze: His Alacrity ſuddenly extinguiſhes; and tho' ſurrounded with every other Means of Delight, he loathes the ſumptuous Banquet, and prefers even the moſt abſtract Study and Speculation, as more agreeable and entertaining.

BUT the ſocial Paſſions never afford ſuch tranſporting Pleaſures, or make ſo glorious an Appearance in the Eyes both of GOD and Man, as when, ſhaking off every earthly Mixture, they aſſociate themſelves with the Sentiments of Virtue, and prompt us to laudable and worthy Actions. As harmonious Colours mutually give and receive a Luſtre by their friendly Union; ſo do theſe ennobling Sentiments of the human Mind. See the Triumph of Nature in parental Affection! What ſelfiſh Paſſion; what ſenſual Delights are a Match for it! Whether a Man exults in the Proſperity and Virtue of his Offspring, or flies to their Succour, thro' the moſt threatning and tremendous Dangers?

PROCEED ſtill in purifying the generous Paſſion, you will ſtill the more admire its ſhining Glories. What Charms are there in the Harmony of Minds, and in a Friendſhip founded on mutual Eſteem and Gratitude! What Satisfaction in relieving the diſtreſt, in comforting the afflicted, in raiſing the fallen, and in ſtopping the Career of cruel Fortune, or of more cruel Man, in their Inſults over the good and virtuous! But what ſupreme Joy in the Victories over Vice as well as Miſery, when, by virtuous Example or wiſe

wiſe Exhortation, our Fellow-Creatures are taught to govern their Paſſions, reform their Vices, and ſubdue their worſt Enemies, which inhabit within their own Boſoms?

But theſe Objects are ſtill too limited for the human Mind, which, being of celeſtial Origin, ſwells with the divineſt and moſt enlarg'd Affections, and carrying its Attention beyond Kindred and Acquaintance, extends its benevolent Wiſhes to the moſt diſtant Poſterity. It views Liberty and Laws as the Source of human Happineſs, and devotes itſelf with the utmoſt Alacrity, to their Guardianſhip and Protection. Toils, Dangers, Death itſelf carry their Charms, when we brave them for the public Good, and ennoble that Being, which we generouſly ſacrifice for the Intereſts of our Country. Happy the Man, whom indulgent Fortune allows to pay to Virtue what he owes to Nature, and to make a generous Gift of what muſt otherwiſe be raviſh'd from him by cruel Neceſſity.

In the true Sage and Patriot are united whatever can diſtinguiſh human Nature, or elevate mortal Man to a Reſemblance with the Divinity. The ſofteſt Benevolence, the moſt undaunted Reſolution, the tendereſt Sentiments, the moſt ſublime Love of Virtue, all theſe animate ſucceſſively his tranſported Boſom. What Satisfaction, when he looks within, to find the moſt turbulent Paſſions tun'd into juſt Harmony and Concord, and every jarring Sound baniſh'd from this enchanting Muſic! If the Contemplation, even of inanimate

inanimate Beauty, be ſo delightful; if it raviſhes the Senſes, even when it appears in foreign Objects: What muſt be the Effects of moral Beauty? And what Influence muſt it have, when it embelliſhes our own Mind, and is the Reſult of our own Reflection and Induſtry?

BUT where is the Reward of Virtue? And what Recompence has Nature provided for ſuch important Sacrifices, as thoſe of Life and Fortune, which we muſt often make to it? Oh, Sons of Earth! Are you ignorant of the Value of this celeſtial Miſtreſs? And do you meanly enquire for her Portion, when you obſerve her genuine Charms? But know, that Nature has been indulgent to human Weakneſs, and has not left this Favourite-child naked and unendow'd. She has provided Virtue of the richeſt Dowry; but being careful, leſt the Allurements of Intereſt ſhou'd engage ſuch Suitors, as were inſenſible of the native Worth of ſo divine a Beauty, ſhe has wiſely provided, that this Dowry can have no Charms but in the Eyes of thoſe who are already tranſported with the Love of Virtue. GLORY is the Portion of Virtue, the ſweet Reward of honourable Toils, the triumphant Crown, that covers the thoughtful Head of the diſintereſted Patriot, or the duſty Brow of the victorious Warrior. Elevated by ſo ſublime a Prize, the Man of Virtue looks down with Contempt on all the Allurements of Pleaſure, and all the Menaces of Danger. Death itſelf loſes its Terrors, when he conſiders, that its Dominion extends only over a Part of him, and that, in Spite of Death and Time, the Rage of the Elements,

ments, and the endleſs Viciſſitude of human Affairs he is aſſur'd of an immortal Fame among all the Sons of Men.

THERE ſurely is a Being that preſides over the Univerſe; and, with infinite Wiſdom and Power, has reduc'd the jarring Elements into juſt Order and Proportion. Let ſpeculative Reaſoners diſpute, how far this beneficent Being extends his Care of Virtue, and whether he prolongs our Exiſtence to a future State, in order to beſtow on it its juſt Reward, and render it fully triumphant. The Man of Virtue, without deciding any Thing on ſo dubious a Subject, is ſatisfy'd with that Portion which is mark'd out to him by the ſupreme Diſpoſer of all Things. Gratefully he accepts of that farther Reward prepar'd for him; but if diſappointed, he thinks not Virtue an empty Name; but juſtly eſteeming it to be it's own Reward, he gratefully acknowledges the Bounty of his Creator, who by calling him forth into Exiſtence, has thereby afforded him an Opportunity of once acquiring ſo invaluable a Poſſeſſion.

ESSAY XX.

The PLATONIST *.

TO ſome Philoſophers it appears Matter of Surprize, that all Mankind, poſſeſſing the ſame Nature, and being endow'd with the ſame Faculties, ſhould yet differ ſo widely in their Purſuits and Inclinations, and that one ſhould utterly condemn what is fondly ſought after by another. To ſome it appears Matter of ſtill more Surprize, that Man ſhould differ ſo widely from himſelf at different Times; and, after Poſſeſſion, reject with Diſdain what, before, was the Object of all his Vows and Wiſhes. To me this feveriſh Uncertainty and Irreſolution, in human Conduct, ſeems altogether unavoidable; nor can a rational Soul, made for the Contemplation of the ſupreme Being, and of his Works, ever enjoy Tranquillity or Satisfaction, while detain'd in the ignoble Purſuits of ſenſual Pleaſure or popular Applauſe. The Divinity is a boundleſs Ocean of Bliſs and Glory: Human Minds are ſmaller Streams, which, ariſing at firſt from this Ocean, ſeek ſtill, amid all their Wanderings, to return to it, and to loſe themſelves in that

* Or, the Man of Contemplation and *Philoſophical* Devotion.

Immen-

Immenſity of Perfection. When check'd in this natural Courſe, by Vice or Folly, they become furious and enrag'd; and, ſwelling to a Torrent, do then ſpread Horror and Devaſtation on the neighbouring Plains.

IN vain, by pompous Phraſe and paſſionate Expreſſions, does each recommend his own Purſuit, and invite the credulous Hearers to an Imitation of his Life and Manners. The Heart belies the Countenance, and ſenſibly feels, even amid the higheſt Succeſs, the unſatisfactory Nature of all thoſe Pleaſures, which detain it from it's true Object. I examine the voluptuous Man before Enjoyment; I meaſure the Vehemence of his Deſire, and the Importance of his Object; I find that all his Happineſs proceeds only from that Hurry of Thought which takes him from himſelf, and turns his View from his Guilt and Miſery. I conſider him a Moment after; he has now enjoy'd the Pleaſure, which he fondly ſought after. The Senſe of his Guilt and Miſery returns upon him with double Anguiſh: His Mind tormented with Fear and Remorſe; his Body depreſt with Diſguſt and Satiety.

BUT a more auguſt, at leaſt a more haughty Perſonage preſents himſelf boldly to our Cenſure; and, aſſuming the Title of a Philoſopher and Man of Morals, offers to ſubmit to the moſt rigid Examination. He challenges, with a viſible, tho' conceal'd Impatience, our Approbation and Applauſe; and ſeems offended, that we ſhould heſitate a Moment before we break

break out into Admiration of his Virtue. Seeing this Impatience, I heſitate ſtill more: I begin to examine the Motives of his ſeeming Virtue: But behold! e'er I can enter upon this Enquiry, he flings himſelf from me; and addreſſing his Diſcourſe to that Crowd of heedleſs Auditors, fondly abuſes them by his magnificent Pretenſions.

O PHILOSOPHER! thy Wiſdom is vain, and thy Virtue unprofitable. Thou ſeekeſt the ignorant Applauſes of Men, not the ſolid Reflections of thy own Conſcience, or the more ſolid Approbation of that Being, who, with one Regard of his all-ſeeing Eye, penetrates the Univerſe. Thou ſurely art conſcious of the Hollowneſs of thy pretended Probity, whilſt calling thyſelf a Citizen, a Son, a Friend, thou forgetteſt thy higher Sovereign, thy true Father, thy greateſt Benefactor. Where is the Adoration due to ſuch infinite Perfection, whence every Thing good and valuable is deriv'd? Where is the Gratitude, due to thy Creator, who call'd thee forth from nothing, who placed thee in all theſe Relations to thy Fellow-Creatures, and requiring thee to fulfil the Duty of each Relation, forbids thee to neglect what thou oweſt to himſelf, the moſt perfect Being, to whom thou art connected by the cloſeſt Tye?

BUT thou art thyſelf thy own Idol: Thou worſhippeſt thy *imaginary* Perfections: Or rather, ſenſible of thy *real* Imperfections, thou ſeekeſt only to deceive the World, and to pleaſe thy Fancy, by multiplying thy ignorant Admirers. Thus not contented

with neglecting what is moſt excellent in the Univerſe, thou deſireſt to ſubſtitute in his Place what is moſt vile and contemptible.

CONSIDER all the Works of Men's Hands; all the Inventions of human Wit, in which thou affecteſt ſo nice a Diſcernment: Thou wilt find, that the moſt perfect Production ſtill proceeds from the moſt perfect Thought, and that 'tis MIND alone, which we admire, while we beſtow our Applauſe on the Graces of a well-proportion'd Statue, or the Symmetry of a noble Pile. The Statuary, the Architect comes ſtill in View, and makes us reflect on the Beauty of his Art and Contrivance, which, from a Heap of unform'd Matter, cou'd extract ſuch Expreſſions and Proportions. This ſuperior Beauty of Thought and Intelligence thou thyſelf acknowledgeſt, while thou inviteſt us to contemplate, in thy Conduct, the Harmony of Affections, the Dignity of Sentiments, and all thoſe Graces of a Mind, which chiefly merit our Attention. But why ſtoppeſt thou ſhort? Seeſt thou nothing farther that is valuable? Amid thy rapturous Applauſes of Beauty and Order, art thou ſtill ignorant where the moſt conſummate Beauty, the moſt perfect Order, is to be found? Compare the Works of Art with thoſe of Nature. The one are but an Imitation of the other. The nearer Art approaches to Nature, the more perfect is it eſteem'd. But ſtill, how wide are its neareſt Approaches, and what an immenſe Interval may be obſerv'd betwixt them? Art copies only the outſide of Nature, leaving the inward and more admirable Springs and Princi-

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ples; as exceeding her Imitation, as beyond her Comprehenſion. Art copies only the minute Productions of Nature, deſpairing to reach that Grandeur and Magnificence, which are ſo aſtoniſhing in the maſterly Works of her Original. Can we then be ſo blind, as not to diſcover an Intelligence and a Deſign in the exquiſite and moſt ſtupendous Contrivance of the Univerſe? Can we be ſo ſtupid, as not to feel the warmeſt Raptures of Worſhip and Adoration, upon the Contemplation of that intelligent Being, ſo infinitely good and wiſe?

THE moſt perfect Happineſs, ſurely, muſt ariſe from the Contemplation of the moſt perfect Object. But what is more perfect than Beauty and Virtue? And where is Beauty to be found equal to that of the Univerſe? Or Virtue, which can be compar'd to the Benevolence and Juſtice of the Deity? If aught can diminiſh the Pleaſure of this Contemplation, it muſt be either the Narrowneſs of our Faculties, which conceals from us the greateſt Part of theſe Beauties and Perfections; or the Shortneſs of our Lives, which allows not Time ſufficient to inſtruct us in them. But 'tis our Comfort, that if we imploy worthily the Faculties here aſſign'd us, they will be enlarg'd in another State of Exiſtence, ſo as to render us more ſuitable Worſhippers of our Maker: And that the Taſk, which can never be finiſhed in Time, will be the Buſineſs of an Eternity.

ESSAY XXI.

The SCEPTIC.

I HAVE long entertain'd a great Suſpicion, with regard to the Deciſions of Philoſophers upon all Subjects, and found in myſelf a greater Inclination to diſpute, than aſſent to their Concluſions. There is one Miſtake, to which they ſeem liable, almoſt without Exception; they confine too much their Principles, and make no Account of that vaſt Variety, which Nature has ſo much affected in all her Operations. When a Philoſopher has once laid hold of a favourite Principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural Effects, he will extend the ſame Principle over the whole Creation, and reduce to it every Phænomenon, tho' by the moſt violent and abſurd Reaſoning. Our own Mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our Conception to the Variety and Extent of Nature; but imagine, that ſhe is as much bounded in her Operations, as we are in our Speculations.

BUT if ever this Infirmity of Philoſophers is to be ſuſpected on any Occaſion, 'tis in their Reaſonings concerning human Life, and the Methods of attaining Happineſs. In that Caſe, they are led aſtray,

not only by the Narrowneſs of their Underſtandings, but alſo by that of their Paſſions. Almoſt every one has a predominant Inclination, to which all his other Deſires and Affections ſubmit, and which governs him, tho', perhaps, with ſome Intervals, thro' the whole Courſe of his Life. 'Tis difficult for him to apprehend, that any Thing which appears totally indifferent to him, can ever give Enjoyment to any Perſon, or can poſſeſs Charms, which altogether eſcape his Obſervation. His own Purſuits are always, in his Account, the moſt engaging: The Objects of his Paſſion, the moſt valuable: And the Road he purſues, the only one that leads to Happineſs.

BUT wou'd theſe prejudic'd Reaſoners reflect a Moment, there are many obvious Inſtances and Arguments, ſufficient to undeceive them, and make them enlarge their Maxims and Principles. Do they not ſee the vaſt Variety of Inclinations and Purſuits among Mankind, where each ſeems fully ſatisfy'd with his own Courſe of Life, and wou'd eſteem it the greateſt Unhappineſs to be confin'd to that of his Neighbour? Do they not feel in themſelves, that what pleaſes at one Time, diſpleaſes at another, by the Change of Inclination; and that it is not in their Power, by their utmoſt Efforts, to recall that Taſte or Appetite, which formerly beſtowed Charms on what now appears indifferent or diſagreeable? What is the Meaning therefore of thoſe general Preferences of the Town or Country-Life, of a Life of Action or one of Pleaſure, of Retirement or Society; when, beſides the different Inclinations of different Men, every one's

Experience may convince him, that each of theſe Kinds of Life is agreeable in its Turn, and that their Variety or their judicious Mixture, does chiefly contribute to the rendering all of them agreeable.

BUT ſhall this Buſineſs be allow'd to go altogether at Adventures? And muſt a Man conſult only his Humour and Inclination, in order to determine his Courſe of Life, without ever employing his Reaſon, to inform him what Road is preferable, and leads moſt ſurely to Happineſs? Is there no Difference then betwixt one Man's Conduct and another?

I ANSWER, There is a great Difference. One Man, following his Inclinations, in chuſing his Courſe of Life, may imploy much ſurer Means for ſucceeding than another, who is led by his Inclination into the ſame Courſe of Life, and purſues the ſame Object. *Are Riches the chief Object of your Deſires?* Acquire Skill in your Profeſſion; be diligent in the Exerciſe of it; and enlarge the Circle of your Friends and Acquaintance; avoid Pleaſure and Expence, and never be generous, but with a View of gaining more than you cou'd ſave by Frugality. *Wou'd you acquire the publick Eſteem?* Guard equally againſt the Extremes of Arrogance and Fawning. Let it appear that you ſet a Value upon yourſelf, but without deſpiſing others. If you fall into either of the Extremes, you either provoke Men's Pride by your Inſolence, or teach them to deſpiſe you by your timorous Submiſſion, and by the mean Opinion you ſeem to entertain of yourſelf.

THESE

THESE, you ſay, are the Maxims of common Prudence and Diſcretion; what every Parent inculcates on his Child, and what every Man of Senſe purſues in the Courſe of Life, which he has choſen to himſelf.—What is it then you deſire more? Do you come to a Philoſopher, as to a *cunning Man*, to learn ſomething by Magic or Witchcraft, beyond what can be known by common Prudence and Diſcretion? —Yes; we come to a Philoſopher to be inſtructed, How we ſhall chuſe our Ends, more than the Means for attaining theſe Ends: We want to know, what Deſires we ſhall ſatisfy, what Paſſions we ſhall comply with, what Appetites we ſhall indulge. As to the reſt, we truſt to common Senſe, and the general Maxims of the World, for our Inſtruction.

I AM ſorry, then, I have pretended to be a Philoſopher: For I find your Queſtions very perplexing, and am in Danger, if my Anſwer be too rigid and ſevere, of paſſing for a Pedant and Scholaſtic; if it be too eaſy and free, of being taken for a Preacher of Vice and Immorality. However, to ſatisfy you, I ſhall deliver my Opinion upon the Matter, and only deſire you to eſteem it of as little Conſequence as I do myſelf. By that Means you will neither think it worthy of your Ridicule nor your Anger.

IF we can depend upon any Principle, which we learn from Philoſophy, this, I think, may be conſider'd as certain and undoubted, That there is nothing, in itſelf, valuable or deſpicable, deſireable or hate-

ful, beautiful or deformed; but that theſe Attributes ariſe from the particular Conſtitution and Fabric of human Sentiments and Affections. What ſeems the moſt delicious Food to one Animal, appears loathſome to another: What affects the feeling of one with Delight, produces Uneaſineſs to another. This is confeſſedly the Caſe with Regard to all the bodily Senſes: But if we examine the Matter more accurately, we ſhall find, that the ſame Obſervation holds even where the Mind concurs with the Body, and mingles its Sentiments with the exterior Appetites.

DESIRE this paſſionate Lover to give you a Character of his Miſtreſs: He will tell you, that he is at a Loſs for Words to deſcribe her Charms, and will aſk you very ſeriouſly, If ever you was acquainted with a Goddeſs or an Angel? If you anſwer, that you never was: He will then ſay, That 'tis impoſſible for you to form a Conception of ſuch divine Beauties as thoſe his Charmer poſſeſſes; ſo complete a Shape; ſuch proportion'd Features; ſo engaging an Air; ſuch a Sweetneſs of Diſpoſition; ſuch Gaiety of Humour. You can infer nothing, however, from all this Diſcourſe, but that the poor Man is in Love; and that the general Appetite betwixt the Sexes, which Nature has infus'd into all Animals, is in him determin'd to a particular Object by ſome Qualities, which gave him Pleaſure. The ſame divine Creature, not only to a different Animal, but alſo to a different Man, appears a mere mortal Being, and is beheld with the utmoſt Indifference.

NATURE has given all Animals a like Prejudice in Favour of their Offspring. As ſoon as the helpleſs Infant ſees the Light, tho' in every other Eye it appears a deſpicable and a miſerable Creature, it is regarded by its fond Parents with the utmoſt Affection, and is prefer'd to every other Object, however perfect or accompliſh'd. The Paſſion alone, ariſing from the Original Structure and Formation of human Nature, beſtows a Value on the moſt inſignificant Object.

WE may puſh the ſame Obſervation further, and may conclude, that even when the Mind operates alone, and feeling the Sentiments of Blame or Approbation, pronounces one Object to be deform'd and odious, another beautiful and amiable; I ſay, that even in that Caſe, theſe Qualities are not really in the Objects, but belong entirely to the Sentiments of that Mind which blames or praiſes. I grant, that it will be more difficult to make this Propoſition evident, and as it were, palpable, to negligent Thinkers, becauſe Nature is more uniform in the Sentiments of the Mind than in moſt Feelings of the Body, and produces a nearer Reſemblance in the inward than in the outward Part of human Kind. There is ſomething reſembling Principles in mental Taſte; and Critics can reaſon and diſpute much more plauſibly than Cooks or Perfumers. This Subject wou'd require a ſeparate Examination. In the mean Time we may obſerve, That this Uniformity among human Kind hinders not, but that there is a

conſiderable Diverſity in the Sentiments of Beauty and Worth, and that Education, Cuſtom, Prejudice, Caprice, and Humour do frequently vary our Taſte of this Kind. You will never convince a Man, who is not accuſtom'd to *Italian* Muſic, and has not an Ear to follow its Intricacies, that a *Scotch* Tune is not preferable. You have not even any ſingle Argument, beyond your own Taſte, which you can employ in your Behalf: And to your Adverſary, his particular Taſte will always appear a much more convincing Argument to the contrary. If you be wiſe, each of you will allow, that the other may be in the right; and having many other Inſtances of this Diverſity of Taſte, you will both confeſs, that Beauty and Worth are merely of a relative Nature, and conſiſt in an agreeable Sentiment produc'd by an Object on a particular Mind, according to the peculiar Structure and Conſtitution of that Mind.

By this Diverſity of Sentiment, obſervable in human Kind, Nature has, perhaps, intended to make us ſenſible of her Authority, and let us ſee what ſurpriſing Changes ſhe cou'd produce on the Paſſions and Deſires of Mankind, merely by the Change of their inward Fabric, without any Alteration on the Objects. The Vulgar may even be convinced by this Argument: But Men accuſtom'd to thinking may draw a more convincing, at leaſt a more general Argument, from the very Nature of the Subject.

In the Operation of Reaſoning, the Mind does nothing but run over its Objects, as they are ſuppoſed

poſed to ſtand in Reality, without adding any Thing to them, or diminiſhing any Thing from them. If I examine the *Ptolomæan* and *Copernican* Syſtems, I endeavour only, by my Enquiries, to know the real Situation of the Planets; that is, in other Words, I endeavour to give them, in my Mind or Conception, the ſame Relations as they bear towards each other in the Heavens. To this Operation of the Mind, therefore, there ſeems to be always a real, tho' often an unknown Standard, in the Nature of Things; nor is Truth or Falſhood variable by the various Apprehenſions of Mankind. Tho' all human Race ſhou'd for ever conclude, that the Sun moves, and the Earth remains at Reſt, the Sun ſtirs not an Inch from his Place for all theſe Reaſonings; and ſuch Concluſions are eternally falſe and erroneous.

BUT the Caſe is not the ſame with the Qualities of *beautiful and deform'd, deſirable and odious*, as with Truth and Falſhood. In the former Caſe, the Mind is not contented with merely ſurveying its Objects, as they ſtand in themſelves: It alſo feels a Sentiment of Delight or Uneaſineſs, Approbation or Blame, conſequent to that Survey; and this Sentiment determines it to pronounce the Object *beautiful or deform'd, deſirable or odious*. Now, 'tis evident, that this Sentiment muſt depend upon the particular Fabric or Structure of the Mind, which enables ſuch particular Objects to operate in ſuch a particular Manner, and produces a Sympathy or Conformity betwixt the Mind and the Objects. Vary the Structure of the Mind or inward Organs, the Sentiment no longer

follows, tho' the Objects remain the ſame. The Sentiment being different from the Object, and ariſing from its Operation upon the Organs of the Mind, an Alteration in either of theſe Particulars muſt vary the Effect, nor can the ſame Object, preſented to a Mind totally different, produce the ſame Sentiment.

THIS Concluſion every one is apt to form of himſelf, without much Philoſophy, where the Sentiment is evidently diſtinguiſhable from the Object. Who is not ſenſible, that Power, and Glory, and Vengeance, are not deſirable of themſelves, but derive all their Value from the Structure of human Paſſions, which begets a Deſire for ſuch particular Objects? But with regard to Beauty, either natural or moral, the Caſe is commonly ſuppos'd to be different. The agreeable Quality is thought to lie in the Object, not in the Sentiment; and that merely becauſe the Sentiment is not ſo turbulent and violent as to diſtinguiſh itſelf, in an evident Manner, from the Perception of the Object.

BUT a very little Reflection ſuffices to diſtinguiſh them. A Man may know exactly all the Circles and Ellipſes of the *Copernican* Syſtem, and all the irregular Spirals of the *Ptolomæan*, without perceiving that the former is more beautiful than the latter. *Euclid* has very fully explain'd all the Qualities of the Circle, but has not, in any Propoſition, ſaid a Word of its Beauty. The Reaſon is evident. The Beauty is not a Quality of the Circle. It lyes

not

not in any Part of the Line, *whoſe* Parts are all equally diſtant from a common Center. It is only the Effect, which that Figure operates upon the Mind, whoſe particular Fabric or Structure renders it ſuſceptible of ſuch Sentiments. In vain would you look for it in the Circle, or ſeek it, either by your Senſes, or by Mathematical Reaſonings, in all the Properties of that Figure.

THE Mathematician, who took no other Pleaſure in reading *Virgil*, but that of examining *Eneas*'s Voyage by the Map, might underſtand perfectly the Meaning of every *Latin* Word, imploy'd by that divine Author; and conſequently, might have a diſtinct Idea of the whole Narration. He would even have a more diſtinct Idea of it, than they could have who had not ſtudy'd ſo exactly the Geography of the Poem. He knew, therefore, every thing in the Poem: But he was ignorant of its Beauty; becauſe the Beauty, properly ſpeaking, lies not in the Poem, but in the Sentiment or Taſte of the Reader. And where a Man has no ſuch Senſibility of Temper, as to make him feel this Sentiment, he muſt be ignorant of the Beauty, tho' he be poſſeſs'd of all the Science and Underſtanding of an Angel †.

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† Were I not afraid of appearing too philoſophical, I would remind my Reader of that famous Doctrine, ſuppos'd to be fully prov'd in modern Times, *That Taſtes and Colours, and all other ſenſible Qualities, lye not in the Bodies, but merely in the Senſes.* The Caſe is the ſame with Beauty and Deformity, Virtue and Vice. This Doctrine, however, takes off no more from the Reality

THE Inference from all this is, that it is not from the Value or Worth of the Object, which any Perſon purſues, that we can determine his Enjoyment, but merely from the Paſſion with which he purſues it, and the Succeſs he meets with in his Purſuit. Objects have abſolutely no Worth or Value in themſelves. They derive their Worth merely from the Paſſion. If that be ſtrong, and ſteady, and ſucceſsful, the Perſon is happy. It cannot reaſonably be doubted, but a little Miſs, dreſt in a new Gown for a Dancing-School Ball, receives as compleat Enjoyment as the greateſt Orator, who triumphs in the Splendor of his Eloquence, while he governs the Paſſions and Reſolutions of a numerous Aſſembly.

ALL the Difference, therefore, betwixt one Man and another, with regard to Life, conſiſts either in the *Paſſion*, or in the *Enjoyment*: And theſe Differences are ſufficient to produce the wide Extremes of Happineſs and Miſery.

Reality of the latter Qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any Umbrage either to Critics or Moraliſts. Tho' Colours were allow'd to lye only in the Eye, would Dyers or Painters ever be leſs regarded or eſteem'd? There is a ſufficient Uniformity in the Senſes and Feelings of Mankind, to make all theſe Qualities the Objects of Art and Reaſoning, and to have the greateſt Influence on Life and Manners. And as 'tis certain, that the Diſcovery above-mentioned in natural Philoſophy, makes no Alteration on Action and Conduct; Why ſhould a like Diſcovery in moral Philoſophy make any Alteration?

TO be happy, the *Paſſions* muſt neither be too violent nor too remiſs. In the firſt Caſe, the Mind is in a perpetual Hurry and Fluſtre; in the ſecond, it ſinks into a diſagreeable Indolence and Lethargy.

TO be happy, the Paſſions muſt be benign and ſocial; not rough or fierce. The Affections of the latter Kind are not near ſo agreeable, to the Feeling, as thoſe of the former. Who will compare Rancour and Animoſity, Envy and Revenge, to Friendſhip, Benignity, Clemency and Gratitude?

TO be happy, the Paſſions muſt be chearful and gay, not gloomy and melancholy. A Propenſity to Hope and Joy is real Riches: One to Fear and Sorrow, real Poverty.

SOME Paſſions or Inclinations, in the *Enjoyment* of their Object, are not ſo ſteady or conſtant as others, nor convey ſuch a durable Pleaſure and Satisfaction. *Philoſophical Devotion*, for Inſtance, like the Enthuſiaſm of a Poet, is the tranſitory Effect of high Spirits, great Leiſure, a fine Genius, and a Habit of Study and Contemplation: But notwithſtanding all theſe Circumſtances, an abſtracted, inviſible Object, like that which *natural* Religion alone preſents to us, cannot long actuate the Mind, or be of any Moment in Life. To render the Paſſion of Continuance, we muſt find ſome Method of affecting the Senſes and Imagination, and muſt embrace ſome *hiſtorical* as well as *philoſophical* Accounts of the Divinity. Popular Superſtitions and Obſervances are even found to be of Uſe in this Particular.

THO'

THO' the Tempers of Men be very different, yet we may ſafely pronounce in general, that a Life of Pleaſure cannot ſupport itſelf ſo long as one of Buſineſs, but is much more ſubject to Satiety and Diſguſt. The Amuſements, which are the moſt durable, have all a Mixture of Application and Attention in them; ſuch as Gaming and Hunting. And in general, Buſineſs and Action fill up all the great Vacancies of human Life.

BUT where the Temper is the beſt diſpos'd for any *Enjoyment*, the Object is often wanting: And in this Reſpect, the Paſſions, which purſue *external* Objects, do not contribute ſo much to Happineſs, as thoſe which reſt in ourſelves; ſince we are neither ſo certain of attaining ſuch Objects, nor ſo ſecure of poſſeſſing them. A Paſſion for Learning is preferable, with regard to Happineſs, to one for Riches.

SOME Men are poſſeſt of great Strength of Mind; and even when they purſue *external* Objects, are not much affected by a Diſappointment, but renew their Application and Induſtry with the greateſt Chearfulneſs. Nothing contributes more to Happineſs than this Turn of Mind.

ACCORDING to this ſhort and imperfect Sketch of human Life, the happieſt Diſpoſition of Mind is the *virtuous*; or, in other Words, that which leads to Action and Employment, renders us ſenſible to the ſocial Paſſions, ſteels the Heart againſt the Aſſaults of

Fortune, reduces the Affections to a juſt Moderation, makes our own Thoughts an Entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the Pleaſures of Society and Converſation, than to thoſe of the Senſes. This, in the mean Time, muſt be obvious to the moſt careleſs Reaſoner, that all Diſpoſitions of Mind are not alike favourable to Happineſs, and that one Paſſion or Humour may be extremely deſirable, while another is equally hateful. And indeed, all the Difference betwixt the Conditions of Life depends upon the Mind; nor is there any Situation of Affairs, in itſelf, preferable to another. Good and Ill, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human Sentiments and Affections. No Man would ever be unhappy, could he alter his Feelings. *Proteus*-like, he would elude all Attacks, by the continual Alterations of his Shape and Form.

BUT this Reſource Nature has, in a great Meaſure, depriv'd us of. The Fabric and Conſtitution of our Mind no more depends on our Choice, than that of our Body. The Generality of Men have not even the ſmalleſt Notion, that any Alteration in this Reſpect can ever be deſirable. As a Stream neceſſarily follows the ſeveral Inclinations of the Ground, on which it runs; ſo are the ignorant and thoughtleſs Part of Mankind actuated by their natural Propenſities. Such are effectually excluded from all Pretenſions to Philoſophy, and the *Medicine of the Mind*, ſo much boaſted. But even upon the wiſe and thoughtful, Nature has a prodigious Influence; nor is it always in a Man's Power, by the utmoſt Art and Induſtry, to correct his

his Temper, and attain that virtuous Character, to which he aſpires. The Empire of Philoſophy extends over a few: and with Regard to theſe too, her Authority is very weak and limited. Men may well be ſenſible of the Value of Virtue, and may deſire to attain it; but 'tis not always certain, that they will be ſucceſsful in their Wiſhes.

Whoever conſiders, without Prejudice, the Courſe of human Actions, will find, that Men are almoſt entirely guided by Conſtitution and Temper, and that general Maxims have little Influence, but ſo far as they affect our Taſte or Sentiment. If a Man have a lively Senſe of Honour and Virtue, with moderate Paſſions, his Conduct will always be conformable to the Rules of Morality; or if he depart from them, his Return will be eaſy and expeditious. But, on the other Hand, where one is born of ſo perverſe a Frame of Mind, of ſo callous and inſenſible a Diſpoſition, as to have no Reliſh for Virtue and Humanity, no Sympathy with his Fellow-Creatures, no Deſire of Eſteem and Applauſe; ſuch a one muſt be allow'd to be entirely incurable, nor is there any Remedy in Philoſophy. He reaps no Satisfaction but from low and ſenſual Objects, or from the Indulgence of malignant Paſſions: He feels no Remorſe to controul his vicious Inclinations: He has not even that Senſe or Taſte, which is requiſite to make him deſire a better Character: For my Part, I know not how I ſhould addreſs myſelf to ſuch a one, or by what Arguments I ſhould endeavour to reform him. Should I tell him of the inward Satisfaction that reſults from laudable and humane

mane Actions, the delicate Pleaſures of diſintereſted Love and Friendſhip, the laſting Enjoyments of a good Name and an eſtabliſhed Character; he might ſtill reply, that theſe were, perhaps, Pleaſures to ſuch as were ſuſceptible of them; but that, for his Part, he finds himſelf of a quite different Turn and Diſpoſition. I muſt repeat it; my Philoſophy affords no Remedy in ſuch a Caſe, nor could I do any thing but lament this Perſon's unhappy Condition. But then I aſk, If any other Philoſophy can afford a Remedy; or if it be poſſible, by any Syſtem, to render all Mankind virtuous, however perverſe may be their natural Frame of Mind? Experience will ſoon convince us of the contrary; and I will venture to affirm, that, perhaps, the chief Benefit, which reſults from Philoſophy, ariſes in an indirect Manner. 'Tis certain, that a ſerious Application to the Sciences and liberal Arts, ſoftens and humanizes the Temper, and cheriſhes thoſe fine Emotions, in which true Virtue and Honour conſiſts. It rarely, very rarely happens, that a Man of Taſte and Learning is not, at leaſt, an honeſt Man, whatever Frailties may attend him. The Bent of his Mind to ſpeculative Studies muſt mortify in him the Paſſions of Intereſt and Ambition, and muſt, at the ſame Time, give him a greater Senſibility of all the Decencies and Duties of Life. He feels more fully a moral Diſtinction in Characters and Manners; nor is his Senſe of this Kind diminiſh'd, but, on the contrary, it is much encreas'd, by his Speculations.

Besides such insensible Changes upon the Temper and Disposition, 'tis highly probable, that others may be produc'd by Study and Application. The prodigious Effects of Education may convince us, that the Mind is not altogether stubborn and inflexible, but will admit of many Alterations from its original Make and Structure. Let a Man propose to himself the Model of a Character, which he approves of; let him be well acquainted with those Particulars, in which his own Character deviates from this Model: Let him keep a constant Watch over himself, and bend his Mind, by a continual Effort, from the Vices towards the Virtues; and I doubt not but, in Time, he will find, in his Temper, an Alteration to the better.

Habit is another powerful Means of reforming the Mind, and implanting in it good Dispositions and Inclinations. A Man who continues for some Time in a Course of Sobriety and Temperance, will hate Riot and Disorder: If he engage himself in Business or Study, Indolence will seem a Punishment to him: If he constrain himself to practise Beneficence and Affability, he will soon abhor all Instances of Pride and Violence. Where one is throughly convinc'd, that the virtuous Course of Life is preferable; if he has but Resolution enough to impose a Violence on himself for some Time; his Reformation need not be despair'd of. The Misfortune is, that this Conviction and this Resolution never can have Place, unless a Man be, before-hand, tolerably virtuous.

HERE then is the utmoſt Triumph of Art and Philoſophy: It inſenſibly refines the Temper, and it points out to us thoſe Diſpoſitions which we ſhould endeavour to attain, by a conſtant *Bent* of Mind, and by repeated *Habit*. Beyond this I cannot acknowledge its Influence; and I muſt entertain great Doubts concerning all thoſe Exhortations and Conſolations, which are in ſuch Vogue among all ſpeculative Reaſoners.

WE have already obſerv'd, that no Objects are, of themſelves, deſirable or odious, valuable or deſpicable; but that all Objects acquire theſe Qualities from the particular Character and Conſtitution of the Mind, which ſurveys them. To diminiſh therefore, or augment any Perſon's Value for an Object, to excite or moderate his Paſſions, there are no direct Arguments or Reaſons, which can be employ'd with any Force or Influence. The catching Flies, like *Domitian*, if it give more Pleaſure, is preferable to the hunting wild Beaſts, like *William Rufus*, or conquering Kingdoms, like *Alexander*.

BUT tho' the Value of every Object can be determin'd only by the Sentiments or Paſſions of every Individual, we may obſerve, that the Paſſions, in pronouncing their Verdict, conſider not the object ſimply, as it is in itſelf, but ſurvey it with all the Circumſtances that attend it. A Man tranſported with Joy, on Account of his poſſeſſing a Diamond, confines not his View to the gliſtering Stone before him:

He

He alſo conſiders its Rarity, and from thence chiefly ariſes his Pleaſure and Exultation. Here therefore a Philoſopher may ſtep in, and ſuggeſt particular Views and Conſiderations, and Circumſtances, which otherwiſe would have eſcap'd us; and, by that Means, he may either moderate or excite any particular Paſſion.

It may ſeem unreaſonable abſolutely to deny the Authority of Philoſophy in this Reſpect: But it muſt be confeſt, that there lies this ſtrong Preſumption againſt it, that if theſe Views be natural and obvious, they would have occurred of themſelves, without the Aſſiſtance of Philoſophy; if they be not natural, they never can have any Influence on the Affections. *Theſe* are of a very delicate Nature, and cannot be forced or conſtrained by the utmoſt Art and Induſtry. A Conſideration, which we ſeek for on Purpoſe, which we enter into with Difficulty, which we retain with Care and Attention, can never produce thoſe genuine and durable Movements of Paſſion, which are the Reſult of Nature, and the Conſtitution of the Mind. A Man may as well pretend to cure himſelf of Love, by viewing his Miſtreſs thro' the *artificial* Medium of a Microſcope, or Proſpect, and beholding there the Coarſeneſs of her Skin, and monſtrous Diſproportion of her Features, as hope to excite or moderate any Paſſion by the *artificial* Arguments of a *Seneca* or an *Epictetus*. The Remembrance of the natural Aſpect and Situation of the Objects will, in both Caſes, ſtill return upon him. The Reflections of Philoſophy are too ſubtile and diſtant to take Place in common Life, or eradicate any Affection. The Air is too fine to breathe

breathe in, where it is above the Winds and Clouds of the Atmoſphere.

Another Defect of thoſe Reflections, which Philoſophy preſents to us, is, that commonly they cannot diminiſh or extinguiſh our vicious Paſſions, without diminiſhing or extinguiſhing ſuch as are virtuous, and rendering the Mind totally indifferent and inactive. They are, for the moſt Part, general, and are applicable to all our Affections. In vain do we hope to direct their Influence only to one Side. If by inceſſant Study and Meditation we have rendered them very intimate and preſent to us, they will operate throughout, and ſpread an univerſal Inſenſibility over the Mind. When we deſtroy the Nerves, we extinguiſh the Senſe of Pleaſure, along with that of Pain.

IT will be eaſy, by one Glance of the Eye, to find one or other of theſe Defects in moſt of thoſe philoſophical Reflections, ſo much celebrated both in ancient and modern Times. *Let not the Injuries or Violence of Men*, ſay the Philoſophers, *ever diſcompoſe you by Anger or Hatred. Would you be angry at the Ape for its Malice, or the Tyger for its Ferocity?* This Reflection leads us into a bad Opinion of human Nature, and muſt extinguiſh the ſocial Affections. It tends alſo to remove all Remorſe for a Man's own Crimes, when he conſiders, that Vice is as natural to Mankind, as the particular Inſtincts to Brute-Creatures.

ALL Ills ariſe from the Order of the Univerſe, which is abſolutely perfect. Would you wiſh to diſturb

ſo divine an Order for the Sake of your own particular Intereſt. What if the Ills I ſuffer ariſe from Malice or Oppreſſion? *But the Vices and Imperfections of Men are alſo comprehended in the Order of the Univerſe.*

If Plagues and Earthquakes break not Heav'n's Deſign,
Why then a Borgia *or a* Catiline?

Let this be allow'd; and my own Vices will alſo be a Part of the ſame Order.

MAN is born to be miſerable; and is he ſurpriz'd at any particular Misfortune? And can he give Way to Sorrow and Lamentation upon Account of any Diſaſter? Yes: He very reaſonably laments, that he ſhould be born to be miſerable. Your Conſolation preſents a hundred Ills for one, that you pretend to eaſe him of.

YOU ſhould always have before your Eyes Death, Diſeaſe, Poverty, Blindneſs, Exile, Calumny, and Infamy, as Ills which are incident to human Nature. When any of theſe Ills falls to your Lot, you will bear it the better that you have laid your Account with it. I anſwer, If we confine ourſelves to a general and diſtant Reflection on the Ills of human Life, *that* can have no Effect to prepare us for them. If by cloſe and intenſe Meditation we render them preſent and intimate to us, *that* is the true Secret to poiſon all our Pleaſures, and render us perpetually miſerable.

YOUR Sorrow is fruitleſs, and will not change the Courſe of Deſtiny. Very true: And for that very Reaſon I am ſorry.

CICE-

CICERO's Conſolation for Deafneſs is ſomewhat curious. *How many Languages are there*, ſays he, *which you do not underſtand? The* Punic, Spaniſh, Gallic, Ægyptian, *&c. With regard to all theſe, you are as if you were deaf, and yet you are indifferent about the Matter. Is it then ſo great a Misfortune to be deaf to one Language more* *?

I LIKE better the Repartee of *Antipater* the *Cyreniac*, when ſome Women were condoling with him for his Blindneſs. *What!* ſays he, *Do you think there are no Pleaſures in the Dark?*

NOTHING can be more deſtructive, ſays *Fontenelle, to Ambition, and the Paſſion for Conqueſts, than the true Syſtem of Aſtronomy. What a poor Thing is even the whole Globe, in Compariſon of the infinite Extent of Nature?* This Conſideration is evidently too diſtant ever to have any Effect. And if it had any, wou'd it not deſtroy Patriotiſm as well as Ambition? The ſame gallant Author adds with ſome Reaſon, that the bright Eyes of the Ladies are the only Objects, which loſe nothing of their Luſtre or Value from the moſt extenſive Views of Aſtronomy and Philoſophy, but ſtand Proof againſt every Syſtem. Wou'd Philoſophers adviſe us to limit our Affection to them?

THERE are only two Conſiderations to be met with in Books of Philoſophy, from which any Effect is to be expected; and that becauſe theſe two Conſiderations alone are drawn from common Life, and occur

* *Tuſc. Quæſt.* Lib. V.

upon the moſt ſuperficial View of human Affairs. When we conſider the Shortneſs and Uncertainty of Life, how frivolous do all our Purſuits of Happineſs appear? And even, if we wou'd extend our Concern beyond our own Life, how frivolous do our moſt enlarg'd and moſt generous Projects appear, when we conſider the inceſſant Changes and Revolutions of human Affairs, by which Laws and Learning, Books and Governments are hurry'd away by Time, as by a rapid Stream, and are loſt in the immenſe Ocean of Matter? Such a Reflection does certainly tend to mortify all our Paſſions: But does it not thereby counterwork the Artifice of Nature, who has happily deceiv'd us into an Opinion, that human Life is of ſome Importance? And may not ſuch a Reflection be imploy'd with Succeſs by voluptuous Reaſoners, to lead us from the Paths of Action and Virtue, into the flowery Fields of Indolence and Pleaſure?

We are inform'd by *Thucydides*, that, during the famous Plague of *Athens*, when Death ſeem'd preſent to every one's Eyes, a diſſolute Mirth and Gaiety prevail'd among the People, who exhorted one another to make the moſt of Life as long as it endur'd. The ſame Principle makes Soldiers, during War, to be more addicted to Riot and Expence, than any other Race of Men: And 'tis obſervable, in this Kingdom, that long Peace, by producing Security, has much alter'd them in this Particular, and has quite remov'd our Officers from the generous Character of their Profeſſion.

THE *ſecond* Philoſophical Conſideration, which may often have an Influence on the Affections, is deriv'd from a Compariſon of our own Condition with the Condition of others. This Compariſon we are continually making, even in common Life; but the Misfortune is, that we are apt rather to compare our Situation with that of our Superiors, than with that of our Inferiors. A Philoſopher corrects this natural Infirmity, by turning his View to the other Side, in order to render himſelf eaſy in the Situation wherein Fortune has plac'd him. There are few People, who are not ſuſceptible of ſome Conſolation from this Reflection; tho', to a very good-natur'd Man, the View of human Miſeries ſhou'd rather produce Sorrow than Comfort, and add to his Lamentations for his own Misfortunes a deep Compaſſion for thoſe of others. Such is the Imperfection, even of the beſt of theſe philoſophical Topics of Conſolation.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, That tho' Virtue be undoubtedly the beſt Choice, when it is attainable; yet ſuch is the Diſorder and Confuſion of human Affairs, that no perfect Oeconomy or regular Diſtribution of Happineſs and Miſery is ever, in this Life, to be expected. Not only the Goods of Fortune, and the Endowments of the Body, (both which are of great Importance) not only theſe Advantages, I ſay, are unequally divided betwixt the virtuous and vicious, but even the Mind itſelf partakes, in ſome Degree, of this Diſorder, and the

moſt worthy Character, by the very Oeconomy of the Paſſions, does not always enjoy the higheſt Felicity.

'Tis obſervable, that tho' every bodily Diſeaſe or Pain proceeds from ſome Diſorder in the Parts, yet the Pain is not always proportion'd to the Diſorder; but is greater or leſs, according to the greater or leſs Senſibility of the Part, upon which the noxious Humours exert their Influence. A *Tooth-ach* produces more violent Convulſions of Pain, than a *Phthiſis*, or a *Dropſy*. In like Manner, with regard to the Conſtitution of the Mind, we may obſerve, that all Vice is indeed pernicious; but yet the Diſturbance or Pain is not meaſured out by Nature with exact Proportion to the Degrees of Vice, nor is the Man of higheſt Virtue, even abſtracting from external Accidents, always the moſt happy. A gloomy and melancholy Diſpoſition is certainly, *to our Sentiments*, a Vice or Imperfection; but as it may be accompany'd with a great Senſe of Honour and great Integrity, it may be found in very worthy Characters; tho' 'tis ſufficient alone to imbitter Life, and render the Perſon affected with it compleatly miſerable. On the other Hand, a ſelfiſh Villain may poſſeſs a Spring and Alacrity of Temper, a certain *Gaiety of Heart*, which is indeed a good Quality, but which is rewarded much beyond its Merit, and when attended with good Fortune, will compenſate the Uneaſineſs and Remorſe ariſing from all the other Vices.

I SHALL

I SHALL add, as an Obſervation to the ſame Purpoſe, that if a Man be liable to a Vice or Imperfection, it may often happen, that a good Quality, which he poſſeſſes along with it, will render him more miſerable, than if he were compleatly vicious. A Perſon of ſuch a Weakneſs and Imbecillity of Temper, as to be eaſily broke by Affliction, is more unhappy for being endow'd with a generous and friendly Diſpoſition, which gives him a lively Concern for others, and expoſes him the more to Fortune and Accidents. A Senſe of Shame, in an imperfect Character, is certainly a Virtue, but produces great Uneaſineſs and Remorſe, from which the abandon'd Villain is intirely free. A very amorous Complexion, with a Heart incapable of Friendſhip, is happier than the ſame Exceſs in Love, with a Generoſity of Temper, which tranſports a Man beyond himſelf, and renders him a total Slave to the Object of his Paſſion.

IN a Word, Human Life is more govern'd by Fortune than by Reaſon; is to be regarded more as a dull Paſtime than as a ſerious Occupation; and is more influenc'd by particular Humour than by general Principles. Shall we engage ourſelves in it with Paſſion and Anxiety? It is not worthy of ſo much Concern. Shall we be indifferent about what happens? We loſe all the Pleaſure of the Game by our Phlegm and Careleſneſs. While we are reaſoning concerning Life, Life is gone; and Death, tho' *perhaps* they receive him differently, yet treats alike the Fool and

the Philoſopher. To reduce Life to exact Rule and Method, is commonly a painful, oft a fruitleſs Occupation: And is it not alſo a Proof, that we over-value the Prize we contend for? Even to reaſon ſo carefully concerning it, and to fix with Accuracy its juſt Idea, would be over-valuing it, were it not that, to ſome Tempers, this Occupation is one of the moſt amuſing, in which Life cou'd poſſibly be employ'd.

ESSAY XXII.

Of POLYGAMY *and* DIVORCES.

AS Marriage is an Engagement enter'd into by mutual Conſent, and, having for its End the Propagation of the Species, 'tis evident it muſt be ſuſceptible of all the Variety of Conditions, which mutual Conſent eſtabliſhes, provided they be not contrary to this End.

A MAN, in conjoining himſelf to a Woman, is bound to her according to the Terms of his Engagement: In begetting Children, he is bound, by all the Laws of Nature and Humanity, to provide for their Subſiſtence and Education. When he has perform'd theſe two Parts of his Duty, no Being can reproach him with Injuſtice or Injury. And as the Terms of his Engagement, as well as the Methods of ſubſiſting his Offspring, may be very various, 'tis mere Superſtition to imagine, that Marriage can be intirely uniform, and will admit only of one Mode or Form. Did not human Laws reſtrain the natural Liberty of Men, every particular Marriage wou'd be as different from one another, as Contracts or Bargains of any other Kind or Species.

As Circumſtances vary, and the Laws propoſe different Advantages, we find, that, in different Times and Places, they impoſe different Conditions on this important Contract. In *Tonquin* 'tis uſual for the Sailors, when the Ships come into the Harbour, to marry for the Seaſon; and, notwithſtanding this precarious Engagement, they are aſſured of the ſtricteſt Fidelity to their Bed, as well as in the whole Management of their Affairs, from thoſe temporary Spouſes.

I CANNOT, at preſent, recollect my Authorities; but I have ſomewhere read, That the Republic of *Athens*, having loſt many of its Citizens by War and Peſtilence, allow'd every Man to marry two Wives, in order the ſooner to repair the Waſte which had been made by theſe Calamities. The Poet *Euripides* happen'd to be coupled to two ugly Vixons, who ſo plagu'd him with their Jealouſies and Quarrels, that he became ever after a profeſt *Woman-hater*; and is the only theatrical Writer, perhaps the only Poet, that ever entertain'd an Averſion againſt the whole Sex.

IN that agreeable Romance, call'd *the Hiſtory of the Sevarambians*, where a great many Men and a few Women are ſuppos'd to be ſhipwreck'd on a deſert Coaſt; the Captain of the Troop, in order to obviate thoſe endleſs Quarrels that aroſe, regulates their Marriages after the following Manner: He takes a handſome Female to himſelf alone; aſſigns one to every couple of inferior Officers; and to five of the loweſt Rank he gives one Wife in common. Cou'd the greateſt

greateſt Legiſlator, in ſuch Circumſtances, have contriv'd Matters with greater Wiſdom?

THE ancient *Britons* had a very ſingular Kind of Marriage, which is to be met with among no other People. Any Number of them, as ten or a dozen, join'd in a Society together, which was perhaps requiſite for mutual Defence in thoſe barbarous Times. In order to link this Society the cloſer, they took an equal Number of Wives in common, and whatever Children were born, were reputed to belong to all of them, and were accordingly provided for by the whole Community.

AMONG the inferior Creatures, Nature herſelf, being the ſupreme Legiſlator, preſcribes all the Laws which regulate their Marriages, and varies thoſe Laws according to the different Circumſtances of the Creature. Where ſhe furniſhes, with Eaſe, Food and Defence to the new-born Animal, the preſent Embrace terminates the Marriage; and the Care of the Offſpring is committed intirely to the Female. Where the Food is of more difficult Purchaſe, the Marriage continues for one Seaſon, till the common Progeny can provide for itſelf; and then the Link immediately diſſolves, and leaves each of the Parties free to enter into a new Engagement at the enſuing Seaſon. But Nature having endow'd Man with Reaſon, has not ſo exactly regulated every Article of his Marriage-Contract, but has left him to adjuſt them, by his own Prudence, according to his particular Circumſtances and Situation. Municipal Laws are a Supply to the

Wiſdom of each Individual; and, at the ſame Time, by reſtraining the natural Liberty of Men, make the private Intereſt ſubmit to the Intereſt of the Public. All Regulations, therefore, on this Head are equally lawful, and equally conformable to the Principles of Nature; tho' they are not all equally convenient, or equally uſeful to Society. The Laws may allow of Polygamy, as among the *Eaſtern* Nations; or of voluntary Divorces, as among the *Greeks* and *Romans*; or they may confine one Man to one Woman, during the whole Courſe of their Lives, as among the modern *Europeans*. It may not be diſagreeable to conſider the Advantages and Diſadvantages of each of theſe Inſtitutions.

THE Advocates for Polygamy may recommend it as the only effectual Remedy for the Furies and Diſorders of Love, and the only Expedient for freeing Men from that Slavery to the Females, which the natural Violence of our Paſſions has impos'd on us. By this Means alone can we regain our Right of Sovereignty; and, by ſating our Appetite, re-eſtabliſh the Authority of Reaſon in our Minds, and, of Conſequence, our own Authority in our Families. Man, like a weak Sovereign, being unable to ſupport himſelf againſt the Wiles and Intrigues of his Subjects, muſt play one Faction againſt another, and become abſolute by the mutual Jealouſies of the Females. *To divide and to govern* is an univerſal Maxim; and, by neglecting it, the *Europeans* undergo a more grievous and a more ignominious Slavery than the *Turks* or *Perſians*, who are ſubjected indeed to a Sovereign, that

that lies at a Diſtance from them, but in their domeſtic Affairs rule with an uncontroulable Sway. An honeſt *Turk*, who ſhould come from his Seraglio, where every one trembles before him, wou'd be ſurpriz'd to ſee *Sylvia* in her drawing Room, ador'd by all the Beaus and pretty Fellows about Town, and he wou'd certainly take her for ſome mighty and deſpotic Queen, ſurrounded by her Guard of obſequious Slaves and Eunuchs.

ON the other Hand, it may be urg'd with better Reaſon, That this Sovereignty of the Man is a real Uſurpation, and deſtroys that Nearneſs, not to ſay Equality of Rank, which Nature has eſtabliſh'd betwixt the Sexes. We are, by Nature, their Lovers, their Friends, their Patrons: Wou'd we willingly change ſuch endearing Appellations for the barbarous Titles of Maſter and Tyrant?

IN what Capacity ſhall we gain by this inhuman Proceeding? As Lovers, or as Huſbands? The *Lover* is totally annihilated; and Courtſhip, the moſt agreeable Scene in human Life, can no longer have Place, where Women have not the free Diſpoſal of themſelves, but are bought and ſold, like the meaneſt Animals. The *Huſband* is as little a Gainer, having found the admirable Secret of diſtinguiſhing every Part of Love, except its Jealouſy. There is no Roſe without its Thorn; but he muſt be a fooliſh Wretch indeed, who throws away the Roſe, and preſerves only the Thorn.

I WOU'D not willingly inſiſt upon it as an Advantage in our *European* Cuſtoms, what was obſerv'd by *Mehemet Effendi* the laſt *Turkiſh* Ambaſſador in *France*. *We Turks*, ſays he, *are great Simpletons in Compariſon of the Chriſtians. We are at the Expence and Trouble of keeping a Seraglio, each in his own Houſe: But you eaſe yourſelves of this Burden, and have your Seraglio in your Friends Houſes.* The known Virtue of our *Britiſh* Ladies frees them ſufficiently from this Imputation: And the *Turk* himſelf, however great a *Turk*, muſt own, that our free Commerce with the Fair-Sex, more than any other Invention, embelliſhes, enlivens, and poliſhes Society.

BUT the *Aſiatic* Manners are as deſtructive to Friendſhip as to Love. Jealouſy excludes Men from all Intimacies and Familiarities. No Man dares bring his Friend to his Houſe or Table, leſt he bring a Lover to his numerous Wives. Hence all over the Eaſt, each Family is as ſeparate from another, as if they were ſo many diſtinct Kingdoms. No Wonder then, that *Solomon*, living like an Eaſtern Prince, with his ſeven hundred Wives, and three hundred Concubines, without one Friend, cou'd write ſo pathetically concerning the Vanity of the World. Had he try'd the Secret of one Wife or Miſtreſs, a few Friends, and a great many Companions, he might have found Life ſomewhat more agreeable. Deſtroy Love and Friendſhip, what does there remain in the World worth accepting?

TO render Polygamy more odious, I need not recount the frightful Effects of Jealouſy, and the Conſtraint

ſtraint in which it holds the Fair-Sex all over the Eaſt. In thoſe Countries Men are not allow'd to have any Commerce with the Females, not even Phyſicians, when Sickneſs may be ſuppos'd to have extinguiſh'd all wanton Paſſions in the Boſoms of the Fair, and, at the ſame Time, has render'd them unfit Objects of Deſire. *Tournefort* tells us, That when he was brought into the *Grand Signior*'s Seraglio as a Phyſician, he was not a little ſurpriz'd, in looking along a Gallery, to ſee a great Number of naked Arms, ſtanding out from the Sides of the Room. He cou'd not imagine what this cou'd mean; 'till he was told, that thoſe Arms belong'd to Bodies, which he muſt cure, without knowing any more about them, than what he cou'd learn from the Arms: He was not allow'd to aſk a Queſtion of the Patient, or even of her Attendants, leſt he might find it neceſſary to enquire concerning Circumſtances, which the Delicacy of the Seraglio allows not to be reveal'd. Hence the Phyſicians in the Eaſtern Countries pretend to know all Diſeaſes from the Pulſe; as our Quacks in *Europe* undertake to cure a Perſon merely from ſeeing his Water. I ſuppoſe, had *Monſieur Tournefort* been of this latter Kind, he would not, in *Conſtantinople*, have been allow'd by the jealous *Turks* to be furniſh'd with Materials requiſite for exerciſing his Art.

IN another Country, where Polygamy is alſo allow'd, they render their Wives Cripples, and make their Feet of no uſe to them, in order to confine them to their own Houſes. But it will, perhaps, ſurprize the Reader to hear, that in an *European* Country, where

Polygamy

Polygamy is not allow'd, Jealouſy can yet be carry'd to ſuch a Height, that 'tis indecent ſo much as to ſuppoſe a Woman of Rank can have Feet or Legs. A *Spaniard* is jealous of the very Thoughts of thoſe who approach his Wife; and, if poſſible, will prevent his being diſhonour'd, even by the Wantonneſs of Imagination. Witneſs the following Story, which we have from very good Authority *. When the Mother of the late King of *Spain* was on her Road towards *Madrid*, ſhe paſt thro' a little Town in *Spain*, famous for its Manufactory of Gloves and Stockings. The honeſt Magiſtrates of the Place thought they could not better expreſs their Joy, for the Reception of their new Queen, than by preſenting her with a Sample of thoſe Commodities, for which alone their Town was remarkable. The *Major-Domo* who conducted the Queen, receiv'd the Gloves very graciouſly: But when the Stockings were preſented, he flung them away with great Indignation, and ſeverely reprimanded the Magiſtrates for this egregious Piece of Indecency. *Know*, ſays he, *That a Queen of* Spain *has no Legs*. The poor young Queen, who, at that Time, underſtood the Language but very imperfectly, and had been often frighten'd with Stories of *Spaniſh* Jealouſy, imagin'd they were to cut off her Legs. Upon which ſhe fell a crying, and begg'd them to conduct her back to *Germany*; for that ſhe never cou'd endure that Operation: And it was with ſome Difficulty they could appeaſe her. *Philip* IV. is ſaid never in his Life to have laugh'd heartily, but at the Recital of this Story.

* *Memoires de la cour d'Eſpagne par Madame d'Annoy.*

IF a *Spaniſh* Lady muſt not be ſuppos'd to have Legs, what muſt be ſuppos'd of a *Turkiſh* Lady? She muſt not be ſuppos'd to have a Being at all. Accordingly, 'tis eſteem'd a Piece of Rudeneſs and Indecency at *Conſtantinople*, ever to make mention of a Man's Wives before him *. In *Europe*, 'tis true, fine bred People make it alſo a Rule never to talk of their Wives: But the Reaſon is not founded on our Jealouſy. I ſuppoſe it is becauſe we ſhould be apt, were it not for this Rule, to become troubleſome to Company, by talking too much of them.

THE Preſident *Monteſquiou* has given a different Reaſon for this polite Maxim, *Men*, ſays he, *never care to mention their Wives in Company, leſt they ſhould talk of them before People, that know them better than they do themſelves.*

HAVING rejected Polygamy, and match'd one Man with one Woman, let us now conſider what Duration we ſhall aſſign to their Union, and whether we ſhall admit of thoſe voluntary Divorces, which were in Uſe among the *Greeks* and *Romans*. They who would defend this Practice, may imploy the following Reaſons.

HOW often does Diſguſt and Averſion ariſe after Marriage, from the moſt trivial Accidents, or from an Incompatibility of Humour; where Time, inſtead of curing the Wounds proceeding from mutual Injuries, does every Day feſter them the more, by new

* *Memoires de Marquis d'Argens.*

Quarrels

Quarrels and Reproaches? Let us ſeparate Hearts, which are not made for each other. Each of them may, perhaps, find another, for which it is better fitted. At leaſt, nothing can be more cruel, than to preſerve, by Violence, an Union, which, at firſt, was made by mutual Love, and is now, in Effect, diſſolv'd by mutual Hatred.

But the Liberty of Divorces is not only a Cure to Hatred and domeſtic Quarrels: It is alſo an admirable Preſervative againſt them, and the only Secret for keeping alive that Love, which firſt united the marry'd Couple. The Heart of Man delights in Liberty: The very Image of Conſtraint is grievous to it: When you wou'd confine it by Violence, to what wou'd otherwiſe have been its Choice, its Inclination immediately changes, and Deſire is turn'd into Averſion. If the public Intereſt will not allow us to enjoy in Polygamy that *Variety*, which is ſo agreeable in Love; deprive us not at leaſt of that Liberty, which is ſo eſſentially requiſite. In vain you tell me, that I had my Choice of the Perſon, with whom I would conjoin myſelf. I had my Choice, 'tis true, of my Priſon; but this is but a ſmall Comfort, ſince it muſt ſtill be a Priſon.

Such are the Arguments, which may be urged in Favour of Divorces: But there ſeem to be theſe three unanſwerable Objections againſt them; *Firſt*, What muſt become of the Children, upon the Separation of the Parents? Muſt they be committed to the Care of a Stepmother; and, inſtead of the fond Care and Concern

Concern of a Mother, feel all the Indifference or Hatred of a Stranger or an Enemy? Theſe Inconveniences are ſufficiently felt, where Nature has made the Divorce by the Doom inevitable to all Mortals: And ſhall we ſeek to multiply theſe Inconveniencies, by multiplying Divorces, and putting it in the Power of Parents, upon every Caprice, to render their Poſterity miſerable?

Secondly, IF it be true, on the one Hand, that the Heart of Man naturally delights in Liberty, and hates every thing to which it is confin'd; 'tis alſo true, on the other Hand, that the Heart of Man naturally ſubmits to Neceſſity, and ſoon loſes an Inclination when there appears an abſolute Impoſſibility of ſatisfying it. Theſe Principles of human Nature, you'll ſay, are contradictory: But what is Man but a Heap of Contradictions? Tho' 'tis remarkable, that where Principles are, after this Manner, contrary in their Operation, they do not always deſtroy each other; but the one or the other may predominate on any particular Occaſion, according as Circumſtances are more or leſs favourable to it. For Inſtance, Love is a reſtleſs and impatient Paſſion, full of Caprice and Variations; ariſing in a Moment from a Feature, from an Air, from nothing, and ſuddenly extinguiſhing after the ſame Manner. Such a Paſſion requires Liberty above all Things; and therefore *Eloiſa* had Reaſon, when, in order to preſerve this Paſſion, ſhe refus'd to marry her belov'd *Abelard*.

How oft, when preſt to Marriage, have I ſaid,
Curſe on all Laws, but thoſe which Love has made.

Love,

Love, free as Air, at Sight of human Ties,
Spreads his light Wing, and in a Moment flies.

But *Friendſhip* is a calm and ſedate Affection, conducted by Reaſon, and cemented by Habit; ſpringing from long Acquaintance and mutual Obligations; without Jealouſies or Fears, and without thoſe feveriſh Fits of Heat and Cold, which cauſe ſuch an agreeable Torment in the amorous Paſſion. So ſober an Affection, therefore, as Friendſhip, rather thrives under Conſtraint, and never riſes to ſuch a Height, as when any ſtrong Intereſt or Neceſſity binds two Perſons together, and gives them ſome common Object of Purſuit. Let us conſider then, whether Love or Friendſhip ſhould moſt predominate in Marriage; and we ſhall ſoon determine whether Liberty or Conſtraint be moſt favourable to it. The happieſt Marriages, to be ſure, are found where Love, by long Acquaintance, is conſolidated into Friendſhip. Whoever dreams of Raptures and Extaſies beyond the Honeymoon, is a Fool. Even Romances themſelves, with all their Liberty of Fiction, are oblig'd to drop their Lovers the very Day of their Marriage, and find it eaſier to ſupport the Paſſion for a dozen of Years under Coldneſs, Diſdain and Difficulties, than a Week under Poſſeſſion and Security. We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the Marriage-knot the cloſeſt poſſible. The Friendſhip betwixt the Perſons, where it is ſolid and ſincere, will rather gain by it: And where it is wavering and uncertain, this is the beſt Expedient for fixing it. How many frivolous Quarrels and Diſguſts are there, which People of common Prudence endeavour to forget, when they lye

lye under the Neceſſity of paſſing their Lives together; but which would ſoon inflame into the moſt deadly Hatred, were they purſu'd to the utmoſt, under the Proſpect of an eaſy Separation?

IN the *third* Place, we muſt conſider, that nothing is more dangerous than to unite two Perſons ſo cloſe in all their Intereſts and Concerns, as Man and Wife, without rendering the Union intire and total. The leaſt Poſſibility of a ſeparate Intereſt muſt be the Source of endleſs Quarrels and Jealouſies. What Dr. *Parnel* calls,

The little pilfering Temper of a Wife,

will be doubly ruinous; and the Husband's Selfiſhneſs, being accompany'd with more Power, may be ſtill more dangerous.

SHOULD theſe Reaſons againſt voluntary Divorces be eſteem'd inſufficient, I hope no Body will pretend to refuſe the Teſtimony of Experience. At the Time that Divorces were moſt frequent among the *Romans*, Marriages were moſt rare; and *Auguſtus* was oblig'd, by penal Laws, to force the Men of Faſhion of *Rome* into the married State: A Circumſtance which is ſcarce to be found in any other Age or Nation.

The Excluſion of Polygamy and Divorces ſufficiently recommends our preſent *European* Practice, with Regard to Marriage.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXIII.

Of SIMPLICITY *and* REFINEMENT *in Writing.*

FINE Writing, according to Mr. *Addiſon*, conſiſts of Sentiments, which are natural, without being obvious. There cannot be a juſter, and more conciſe Definition of fine Writing.

SENTIMENTS, which are merely natural, affect not the Mind with any Pleaſure, and ſeem not worthy to engage our Attention. The Pleaſantries of a Waterman, the Obſervations of a Peaſant, the Ribaldry of a Porter or Hackney Coachman; all theſe are natural, and diſagreeable. What an inſipid Comedy ſhould we make of the Chit-chat of the Tea-table, copy'd faithfully and at full Length? Nothing can pleaſe Perſons of Taſte, but Nature drawn with all her Graces and Ornaments, *la belle nature*; or if we copy low Life, the Strokes muſt be ſtrong and remarkable, and muſt convey a lively Image to the Mind. The abſurd † Naivety of *Sancho Pancho* is repreſented

† A Word which I have borrow'd from the *French*, and which is much wanted in our Language.

in ſuch inimitable Colours by *Cervantes*, that it entertains as much as the Picture of the moſt magnanimous Hero or ſofteſt Lover.

THE Caſe is the ſame with Orators, Philoſophers, Critics, or any Author, who ſpeaks in his own Perſon, without introducing other Speakers or Actors. If his Language be not elegant, his Obſervations uncommon, his Senſe ſtrong and maſculine, he will in vain boaſt his Nature and Simplicity. He may be correct; but he never will be agreeable. 'Tis the Unhappineſs of ſuch Authors, that they are never blam'd nor cenſur'd. The good Fortune of a Book, and that of a Man, are not the ſame. The ſecret deceiving Path of Life, which *Horace* talks of, *fallentis ſemita vitæ*, may be the happieſt Lot of the one; but is the greateſt Misfortune that the other can poſſibly fall into.

ON the other Hand, Productions, which are merely ſurpriſing, without being natural, can never give any laſting Entertainment to the Mind. To draw Chimeras is not, properly ſpeaking, to copy or imitate. The Juſtneſs of the Repreſentation is loſt, and the Mind is diſpleaſed to find a Picture, which bears no Reſemblance to any Original. Nor are ſuch exceſſive Refinements more agreeable in the epiſtolary or philoſophic Stile than in the Epic or Tragic. Too much Ornament is a Fault in every Kind of Production. Uncommon Expreſſions, ſtrong Flaſhes of Wit, pointed Similies, and epigrammatic Turns, eſpecially when laid too thick, are a Diſfigurement rather than any Embelliſhment of Diſcourſe. As the Eye,

in

in ſurveying a *Gothic* Building, is diſtracted by the Multiplicity of Ornaments, and loſes the whole by its minute Attention to the Parts; ſo the Mind, in peruſing a Work over-ſtock'd with Wit, is fatigu'd and diſguſted with the conſtant Endeavour to ſhine and ſurprize. This is the Caſe where a Writer overabounds in Wit, even tho' that Wit, in itſelf, ſhould be juſt and agreeable. But it commonly happens to ſuch Writers, that they ſeek for their favourite Ornaments, even where the Subject affords them not; and by that Means, have twenty inſipid Conceits for one Thought that is really beautiful.

THERE is no Subject in critical Learning more copious than this of the juſt Mixture of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing; and therefore, not to wander in too large a Field, I ſhall confine myſelf to a few general Obſervations on that Head.

Firſt, I obſerve, *That tho' Exceſſes of both Kinds are to be avoided, and tho' a proper Medium ought to be ſtudy'd in all Productions; yet this Medium lies not in a Point, but admits of a very conſiderable Latitude.* Conſider the wide Diſtance, in this Reſpect, betwixt Mr. *Pope* and *Lucretius*. Theſe ſeem to lye in the two greateſt Extremes of Refinement and Simplicity, which a Poet can indulge himſelf in, without being guilty of any blameable Exceſs. All this Interval may be fill'd with Poets, who may differ from each other, but may be equally admirable, each in his peculiar Stile and Manner. *Corneille* and *Congreve*, who carry their Wit and Refinement ſomewhat farther than Mr.

Pope

Pope (if Poets of ſo different a Kind can be compar'd together) and *Sophocles* and *Terence*, who are more ſimple than *Lucretius*, ſeem to have gone out of that Medium, wherein the moſt perfect Productions are to be found, and are guilty of ſome Exceſs in theſe oppoſite Characters. Of all the great Poets, *Virgil* and *Racine*, in my Opinion, lye neareſt the Center, and are the fartheſt remov'd from both the Extremities.

My *ſecond* Obſervation on this Head is, *That it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to explain, by Words, wherein the juſt Medium betwixt the Exceſſes of Simplicity and Refinement conſiſts, or to give any Rule, by which we can know preciſely the Bounds betwixt the Fault and the Beauty.* A Critic may not only diſcourſe very judiciouſly on this Head, without inſtructing his Readers, but even without underſtanding the Matter perfectly himſelf. There is not in the World a finer Piece of Criticiſm than *Fontenelle*'s *Diſſertation on Paſtorals*; wherein, by a Number of Reflections and philoſophical Reaſonings, he endeavours to fix the juſt Medium, which is ſuitable to that Species of Writing. But let any one read the Paſtorals of that Author, and he will be convinc'd, that this judicious Critic, notwithſtanding his fine Reaſonings, had a falſe Taſte, and fix'd the Point of Perfection much nearer the Extreme of Refinement, than paſtoral Poetry will admit of. The Sentiments of his Shepherds are better ſuited to the Toilettes of *Paris*, than to the Foreſts of *Arcadia*. But this it is impoſſible to diſcover from his critical Reaſonings.

He blames all exceſſive Painting and Ornament as much as *Virgil* could have done, had *he* wrote a Diſſertation on this Species of Poetry. However diſferent the Taſtes of Men may be, their general Diſcourſes on theſe Subjects are commonly the ſame. No Criticiſm can be very inſtructive, which deſcends not to Particulars, and is not full of Examples and Illuſtrations. 'Tis allow'd on all Hands, that Beauty, as well as Virtue, lies always in a Medium; but where this Medium is plac'd, is the great Queſtion, and can never be ſufficiently explain'd by general Reaſonings.

I SHALL deliver it as a *third* Obſervation on this Subject, *that we ought to be more on our Guard againſt the Exceſs of Refinement than that of Simplicity; and that becauſe the former Exceſs is both leſs* beautiful, *and more* dangerous *than the latter.*

'TIS a certain Rule, that Wit and Paſſion are intirely inconſiſtent. When the Affections are mov'd, there is no Place for the Imagination. The Mind of Man being naturally limited, 'tis impoſſible all its Faculties can operate at once: And the more any one predominates, the leſs Room is there for the others to exert their Vigour. For this Reaſon, a greater Degree of Simplicity is requir'd in all Compoſitions, where Men, and Actions, and Paſſions are painted, than in ſuch as conſiſt of Reflections and Obſervations. And as the former Species of Writing is the more engaging and beautiful, one may ſafely, upon this Account, give the Preference to the Extreme of Simplicity above that of Refinement.

WE may alſo obſerve, that thoſe Compoſitions, which we read the oftneſt, and which every Man of Taſte has got by Heart, have the Recommendation of Simplicity, and have nothing ſurprizing in the Thought, when diveſted of that Elegance of Expreſſion, and Harmony of Numbers, with which it is cloath'd. If the Merit of the Compoſition lyes in a Point of Wit; it may ſtrike at firſt; but the Mind anticipates the Thought in the ſecond Peruſal, and is no longer affected by it. When I read an Epigram of *Martial*, the firſt Line recalls the Whole; and I have no Pleaſure in repeating to myſelf what I know already. But each Line, each Word in *Catullus* has its Merit; and I am never tir'd with the Peruſal of him. 'Tis ſufficient to run over *Cowley* once: But *Parnel*, after the fiftieth Reading, is as freſh as at the firſt. Beſides, 'tis with Books, as with Women, where a certain Plainneſs of Manner and of Dreſs is more engaging than that Glare of Paint and Airs and Apparel, which may dazzle the Eye, but reaches not the Affections. *Terence* is a modeſt and baſhful Beauty, to whom we grant every thing, becauſe he aſſumes nothing, and whoſe Purity and Nature make a durable, tho' not a violent, Impreſſion upon us.

But Refinement, as it is the leſs *beautiful*, ſo it is the more *dangerous* Extreme, and what we are the apteſt to fall into. Simplicity paſſes for Dulneſs, when it is not accompany'd with great Elegance and Propriety. On the contrary, there is ſomething ſurprizing in a Blaze of Wit and Conceit. Ordinary

Readers are mightily ſtruck with it, and falſly imagine it to be the moſt difficult, as well as moſt excellent Way of Writing. *Seneca* abounds with agreeable Faults, ſays *Quinctilian*, *abundat dulcibus vitiis*; and for that Reaſon is the more dangerous, and the more apt to pervert the Taſte of the young and inconſiderate.

I SHALL add, that the Exceſs of Refinement is now more to be guarded againſt than ever; becauſe 'tis the Extreme, which Men are the moſt apt to fall into, after Learning has made great Progreſs, and after eminent Writers have appear'd in every Species of Compoſition. The Endeavour to pleaſe by Novelty, leads Men wide of Simplicity and Nature, and fills their Writings with Affectation and Conceit. 'Twas thus the Age of *Claudius* and *Nero* became ſo much inferior to that of *Auguſtus* in Taſte and Genius: And perhaps there are, at preſent, ſome Symptoms of a like Degeneracy of Taſte, in *France* as well as in *England*.

*ESSAY XXIV.

Of NATIONAL CHARACTERS.

THE Vulgar are very apt to carry all *national Characters* to Extremes; and having once eſtabliſh'd it as a Principle, that any People are knaviſh, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no Exception, but comprehend every Individual under the ſame Character. Men of Senſe condemn theſe undiſtinguiſh'd Judgments; tho' at the ſame Time, they allow, that each Nation has a peculiar Set of Manners, and that ſome particular Qualities are more frequently to be met with among one People than among their Neighbours. The common People in *Swiſſerland* have ſurely more Probity than thoſe of the ſame Rank in *Ireland*; and every prudent Man will, from that Circumſtance alone, make a Difference in the Truſt he repoſes in them. We have Reaſon to expect greater Wit and Gaiety in a *Frenchman* than in a *Spaniard*; tho' *Cervantes* was born in *Spain*. An *Engliſhman* will naturally be ſuppoſed to have more Knowledge than a *Dane*; tho' *Tycho Brahe* was a Native of *Denmark*. Different Reaſons are aſſign'd

* The three following Eſſays are added to this Edition.

for theſe *national Characters*; while ſome account for them from *moral* and others from *phyſical* Cauſes. By *moral* Cauſes, I mean all Circumſtances, which are fitted to work on the Mind as Motives or Reaſons, and which render a peculiar Set of Manners habitual to us. Of this Kind are, the Nature of the Government, the Revolutions of public Affairs, the Plenty or Penury in which the People live, the Situation of the Nation with Regard to its Neighbours, and ſuch like Circumſtances. By *phyſical* Cauſes, I here mean thoſe Qualities of the Air and Climate, which are ſuppoſed to work inſenſibly on the Temper, by altering the Tone and Habit of the Body, and giving a particular Complexion, which, tho' Reflection and Reaſon may ſometimes overcome, yet will it prevail among the Generality of Mankind, and have an Influence on their Manners.

That the Character of a Nation will very much depend on *moral* Cauſes muſt be evident to the moſt ſuperficial Obſerver; ſince a Nation is nothing but a Collection of Individuals, and the Manners of Individuals are frequently determined by theſe Cauſes. As Poverty and hard Labour debaſe the Minds of the common People, and render them unfit for any Science and ingenious Profeſſion; ſo where any Government becomes very oppreſſive to all its Subjects, it muſt have a proportional Effect on their Temper and Genius, and muſt baniſh all the liberal Arts from amongſt them. Inſtances of this Nature are very frequent in the World.

THE ſame Principle of moral Cauſes fixes the Character of different Profeſſions, and alters even that Diſpoſition, which the particular Members receive from the Hand of Nature. A Soldier and a Prieſt are different Characters, in all Nations, and all Ages; and this Difference is founded on Circumſtances, whoſe Operation is eternal and unalterable.

THE Uncertainty of their Life makes Soldiers laviſh and generous as well as brave: Their Idleneſs as well as the large Societies, which they form in Camps or Garriſons, incline them to Pleaſure and Gallantry: By their frequent Change of Company, they acquire good Breeding and an Openneſs of Behaviour: Being employ'd only againſt a public and an open Enemy, they become candid, honeſt, and undeſigning: And as they uſe more the Labour of the Body than that of the Mind, they are commonly thoughtleſs and ignorant †.

'TIS a trite, but not altogether a falſe Maxim, that *Prieſts of all Religions are the ſame*; and tho' the

† 'Tis a Saying of *Minander*, Κομψὸς στρατιώτης, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ πλάττει θεὸς Οὐθεὶς γένοιτ' ἄν. *Men. apud. Stobæum.* *'Tis not in the Power even of God to make a polite Soldier.* The contrary Obſervation with regard to the Manners of Soldiers takes Place in our Days. This ſeems to me a Preſumption, that the Ancients ow'd all their Refinement and Civility to Books and Study; for which, indeed, a Soldier's Life is not ſo well qualified. Company and the World is their Sphere. And if there be any Politeneſs to be learned from Company, they will certainly have the moſt conſiderable Share of it.

Character of the Profeſſion will not, in every Inſtance, prevail over the perſonal Character, yet it is ſure always to predominate with the greater Number. For as Chymiſts obſerve, that Spirits, when rais'd to a certain Height, are all the ſame, from whatever Materials they be extracted; ſo theſe Men, being elevated above Humanity, acquire a uniform Character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my Opinion, is, generally ſpeaking, not the moſt amiable, that is to be met with in human Society. It is, in moſt Points, oppoſite to that of a Soldier; as is the Way of Life, from which it is deriv'd †.

As

† Tho' all Mankind have a ſtrong Propenſity to Religion at certain Times and in certain Diſpoſitions; yet are there few or none, who have it to that Degree, and with that Conſtancy, which is requiſite to ſupport the Character of this Profeſſion. It muſt, therefore, happen, that Clergymen, being drawn from the common Maſs of Mankind, as People are to other Employments, by the Views of Profit, the greateſt Part, tho' no Atheiſts or Freethinkers, will find it neceſſary, on particular Occaſions, to feign more Devotion than they are, at that Time, poſſeſt of, and to maintain the Appearance of Fervour and Seriouſneſs, even when jaded with the Exerciſes of their Religion, or when they have their Minds engag'd in the common Occupations of Life. They muſt not, like the reſt of the World, give Scope to their natural Movements and Sentiments: They muſt ſet a Guard over their Looks and Words and Actions: And in order to ſupport the Veneration paid them by the ignorant Vulgar, they muſt not only keep a remarkable Reſerve, but muſt promote the Spirit of Superſtition, by a continu'd Grimace and Hypocriſy. This Diſſimulation often deſtroys the Candour and Ingenuity of their Tempers, and makes an irreparable Breach in their Characters.

If

As to *phyſical* Cauſes, I am inclin'd to doubt altogether of their Operation in this particular; nor do I think,

If by Chance any of them be poſſeſt of a Temper more ſuſceptible of Devotion than uſual, ſo that he has but little Occaſion for Hypocriſy to ſupport the Character of his Profeſſion; 'tis ſo natural for him to over-rate this Advantage, and to think it atones for every Violation of Morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the Hypocrite. And tho' few dare openly avow thoſe exploded Opinions, *that every thing is lawful to the Saints, and that they alone have a Property in their Goods*; yet may we obſerve, that theſe Principles lurk in every Boſom, and repreſent a Zeal for religious Obſervances as ſo great a Merit, that it may compenſate for many Vices and Enormities. This Obſervation is ſo common, that all prudent Men are on their Guard, when they meet with any extraordinary Appearance of Religion; tho' at the ſame Time, they confeſs, that there are many Exceptions to this general Rule, and that Probity and Superſtition are far from being incompatible.

Moſt Men are ambitious; but the Ambition of other Men may commonly be ſatisfy'd, by excelling in their particular Profeſſion, and thereby promoting the Intereſts of Society. The Ambition of the Clergy can often be ſatisfy'd only by promoting Ignorance and Superſtition and implicite Faith and pious Frauds. And having got what *Archimedes* only wanted, (*viz.* another World, on which he could fix his Engines) no Wonder they move this World at their Pleaſure.

Moſt Men have an over-weaning Conceit of themſelves; but *theſe* have a peculiar Temptation to that Vice, who are regarded with ſuch Veneration, and are even deem'd ſacred, by the ignorant Multitude.

Moſt Men are apt to bear a particular Regard for the Members of their own Profeſſion; but as a Lawyer, or Phyſician, or Merchant does, each of them, follow out his Buſineſs apart, the Intereſts of theſe Profeſſions are not ſo cloſely united as the Intereſts of Clergymen of the ſame Religion; where the whole

I think, that Men owe any thing of their Temper or Genius to the Air, Food, or Climate. I confeſs,

Body gains by the Veneration, paid to their common Tenets, and by the Suppreſſion of Antagoniſts.

Few Men can bear Contradiction with Patience; but the Clergy too often proceed even to a Degree of Fury on this Article: Becauſe all their Credit and Livelihood depend upon the Belief, which their Opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and ſupernatural Authority, or have any Colour for repreſenting their Antagoniſts as impious and prophane. The *Odium Theologicum*, or Theological Hatred, is noted even to a Proverb, and means that Degree of Rancour, which is the moſt furious and implacable.

Thus many of the Vices of human Nature are, by fixt moral Cauſes, inflam'd in that Profeſſion; and tho' ſeveral Individuals eſcape the Contagion, yet all wiſe Governments will be on their Guard againſt the Attempts of a Society, who will for ever combine into one Faction, and while it acts as a Society, will for ever be actuated by Ambition, Pride, and a perſecuting Spirit.

The Temper of Religion is grave and ſerious; and this is the Character requir'd of Prieſts, which confines them to ſtrict Rules of Decency, and commonly prevents Irregularity and Intemperance amongſt them. The Gaiety, much leſs the Exceſſes of Pleaſure, is not permitted in that Body; and this Virtue is, perhaps, the only one they owe to their Profeſſion. In Religions, indeed, founded on ſpeculative Principles, and where public Diſcourſes make a Part of religious Service, it may alſo be ſuppoſed that the Clergy will have a conſiderable Share in the Learning of the Times; tho' 'tis certain that their Taſte in Eloquence will always be better than their Skill in Reaſoning and Philoſophy. But whoever poſſeſſes the other noble Virtues of Humanity, Meekneſs, and Moderation, as very many of them, no Doubt, do, is beholden for them to Nature or Reflection, not to the Genius of his Calling.

that

that the contrary Opinion may juſtly, at firſt Sight, ſeem very probable; ſince we find, that theſe Circumſtances have an Influence over every other Animal, and that even thoſe Creatures, which are fitted to live in all Climates, ſuch as Dogs, Horſes, *&c.* do not yet attain the ſame Perfection in all. The Courage of Bull-Dogs and Game-Cocks ſeems peculiar to *England*. *Flanders* is remarkable for large and heavy Horſes: *Spain* for Horſes light, and of good Mettle. And any Breed of theſe Creatures, tranſported from one Country into another, will ſoon loſe the Qualities, which they deriv'd from their native Climate. It may be aſk'd, Why not the ſame with Men?

THERE are few Queſtions more curious than this, nor which will occur oftener in our Enquiries concerning human Affairs; and therefore it may be proper to give it a ſerious Examination.

THE human Mind is of a very imitative Nature; nor is it poſſible, for any Set of Men, to converſe often together, without acquiring a Similitude of Manners, and communicating to each other their Vices as well as Virtues. The Propenſity to Company and Society is ſtrong in all rational Creatures; and the ſame Diſpoſition, which gives us this Propenſity, makes us enter deeply into each other's Sentiments, and cauſes like Paſſions and Inclinations to run, as it were by Contagion, thro' the whole Club or Knot of Companions. Where a Number of People are united into one political Body, the Occaſions

of their Intercourſe muſt be ſo frequent, for Defence, Commerce, and Government, that, along with the ſame Speech or Language, they muſt contract a Reſemblance in their Manners, and have a common or national Character, as well as a perſonal one, peculiar to each Individual. Now tho' Nature produces all Kinds of Temper and Underſtanding in great Abundance, it follows not that ſhe always produces them in like Proportions, and that in every Society the Ingredients of Induſtry and Indolence, Valour and Cowardice, Humanity and Brutality, Wiſdom and Folly will be mixt after the ſame Manner. In the Infancy of Society, if any of theſe Diſpoſitions be found in greater Abundance than the reſt, it will naturally prevail in the Compoſition, and give a Tincture to the national Character. Or ſhould it be aſſerted, that no Species of Temper can reaſonably be preſum'd to predominate, even in thoſe contracted Societies, and that the ſame Proportions will always be preſerv'd in the Mixture; yet ſurely the Perſons in Credit and Authority, being a more contracted Body, cannot always be preſum'd to be of the ſame Character; and their Influence on the Manners of the People, muſt, at all Times, be very conſiderable. If on the firſt Eſtabliſhmeut of a Republic, a *Brutus* ſhould be plac'd in Authority, and be tranſported with ſuch an Enthuſiaſm for Liberty and public Good, as to overlook all the Ties of Nature, as well as private Intereſt; ſuch an illuſtrious Example will naturally have an Effect on the whole Society, and kindle the ſame Paſſion in every Boſom. Whatever it be that forms the Manners of one Generation, the next muſt im-

imbibe a deeper Tincture of the ſame Dye; Men being more ſuſceptible of all Impreſſions during Infancy, and retaining theſe Impreſſions as long as they remain in the World. I aſſert, then, that all national Characters, where they depend not on fixt *moral* Cauſes, proceed from ſuch Accidents as theſe, and that phyſical Cauſes have no diſcernible Operation on the human Mind.

If we run over the whole Globe, or revolve all the Annals of Hiſtory, we ſhall diſcover every-where Signs of this Sympathy or Contagion of Manners, and none of the Influence of Air or Climate.

Firſt. We may obſerve, that where a very extenſive Government has been eſtabliſh'd for many Centuries, it ſpreads a national Character over the whole Empire, and communicates to every Part a Similitude of Manners. Thus the *Chineſe* have the greateſt Uniformity of Character imaginable; tho' the Air and Climate, in different Parts of that vaſt Empire, admit of very conſiderable Variations.

Secondly. In ſmall Governments, which are very contiguous, the People have notwithſtanding a different Character, and are often as diſtinguiſhable in their Manners as the moſt diſtant Nations. *Athens* and *Thebes* were but a ſhort Day's Journey from each other; tho' the *Athenians* were as remarkable for Ingenuity, Politeneſs, and Gaiety, as the *Thebans* for Dulneſs, Ruſticity, and a phlegmatic Temper. *Plutarch*, diſcourſing of the Effects of Air on the Minds

of Men, obſerves that the Inhabitants of the *Piræum*, poſſeſt very different Tempers from thoſe of the higher Town of *Athens*, which was diſtant about four Miles from it. But I believe no one attributes the Difference of Manners, in *Wapping* and St. *James*'s, to a Difference of Air or Climate.

Thirdly. THE ſame national Character commonly follows the Authority of the Government to a preciſe Limit or Boundary; and upon croſſing a River, or paſſing a Mountain, one finds a new Set of Manners along with a new Government. The *Languedocians* and *Gaſcons* are the gayeſt People of all *France*; but whenever you go over the *Pyrenees*, you are among *Spaniards*. Is it conceivable, that the Qualities of the Air ſhould change ſo exactly with the Limits of an Empire, which depend ſo much on the Accidents of Battles, Negotiations, and Marriages?

Fourthly. WHERE any Set of Men, ſcatter'd over diſtant Nations, have a cloſe Society or Communication together, they acquire a Similitude of Manners, and have but little in common with the Nations amongſt whom they live. Thus the *Jews* in *Europe*, and the *Armenians* in the Eaſt, have a peculiar Character; and the former are as much noted for Fraud, as the latter for Probity. The *Jeſuites*, in all *Roman-Catholic* Countries, are alſo obſerv'd to have a Character peculiar to themſelves.

Fifthly. WHERE any Accident, as a Difference of Language or Religion, keeps two Nations, inhabiting the

the ſame Country, from mixing with each other, they will preſerve a diſtinct and even oppoſite Set of Manners for ſeveral Centuries. The Integrity, Gravity, and Bravery of the *Turks* form an exact Contraſt to the Levity, Deceit, and Cowardice of the modern *Greeks*.

Sixthly. The ſame Set of Manners will follow a Nation, and adhere to them over the whole Globe, as well as the ſame Laws and Language. The *Spaniſh*, *Engliſh*, *French*, and *Dutch* Colonies are all diſtinguiſhable, even betwixt the Tropics.

Seventhly. The Manners of a People change very conſiderably from one Age to another; either by great Alterations in their Government, by the Mixtures of new People, or by that Inconſtancy, to which all human Affairs are ſubject. The Ingenuity and Induſtry of the ancient *Greeks* have nothing in common with the Stupidity and Indolence of the preſent Inhabitants of thoſe Regions. Candour, Bravery, and Love of Liberty, form'd the Character of the ancient *Romans*; as Subtilty, Cowardice, and a Slaviſh Diſpoſition do that of the modern. The old *Spaniards* were reſtleſs, turbulent, and ſo addicted to War, that many of them killed themſelves, when they were depriv'd of their Arms by the *Romans*. One would find an equal Difficulty, at preſent, (at leaſt fifty Years ago) to rouze up the modern *Spaniards* to Arms. The *Batavians* were all Soldiers of Fortune, and hir'd themſelves into the *Roman* Armies. Their Poſterity make uſe of Foreigners for the ſame Purpoſe that the *Romans* did

did their Anceſtors. Tho' ſome Strokes of the *French* Character be the ſame, which *Cæſar* has aſcrib'd to the *Gauls*; yet what Compariſon betwixt the Civility, Humanity and Knowledge of the modern Inhabitants of that Country, and the Ignorance, Barbarity and Groſſneſs of the ancient?

Eighthly. Where ſeveral neighbouring Nations have a very cloſe Communication together, either by Policy, Commerce, or Travelling, they acquire a Similitude of Manners, proportion'd to the Communication. Thus all the *Franks* ſeem to have a uniform Character to the Eaſtern Nations. The Differences among them are like the particular Accents of different Provinces, which are not diſtinguiſhable, except by an Ear accuſtom'd to them, and which commonly eſcape a Foreigner.

Ninthly. We may often remark a wonderful Mixture of Manners and Character in the ſame Nation, ſpeaking the ſame Language, and ſubject to the ſame Government: And in this Particular, the *Engliſh* are the moſt remarkable of any People, that ever were in the World. Nor is this to be aſcrib'd to the Mutability and Uncertainty of their Climate, or to any other *phyſical* Cauſes; ſince all theſe Cauſes take Place in their neighbouring Kingdom of *Scotland*, without having the ſame Effect. Where the Government of a Nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a particular Set of Manners. Where it is altogether monarchical, it is more apt to have the ſame Effect; the Imitation of Superiors ſpreading the national Manners faſter among

among the People. If a State conſiſts altogether of Merchants, ſuch as *Holland*, their uniform Way of Life will form their Character. If it conſiſts chiefly of Nobles and landed Gentry, like *Germany*, *France*, and *Spain*, the ſame Effect follows. The Genius of a particular Sect or Religion is alſo apt to mould the Manners of a People. But the *Engliſh* Government is a Mixture of Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy. The People are compos'd of Gentry and Merchants. All Sects of Religion are to be found amongſt them. And the great Liberty and Independency, which they enjoy, allows every one to diſplay the Manners, which are peculiar to him. Hence the *Engliſh*, of any People in the Univerſe, have the leaſt of a national Character; unleſs this very Singularity be made their national Character.

IF the Characters of Men depended on the Air and Climate, the Degrees of Heat and Cold ſhould naturally be expected to have a mighty Influence; ſince nothing has a greater Effect on all Plants and irrational Animals. And indeed, there is ſome Reaſon to think, that all the Nations, which live beyond the polar Circles or betwixt the Tropics, are inferior to the reſt of the Species, and are utterly incapable of all the higher Attainments of the human Mind. The Poverty and Miſery of the northern Inhabitants of the Globe, and the Indolence of the ſouthern, may, perhaps, account for this remarkable Difference, without having Recourſe to *phyſical* Cauſes. This however is certain, that the Characters of Nations are very promiſcuous in the temperate Climates, and that almoſt

moſt all the general Obſervations, which have been form'd of the more ſouthern or more northern Nations in theſe Climates, are found to be uncertain and fallacious.

SHALL we ſay, that the Neighbourhood of the Sun inflames the Imagination of Men, and gives them a peculiar Spirit and Vivacity? The *French*, *Greeks*, *Egyptians* and *Perſians* are remarkable for Gaiety: The *Spaniards*, *Turks* and *Chineſe* are noted for Gravity and a ſerious Behaviour; without any ſuch Difference of Climate, as to produce this Difference of Temper.

THE *Greeks* and *Romans*, who call'd all other Nations Barbarians, confin'd Genius and a fine Underſtanding to the more ſouthern Climates, and pronounc'd the northern Nations incapable of all Knowledge and Civility. But *Britain* has produc'd as great Men, either for Action or Learning, as *Greece* or *Italy* have to boaſt of.

'TIS pretended, that the Sentiments of Men become more delicate as they approach nearer the Sun; and that their Taſte of Beauty and Elegance of every Kind receives proportionable Improvements in every Latitude, as we may particularly obſerve of the Languages, of which the more ſouthern are ſmooth and melodious, the northern harſh and untuneable. But this Obſervation holds not univerſally. The *Arabic* is uncouth and diſagreeable: The *Muſcovite* ſoft and muſical. Energy, Strength, and ſometimes Harſh-

neſs form the Character of the *Latin* Tongue: The *Italian* is the moſt liquid, ſmooth, and effeminate Language, that can poſſibly be imagin'd. Every Language will depend ſomewhat on the Manners of the People; but much more on that original Stock of Words and Sounds, which they receiv'd from their Anceſtors, and which remain unchangeable, even while their Manners admit of the greateſt Alterations. Who can doubt, that the *Engliſh* are at preſent a much more polite and knowing People than the *Greeks* were for ſeveral Ages after the Siege of *Troy*? Yet there is no Compariſon between the Language of *Milton* and that of *Homer*. Nay, the greater are the Alterations and Improvements, which happen in the Manners of a People, the leſs can be expected in their Language. A few great and refin'd Geniuſes will communicate their Taſte and Knowledge to a whole People, and produce the greateſt Improvements: But they fix the Tongue by their Writings, and prevent, in ſome Degree, its farther Changes.

My Lord *Bacon* has obſerv'd, that the Inhabitants of the South are, in general, more ingenious than thoſe of the North; but that, where the Native of a cold Climate has Genius, he riſes to a higher Pitch than can be reached by the ſouthern Wits. This Obſervation a late Writer † confirms, by comparing the ſouthern Wits to Cucumbers, which are commonly all good of their Kind; but at the beſt are an inſipid Fruit: While the northern Geniuſes are like Me-

† Dr. *Berkeley*: Minute Philoſopher.

lons,

lons, of which not one in fifty is good; but when it is good, it has an exquiſite Reliſh. I believe this Remark may be allow'd juſt, when confin'd to the *European* Nations, and to the preſent Age, or rather to the preceding one: But then I think it may be accounted for by moral Cauſes. All the Sciences and liberal Arts have been imported to us from the South; and 'tis eaſy to imagine, that, in the firſt Ardour of Application, when excited by Emulation and by Glory, the few, that were addicted to them, would carry them to the greateſt Height, and ſtretch every Nerve, and every Faculty, to reach the Pinnacle of Perfection. Such illuſtrious Examples ſpred Knowledge every where, and begot an univerſal Eſteem for the Sciences: After which, 'tis no Wonder, that Induſtry relaxes; while Men meet not with ſuitable Encouragements, nor arrive at ſuch Diſtinction by their Attainments. The univerſal Diffuſion of Learning among a People, and the entire Baniſhment of groſs Ignorance and Ruſticity is, therefore, ſeldom attended with any remarkable Perfection in particular Perſons. "Formerly, "ſays *Juvenal*, Learning was confin'd to *Greece* and "*Italy*. Now the whole World emulate *Athens* and "*Rome*. Eloquent *Gaul* has taught *Britain*, know-"ing in the Laws. Even *Thulé* entertains Thoughts "of hiring Rhetoricians for its Inſtruction." * This

* *Sed Cantaber unde*
Stoicus? antiqui præſertim ætate Metelli.
Nunc totus Graias, noſtraſque habet orbis Athenas,
Gallia cauſidicos docuit facunda Britannos:
De conducendo loquitur jam rhetore Thulé.

Satyr. 15.

State

State of Learning is remarkable; becauſe *Juvenal* is himſelf the laſt of the *Roman* Writers, who poſſeſt any Degree of Genius: Thoſe, who ſucceeded, are valued for nothing but the Matters of Fact, of which they give us Information. I wiſh the late Converſion of *Muſcovy* to the Study of the Sciences may not prove a like Prognoſtic to the preſent Period of Learning.

Cardinal *Bentivoglio* gives the Preference to the northern Nations above the ſouthern with regard to Candour and Sincerity; and mentions, on the one Hand, the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, and on the other the *Flemiſh* and *Germans*. But I am apt to think, that this has happened by Accident. The ancient *Romans* ſeem to have been a candid ſincere People; as are the modern *Turks*. But if we will needs ſuppoſe, that this Event has ariſen from fixt Cauſes, we may only conclude from it, that all Extremes are apt to concur, and are commonly attended with the ſame Conſequences. Treachery is the moſt uſual Concomitant of Ignorance and Barbarity; and if civiliz'd Nations ever embrace ſubtle and crooked Politics, 'tis from an Exceſs of Refinement, which makes them diſdain the plain direct Road to Power and Glory.

Most Conqueſts have gone from North to South; and thence it has been infer'd, that the northern Nations poſſeſs a ſuperior Degree of Courage and Ferocity. But it would have been juſter to have ſaid, that moſt Conqueſts are made by Poverty and Want upon Plenty and Riches. The *Saracens*, leaving the Deſerts of *Arabia*, carried their Conqueſts northwards upon

upon all the fertile Provinces of the *Roman* Empire; and met the *Turks* half Way, who were coming ſouthwards from the Deſerts of *Tartary*.

An eminent Writer * has remark'd, that all courageous Animals are alſo carnivorous, and that greater Courage is to be expected in a People, ſuch as the *Engliſh*, whoſe Food is ſtrong and hearty, than in the half-ſtarv'd Commonalty of other Countries. But the *Swedes*, notwithſtanding their Diſadvantages in this Particular, are not inferior, in martial Courage, to any Nation that ever was in the World.

In general, we may obſerve, that Courage, of all national Qualities, is the moſt precarious; becauſe it is exerted only at Intervals, and by a few in every Nation; whereas Induſtry, Knowledge, Civility, may be of conſtant and univerſal Uſe, and may become habitual to the whole People. If Courage be preſerv'd, it muſt be by Diſcipline, Example, and Opinion †. The tenth Legion of *Cæſar*, and the Regiment of *Pi-*

* Sir *William Temple*'s Account of the Netherlands.

† As a Proof how much Courage depends on Opinion, we may obſerve, that of the two chief Tribes of the *Greeks*, the *Dorians* and *Ionians*, the former were always eſteem'd, and always appear'd more brave and manly than the latter; tho' the Colonies of both the Tribes were interſpers'd and intermingled thro' all the Extent of *Greece*, the leſſer *Aſia*, *Sicily*, *Italy* and the Iſlands of the *Ægean* Sea. The *Athenians* were the only *Ionians* that ever had any Reputation for Valour or military Atchievements; tho' even theſe were eſteem'd inferior to the *Lacedemonians*, the braveſt of the *Dorians*.

cardy

cardy in *France* were form'd promiſcuouſly from amongſt the Citizens; but having once entertain'd a Notion, that they were the beſt Troops in the Service, this very Opinion really made them ſuch.

THE only Obſervation, with regard to the Differences of Men in different Climates, on which we can repoſe any Weight, is the Vulgar one, that People in the northern Regions have a greater Inclination to ſtrong Liquors, and thoſe in the ſouthern to Love and Women. One can aſſign a very probable *phyſical* Cauſe for this Difference. Wine and diſtill'd Spirits warm the frozen Blood in the colder Climates, and fortify Men againſt the Injuries of the Weather: As the genial Heat of the Sun, in the Countries, expos'd to his Beams, inflames the Blood, and exalts the Paſſion betwixt the Sexes.

PERHAPS too, the Matter may be accounted for by *moral* Cauſes. All ſtrong Liquors are rarer in the North, and conſequently are more coveted. *Diodorus Siculus* * tells us, that the *Gauls*, in his Time, were great Drunkards, and much addicted to Wine, chiefly from its Rarity and Novelty. On the other Hand, the Heat in the ſouthern Climates, obliging Men and Women to go half naked, thereby renders their frequent Commerce more dangerous, and in-

* *Lib.* 5. The ſame Author aſcribes Taciturnity to that People; a new Proof that national Characters may alter very much.

flames

flames their mutual Paſſion. This makes Parents and Huſbands more jealous and reſerv'd; which ſtill farther inflames the Paſſion. Not to mention, that as Women ripen ſooner in the ſouthern Regions, 'tis neceſſary to obſerve greater Jealouſy and Care in their Education; it being evident that a Girl of twelve cannot poſſeſs equal Diſcretion to govern the Furies of this Paſſion, as one, who feels not its Violence till ſhe be ſeventeen or eighteen.

PERHAPS too, the Fact is falſe, that Nature has, either from moral or phyſical Cauſes, diſtributed theſe different Inclinations to the different Climates. The ancient *Greeks*, tho' born in a warm Climate, ſeem to have been much addicted to the Bottle; nor were their Parties of Pleaſure any thing but Matches of Drinking amongſt the Men, who paſt their Time altogether apart from the Fair-Sex. Yet when *Alexander* led the *Greeks* into *Perſia*, a ſtill more ſouthern Climate, they multiplied their Debauches of this Kind, in Imitation of the *Perſian* Manners. So honourable was the Character of a Drunkard amongſt the *Perſians*, that *Cyrus* the younger, ſoliciting the ſober *Lacedomonians* for Succour againſt his Brother, *Artaxerxes*, claims it chiefly on Account of his ſuperior Endowments, as more valorous, more bountiful, and a better Drinker. *Darius Hyſtaſpes* made it be inſcribed on his Tombſtone, among his other Virtues and Princely Qualities, that no one could bear a greater Quantity of Liquor. You may obtain any Thing of the *Negroes* by offering them ſtrong Liquors; and may

may eaſily prevail with them to ſell, not only their Parents, but their Wives and Miſtreſſes, for a Caſk of Brandy. In *France* and *Italy* no Body ever drinks pure Wine, except in the greateſt Heats of Summer; and indeed, it is then almoſt as neceſſary, in order to recruit the Spirits, evaporated by Heat, as it is in *Sweden*, during the Winter, in order to warm the Bodies congeal'd by the Rigour of the Seaſon.

If Jealouſy be regarded as a Proof of an amorous Diſpoſition, no People were more jealous than the *Muſcovites*, before their Communication with *Europe* had ſomewhat alter'd their Manners in this Particular.

But ſuppoſing the Fact true, that Nature, by phyſical Principles, has regularly diſtributed theſe two Paſſions, the one to the northren, the other to the ſouthern Regions; we can only infer, that the Climate may affect the groſſer and more bodily Organs of our Frame; not that it can work upon thoſe finer Organs, on which the Operations of the Mind and Underſtanding depend. And this is agreeable to the Analogy of Nature. The Races of Animals never degenerates when carefully tended; and Horſes, in particular, always ſhow their Blood in their Shape, Spirit, and Swiftneſs: But a Coxcomb may beget a Philoſopher, as a Man of Virtue may leave a Scoundrel Progeny.

I shall conclude this Subject with obſerving, that tho' the Paſſion for Liquor be much more brutal and de-

debaſing than Love, which, when properly manag'd, is the Source of all Politeneſs and Refinement; yet this gives not ſo great an Advantage to the ſouthern Climates, as we may be apt, at firſt Sight, to imagine. When Love goes beyond a certain Pitch, it renders Men jealous, and cuts off the free Intercourſe betwixt the Sexes, on which the Politeneſs of a Nation will always much depend. And if we would ſubtilize and refine upon this Point, we might obſerve, that Nations, in very temperate Climates, ſtand the faireſt Chance for all Sorts of Improvement; their Blood not being ſo inflam'd as to render them jealous, and yet being warm enough to make them ſet a due Value on the Charms and Endowments of the Fair Sex.

ESSAY XXV.

Of the ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

AS no Party, in the preſent Age, can pretend to ſupport itſelf, without a philoſophical or ſpeculative Syſtem of Principles, annex'd to its political or practical ones; we accordingly find, that each of the Parties, into which this Nation is divided, has rear'd up a Fabric of this Kind, in order to protect and cover that Scheme of Actions, which it proſecutes. The People being commonly very rough Builders, eſpecially in this ſpeculative way, and more eſpecially ſtill, when actuated by Party Zeal; 'tis natural to imagine, that their Workmanſhip muſt be a little unſhapely, and diſcover evident Marks of that Violence and Hurry, in which it was rais'd. The one Party, by tracing up the Origin of Government to the DEITY, endeavour to render it ſo ſacred and inviolate, that it muſt be little leſs than Sacrilege, however diſorderly it may become, to touch or invade it, in the ſmalleſt Article. The other Party, by founding Government altogether on the Conſent of the PEOPLE, ſuppoſe that there is a Kind of *original Contract*, by which the Subjects have reſerv'd the Power of reſiſting their Sovereign, whenever they find themſelves

aggrieved by that Authority, with which they have, for certain Purpoſes, voluntarily entruſted him. Theſe are the ſpeculative Principles of the two Parties; and theſe too are the practical Conſequences, deduc'd from them.

I SHALL venture to affirm, *That both theſe* Syſtems *of ſpeculative Principles are juſt; tho' not in the Senſe, intended by the Parties:* And *That both the* Schemes *of practical Conſequences are prudent; tho' not in the Extremes, to which each Party, in Oppoſition to the other, has commonly endeavoured to carry them.*

THAT the DEITY is the ultimate Author of all Government, will never be denied by any one who admits a general Providence, and allows, that all Events in the Univerſe are conducted by a uniform Plan and directed to wiſe Purpoſes. As 'tis impoſſible for human Race to ſubſiſt, at leaſt in any comfortable or ſecure State, without the Protection of Government; it muſt certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the Good of all his Creatures: And as it has univerſally, in Fact, taken place, in all Countries and all Ages; we may conclude, with ſtill greater Certainty, that it was intended by that omniſcient Being, who can never be deceived by any Event or Operation. But ſince he gave riſe to it, not by any particular or miraculous Interpoſition, but by his concealed and univerſal Efficacy; a Sovereign cannot, properly ſpeaking, be called his Vice-gerent, in any other Senſe than every Power or Force, being deriv'd from him, may be ſaid to act by his Commiſſion. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general Plan or Intention

tion of Providence; nor has the greateſt and moſt lawful Prince any more Reaſon, upon that Account, to plead a peculiar Sacredneſs or inviolable Authority, than an inferior Magiſtrate, or even an Uſurper, or even a Robber and a Pyrate. The ſame divine Super-intendant, who, for wiſe Purpoſes, inveſted an *Elizabeth* or a *Harry** with Authority, did alſo, for Purpoſes, no doubt, equally wiſe, tho' unknown, beſtow Power on a *Borgia* or an *Angria*. The ſame Cauſes, which gave Riſe to the Sovereign Power in every State, did alſo eſtabliſh every petty Juriſdiction in it, and every limited Authority. A Conſtable, therefore, no leſs than a King, acts by a divine Commiſſion, and poſſeſſes an indefeaſible Right.

WHEN we conſider how nearly equal all Men are in their bodily Force, and even in their mental Powers and Faculties, 'ere cultivated by Education; we muſt neceſſarily allow, that nothing but their own Conſent cou'd, at firſt, aſſociate them together, and ſubject them to any Authority. The PEOPLE, if we trace up Government to its firſt Origin, in the Woods and Deſerts, are the Source of all Power and Juriſdiction, and voluntarily, for the Sake of Peace and Order, abandon'd their native Liberty, and receiv'd Laws from their Equal and Companion. The Conditions, upon which they were willing to ſubmit, were either expreſt, or were ſo clear and obvious, that it might well be eſteem'd ſuperfluous to expreſs them. If this, then, be meant by the *original Contract*, it cannot be denied, that all Government is,

* *Harry* the 4th of *France*.

at firſt, founded on a Contract, and that the moſt ancient rude Combinations of Mankind were form'd entirely by that Principle. In vain, are we ſent to the Records to ſeek for this Charter of our Liberties. It was not wrote on Parchment, nor yet on Leaves or Barks of Trees. It preceded the Uſe of Writing, and all the other civiliz'd Arts of Life. But we trace it plainly in the Nature of Man, and in the Equality, which we find in all the Individuals of that Species. The Force, which now prevails, and which is founded on Fleets and Armies, is plainly political, and deriv'd from Authority, the Effect of eſtabliſh'd Government. A Man's natural Force conſiſts only in the Vigour of his Limbs and Firmneſs of his Courage; which could never ſubject Multitudes to his Command. Nothing but their own Conſent, and their Senſe of the Advantages of Peace and Order, could have had that Influence.

BUT Philoſophers, who have embrac'd a Party (if that be not a Contradiction in Terms) are not contented with theſe Conceſſions. They aſſert, not only that Government in its earlieſt Infancy aroſe from Conſent, or the voluntary Combination of the People, but alſo, that, even at preſent, when it has attain'd its full Maturity, it reſts on no other Foundation. They affirm, that all Men are ſtill born equal, and owe Allegiance to no Prince or Government, unleſs bound by the Obligation and Sanction of a *Promiſe*. And as no Man, without ſome Equivalent, would forego the Advantages of his native Liberty, and ſubject himſelf to the Will of another; this Promiſe is always underſtood to be conditional, and impoſes on him no Obli-

Obligation, unleſs he meets with Juſtice and Protection from his Sovereign. Theſe Advantages the Sovereign promiſes him in return; and if he fails in the Execution, he has broke his Articles of Engagement, and thereby freed his Subjects from all Obligations to Allegiance. Such, according to theſe Philoſophers, is the Foundation of Authority in every Government; and ſuch the Right of Reſiſtance, poſſeſt by every Subject.

BUT would theſe Reaſoners look abroad into the World, they would meet with nothing that, in the leaſt, correſponds to their Ideas, or can warrant ſo refin'd and philoſophical a Syſtem. On the contrary, we find, every where, Princes, who claim their Subjects as their Property, and aſſert their independent Right of Sovereignty, from Conqueſt or Succeſſion. We find alſo, every where, Subjects, who acknowledge this Right in their Princes, and ſuppoſe themſelves born under Obligations of Obedience to a certain Sovereign, as much as under the Ties of Reverence and Duty to certain Parents. Theſe Connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our Conſent, in *Perſia* and *China*; in *France* and *Spain*; and even in *Holland* and *England*, wherever the Doctrines abovemention'd have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or Subjection becomes ſo familiar, that moſt Men never make any Enquiry about its Origin or Cauſe, more than about the Principle of Gravity, Reſiſtance, or the moſt univerſal Laws of Nature. Or if Curioſity ever move them; as ſoon as they learn, that they themſelves and their Anceſtors have, for ſeveral Ages, or from Time im-

memorial, been ſubject to ſuch a Government or ſuch a Family; they immediately acquieſce, and acknowledge their Duty of Allegiance. Were you to preach, in moſt Parts of the World, that political Connexions are founded altogether on voluntary Conſent or a mutual Promiſe, the Magiſtrate would ſoon impriſon you, as ſeditious, for looſening the Tyes of Obedience; if your Friends did not before ſhut you up, as delirious, for advancing ſuch Abſurdities. 'Tis ſtrange, that an Act of the Mind, which every Individual is ſuppos'd to have form'd, and after he came to the Uſe of Reaſon too, otherwiſe it cou'd have no Authority; that this Act, I ſay, ſhould be ſo unknown to all of them, that, over the Face of the whole Earth, there ſcarce remain any Traces or Memory of it.

BUT the Contract, on which Government is founded, is ſaid to be the *original Contract*; and conſequently may be ſuppos'd too old to fall under the Knowledge of the preſent Generation. If the Agreement, by which ſavage Men firſt aſſociated and conjoin'd their Force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being ſo ancient, and being obliterated by a thouſand Changes of Government and Princes, it cannot now be ſuppos'd to retain any Authority. If we would ſay any Thing to the Purpoſe, we muſt aſſert, that every particular Government, which is lawful, and which impoſes any Duty of Allegiance on the Subject, was, at firſt, founded on Conſent and a voluntary Compact. But beſides that this ſuppoſes the Conſent of the Fathers to bind the Children, even to the moſt remote Generations (which

(which republican Writers will never allow) beſides this, I ſay, it is not juſtified by Hiſtory or Experience, in any Age or Country of the World.

ALMOST all the Governments, which exiſt at preſent, or of which there remains any Record in Story, have been founded originally, either on Uſurpation, or Conqueſt, or both, without any Pretence of a fair Conſent, or voluntary Subjection of the People. When an artful and bold Man is plac'd at the Head of an Army or Faction, 'tis often eaſy for him, by employing ſometimes Violence, ſometimes falſe Pretences, to eſtabliſh his Dominion over a People a hundred Times more numerous than his Partizans. He allows no ſuch open Communication, that his Enemies can know, with Certainty, their Number or Forces. He gives them no Leiſure to aſſemble together in a Body to oppoſe him. Even all thoſe, who are the Inſtruments of his Uſurpation, may wiſh his Fall; but their Ignorance of each other's Intentions keeps them in Awe, and is the ſole Cauſe of his Security. By ſuch Arts as theſe many Governments have been eſtabliſh'd; and this is all the *original Contract* they have to boaſt of.

THE Face of the Earth is continually changing, by the Encreaſe of ſmall Kingdoms into mighty Empires, by the Diſſolution of great Empires into ſmaller Kingdoms, by the planting of Colonies, by the Migration of Tribes. Is there any Thing diſcoverable, in all theſe Events, but Force and Violence? Where is the mutual Agreement or voluntary Aſſociation ſo much talkt of?

EVEN the ſmootheſt Way, by which a Nation may receive a foreign Maſter, by Marriage or a Will, is

not extremely honourable for the People; but ſuppoſes them to be diſpos'd of, like a Dowry or a Legacy, according to the Pleaſure or Intereſt of their Rulers.

But where no Force interpoſes, and Election takes place; what is this Election ſo highly vaunted? 'Tis either a few great Men, who decide for the Whole, and will allow of no Contradiction or Oppoſition: Or 'tis the Rabble, that follow a ſeditious Ring-leader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen amongſt them, and who owes his Advancement merely to his Impudence, or the momentary Caprice of his Fellows. Are theſe diſorderly Elections, which are rare too, of ſuch mighty Authority, as to be the only lawful Foundation of all Government and Allegiance?

In reality, there is not a more terrible Event, than a total Diſſolution of Government, which gives Liberty to the Multitude, and makes the Determination or Choice of the new Eſtabliſhment depend upon a Number, that nearly approaches the Body of the People: For it never comes entirely to the whole Body of them. Every wiſe Man, then, wiſhes to ſee, at the Head of a powerful and obedient Army, a General, who may ſpeedily ſeize the Prize, and give to the People a Maſter, which they are ſo unfit to chooſe for themſelves. So little correſpondent is Fact and Reality to thoſe philoſophical Notions.

Let not the Eſtabliſhment at the *Revolution*, deceive us, or make us ſo much in Love with a philoſophical Origin to Government, as to imagine all others monſtrous and irregular. Even that

was

was far from correſponding to theſe refin'd Ideas. 'Twas only the Succeſſion, and that only in the regal Part of the Government, which was then changed: And 'twas only the Majority of ſeven hundred, who determin'd that Change for near ſeven Millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the Bulk of theſe ſeven Millions acquieſc'd willingly in the Determination: But was the Matter left, in the leaſt, to their Choice? Was it not juſtly ſuppoſed to be, from that Moment, decided, and every Man puniſh'd, who refus'd to ſubmit to the new Sovereign? How otherways could the Matter have ever been brought to any Iſſue or Concluſion?

THE Republic of *Athens* was, I believe, the moſt extenſive Democracy we read of in Hiſtory: Yet if we make the requiſite Allowances for the Women, the Slaves, and the Strangers, we ſhall find, that that Eſtabliſhment was not, at firſt, made, nor any Law ever voted, by a tenth Part of thoſe, who were bound to pay Obedience to it. Not to mention the Iſlands and foreign Dominions, which the *Athenians* claim'd as theirs by Right of Conqueſt. And as 'tis well known, that popular Aſſemblies in that City were always full of Licence and Diſorder, notwithſtanding of the Forms and Laws, by which they were checkt: How much more diſorderly muſt they be, where they form not the eſtabliſh'd Conſtitution, but aſſemble tumultuouſly on the Diſſolution of the ancient Government, in order to give riſe to a new one? How chimerical muſt it be to talk of a Choice in any ſuch Circumſtances?

'TIS in vain to ſay, that all Governments are, or ſhou'd be, at firſt, founded on popular Conſent,

as much as the Neceſſity of human Affairs will admit. This favours entirely my Preterſion. I maintain, that human Affairs never will admit of this Conſent; ſeldom of the Appearance of it: But that Conqueſt or Uſurpation, that is, in plain Terms, Force, by diſſolving the ancient Governments, is the Origin of almoſt all the new ones, that ever were eſtabliſh'd in the World. And that in the few Caſes, wherein Conſent may ſeem to have taken place, it was ſo irregular, ſo confin'd, or ſo much intermix'd either with Fraud or Violence, that it cannot have any great Authority.

When a new Government is eſtabliſh'd, by whatever Arts, the People are commonly diſſatisfy'd with it, and pay Obedience more from Fear and Neceſſity, than from any Idea of Allegiance or moral Obligation. The Prince is watchful and jealous, and muſt carefully guard againſt every Beginning or Appearance of Inſurrection. Time, by Degrees, removes all theſe Difficulties, and accuſtoms the Nation to regard, as their lawful or native Princes, that Family, whom, at firſt, they conſidered as Uſurpers or foreign Conquerors. In order to found this Opinion, they have no Recourſe to any Notion of voluntary Conſent or Promiſe, which, they know, never was, in this Caſe, either expected or demanded. The original Eſtabliſhment was form'd by Violence, and ſubmitted to from Neceſſity. The ſubſequent Adminiſtration is alſo ſupported by Power, and acquieſc'd in by the People, not as a Matter of Choice, but of Obligation. They imagine not, that their Conſent gives their Prince a Title: But they willingly conſent, because

cauſe they think, that, from long Poſſeſſion, he has acquir'd a Title, independent of their Choice or Inclination.

SHOULD it be ſaid, that by living under the Dominion of a Prince, which one might leave, every Individual has given a *tacit* Conſent to his Authority, and promis'd him Obedience; it may be anſwer'd, That ſuch imply'd Conſent can only take place, where a Man imagines, that the Matter depends on his Choice. But where he thinks (as all Mankind do, who are born under eſtabliſh'd Governments) that by his Birth he owes Allegiance to a certain Prince or certain Government; it would be abſurd to infer a Conſent or Choice, which he expreſly, in this Caſe, renounces and abjures.

CAN we ſeriouſly ſay, that a poor Peaſant or Artizan has a free Choice to leave his own Country, when he knows no foreign Language or Manners, and lives from Day to Day, by the ſmall Wages he acquires? We may as well aſſert, that a Man, by remaining in a Veſſel, freely conſents to the Dominion of the Maſter; tho' he was carry'd on board while aſleep, and muſt leap into the Ocean, and periſh, the Moment he leaves her.

WHAT if the Prince forbid his Subjects to leave his Dominions; as *Tiberius* puniſh'd a *Roman* Senator for attempting to fly to the *Parthians*, in order to eſcape his Tyranny? Or as the ancient *Muſcovites* prohibited all travelling under Pain of Death? And did a Prince obſerve, that many of his Subjects were ſeiz'd with the Frenzy of tranſporting themſelves to foreign Nations, he would doubtleſs, with great Rea-

ion and Juſtice, reſtrain it, in order to prevent the Depopulation of his own Country. Would he forfeit the Allegiance of all his Subjects, by ſo wiſe and reaſonable a Law? Yet the Freedom of their Choice is ſurely, in that Caſe, raviſh'd from them.

A COMPANY of Men, who ſhould leave their native Country, in order to People ſome uninhabited Region, might dream of recovering their native Freedom; but they would ſoon find, that their Prince ſtill laid claim to them, and call'd them his Subjects, even in their new Settlement. And in this he would act entirely conformable to the common Ideas of Mankind.

THE trueſt *tacit* Conſent of this Kind, which is ever obſerv'd, is when a Foreigner ſettles in any Country, and is beforehand acquainted with the Prince, and Government, and Laws, to which he muſt ſubmit: Yet is his Allegiance, tho' more voluntary, much leſs expected or depended on, than that of a natural born Subject. On the contrary, his native Prince ſtill aſſerts a Right to him. And if he puniſhes not the Renegade, when he ſeizes him in War with his new Prince's Commiſſion; this Clemency is not founded on the municipal Law, which in all Countries condemns the Priſoner; but on the Conſent of Princes, who have agreed to this Indulgence, in order to prevent Repriſals.

SUPPOSE an Uſurper, after having baniſh'd his lawful Prince and royal Family, ſhould eſtabliſh his Dominion for ten or a dozen Years in any Country, and ſhould preſerve ſuch an exact Diſcipline in his Troops, and ſo regular a Diſpoſition in his Gariſons,

that no Inſurrection had ever been rais'd, or even Murmur heard, againſt his Adminiſtration: Can it be aſſerted, that the People, who in their Hearts abhor his Treaſon, have tacitly conſented to his Authority, and promis'd him Allegiance, merely becauſe, from Neceſſity, they live under his Dominion? Suppoſe again their natural Prince reſtor'd, by Means of an Army, which he aſſembles in foreign Countries: They receive him with Joy and Exultation, and ſhew plainly with what Reluctance they had ſubmitted to any other Yoke. I may now aſk, upon what Foundation the Prince's Title ſtands? Not on popular Conſent ſurely: For tho' the People willingly acquieſce in his Authority, they never imagine, that their Conſent makes him Sovereign: They conſent; becauſe they apprehend him to be already, by Birth, their lawful Sovereign. And as to that tacit Conſent, which may now be infer'd from their living under his Dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the Tyrant and Uſurper.

WHEN we aſſert, that all lawful Government ariſes from the People, we certainly do them a great deal more Honour than they deſerve, or even expect and deſire from us. After the *Roman* Dominions became too unweildy for the Republic to govern, the People, over the whole known World, were extremely grateful to *Auguſtus* for that Authority, which, by Violence, he eſtabliſh'd over them; and they ſhew'd an equal Diſpoſition to ſubmit to the Succeſſor, whom he left them, by his laſt Will and Teſtament. It was afterwards their Misfortune, that there never was, in one Family, any long regular Succeſſion; but that their

their Line of Princes was continually broke, either by private Aſſaſſinations or public Rebellions. The *Prætorian* Bands, on the Failure of every Family, ſet up one Emperor: the Legions in the *Eaſt* a ſecond: thoſe in *Germany*, perhaps, a third: And the Sword alone could decide their Pretenſions. The Condition of the People, in that mighty Monarchy, was to be lamented, not becauſe the Choice of Emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But becauſe they never fell under any Succeſſion of Maſters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the Violence and Wars and Bloodſhed, occaſion'd by every new Settlement; thoſe were blameleſs, becauſe inevitable.

THE Houſe of *Lancaſter* rul'd in *England* about ſixty Years: The preſent Eſtabliſhment has taken Place very near the ſame Time. Have all Views of Right in another Family been utterly extinguiſh'd; even tho' few Men now alive had arriv'd at Years of Diſcretion, when it was expell'd, or could have conſented to its Dominion, or have promis'd it Allegiance? A ſufficient Indication ſurely of the general Sentiment of Mankind on this Head. For we blame not the Adherents of the abdicated Family, merely on Account of the long Time they have preſerv'd their imaginary Fidelity. We blame them for adhering to a Family, which, we affirm, has been juſtly expell'd, and which, from the Moment the new Settlement took place, had forfeited all Title to Authority.

BUT would we have a more regular, at leaſt, a more philoſophical Refutation of this Principle of an original Contract or popular Conſent; perhaps, the following Obſervations may ſuffice. ALL

ALL *moral* Duties may be divided into two Kinds. The *firſt* are thoſe, to which Men are impell'd by a natural Inſtinct or immediate Propenſity, that operates in them, independent of all Ideas of Obligation, and of all Views either to public or private Utility. Of this Nature are, Love of Children, Gratitude to Benefactors, Pity to the Misfortunate. When we reflect on the Advantage, that reſults to Society from ſuch humane Inſtincts, we pay them the juſt Tribute of moral Approbation and Eſteem: But the Perſon, actuated by them, feels their Power and Influence, antecedent to any ſuch Reflection.

THE *ſecond* Kind of moral Duties are ſuch as are not ſupported by any original Inſtincts of Nature, but are perform'd entirely from a Senſe of Obligation, when we conſider the Neceſſities of human Society, and the Impoſſibility of ſupporting it, if theſe Duties were neglected. 'Tis thus *Juſtice* or a Regard to the Property of others, *Fidelity* or the Obſervance of Promiſes, become moral Duties, and acquire an Authority over Mankind. For as 'tis evident that every Man loves himſelf better than any other Perſon, he is naturally impell'd to acquire as much as poſſible; and nothing can ever reſtrain him, in this Propenſity, but Reflection and Experience, by which he learns the pernicious Effects of that Licence, and the total Diſſolution of Society, which muſt enſue from it. His original Inclination, therefore, or Inſtinct is here check'd and reſtrain'd by a ſubſequent Judgment or Obſervation.

THE Caſe is preciſely the ſame with the political or civil Duty of *Allegiance*, as with the natural Du-

ties of Juſtice and Fidelity. Our primary Inſtincts lead us, either to indulge ourſelves in unlimited Liberty, or to ſeek Dominion over others: And 'tis Reflection only, that engages us to ſacrifice ſuch ſtrong Paſſions to the Intereſts of Peace and Order. A very ſmall Degree of Experience and Obſervation ſuffices to teach us, that Society cannot poſſibly be maintained without the Authority of Magiſtrates, and that that Authority muſt ſoon fall into Contempt, where exact Obedience is not pay'd to it. The Obſervation of theſe general and obvious Intereſts is the Source of all Allegiance, and of that moral Obligation, which we attribute to it.

What Neceſſity is there, therefore, to found the Duty of *Allegiance* or Obedience to Magiſtrates on that of *Fidelity* or a Regard to Promiſes, and to ſuppoſe, that 'tis the Conſent of each Individual, which ſubjects him to Government; when it appears, that both Allegiance and Fidelity ſtand preciſely on the ſame Foundation, and are both ſubmitted to by Mankind, on Account of the apparent Intereſts and Neceſſities of human Society? We are bound to obey our Sovereign, 'tis ſaid; becauſe we have given a tacit Promiſe to that Purpoſe. But why are we bound to obſerve our Promiſe? It muſt be aſſerted, that the Commerce and Intercourſe of Mankind, which are of ſuch infinite Advantage, can have no Security, where Men pay no regard to their Engagements. It may, in like Manner, be ſaid, that Men could not live at all in Society, at leaſt in a civiliz'd Society, without Laws and Magiſtrates and Judges, to prevent the Encroachments of the ſtrong upon the weak, the violent upon

on the juſt and equitable. The Obligation to Allegiance, being of like Force and Authority with the Obligation to Fidelity, we gain nothing by reſolving the one into the other. The general Intereſts or Neceſſities of Society are ſufficient to eſtabliſh both.

IF the Reaſon is aſkt of that Obedience, which we are bound to pay to Government, I readily anſwer; *becauſe Society cou'd not otherwiſe ſubſiſt:* And this Anſwer is clear and intelligible to all Mankind. Your anſwer is, *becauſe we ſhou'd keep our Word.* But beſides, that no Body, 'till train'd in a philoſophical Syſtem, can either comprehend or reliſh this Anſwer: Beſides this, I ſay, you find yourſelf embarraſs'd, when 'tis aſk'd you, *why we are bound to keep our Word?* And you can give no other Anſwer, but what would, immediately, without any Circuity, have accounted for our Obligation to Allegiance.

BUT *to whom is Allegiance due? And who are our lawful Sovereigns?* This Queſtion is often the moſt difficult of any, and liable to infinite Diſcuſſions. When People are ſo happy, that they can anſwer, *Our preſent Sovereign, who inherits, in a direct Line, from Anceſtors, that have govern'd us for many Ages*; this Anſwer admits of no Reply; even tho' Hiſtorians, in tracing up to the remoteſt Antiquity the Origin of that royal Family, may find, as commonly happens, that its firſt Authority was deriv'd from Uſurpation and Violence. 'Tis confeſt, that private Juſtice or the Abſtinence from the Properties of others, is a moſt cardinal Virtue: Yet Reaſon tells us, that there is no Property in durable Objects, ſuch as Lands or Houſes, when carefully examin'd in paſſing from Hand

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Hand to Hand, but muſt, in ſome Period, have been founded on Fraud and Injuſtice. The Neceſſities of human Society, neither in private nor publick Life, will allow of ſuch an accurate Enquiry: And there is no Virtue or moral Duty, but what may, with Facility, be refin'd away, if we indulge a falſe Philophy, in ſifting and ſcrutinizing it, by every captious Rule of Logic, in every Light or Poſition, wherein it may be plac'd.

THE Queſtions with Regard to private Property have fill'd infinite Volumes of Law and Philoſophy, not to mention the Commentators upon both; and in the End, we may ſafely pronounce, that many of the Rules, there eſtabliſh'd, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like Opinion may be form'd with regard to the Succeſſions and Rights of Princes and Forms of Government. The Diſcuſſion of theſe Matters would lead us entirely beyond the Compaſs of theſe Eſſays. 'Tis ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe, if we have been able to determine, in general, the Foundation of that Allegiance, which is due to the eſtabliſh'd Government, in every Kingdom and Commonwealth *. WE

* When there is no legal Prince, who has a Title to a Throne, I believe it may ſafely be determined to belong to the firſt Occupier. This was frequently the Caſe with the *Roman* Empire. When any Race of Princes expires, the Will or Deſtination of the laſt Prince will be regarded as a Title. Thus the Edict of *Louis* the XIVth, who call'd the Baſtard Princes to the Succeſſion, in Caſe of Failure of all the legitimate Princes, would, in ſuch an Event, have ſome Authority. The Ceſſion of the ancient Proprietor, eſpecially when join'd to Conqueſt, is likewiſe eſteem'd a very good Right. The general Bond or Obligation, that binds us to Government, is the Intereſt and Neceſſities of Society; and this Obli-

WE ſhall only obſerve, before we conclude, that tho' an Appeal to general Opinion may juſtly, in the ſpeculative Sciences of Metaphyſics, natural Philoſophy, or Aſtronomy, be eſteem'd unfair and inconcluſive, yet in all Queſtions with regard to Morals, as well as Criticiſm, there is really no other Standard, by which any other Controverſy can ever be decided. And nothing can be a clearer Proof, that a Theory of this Kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads us into Paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common Sentiments of Mankind, and to the Practice and Opinion of all Nations and all Ages. The Doctrine, that founds all lawful Government on an *original Contract*, or Conſent of the People, is plainly of this Kind; nor has the ableſt of its Partizans, in Proſecution of it, ſcrupled to affirm, *that abſolute Monarchy is inconſiſtent with civil Society, and ſo can be no Form of civil Government at all* *; and *that the ſupreme Power in a State cannot take from any Man by Taxes and Impoſitions, any Part of his Property without his own Conſent or that of his Repreſentatives* †. What Authority any moral Reaſoning can have, which leads into Opinions, ſo wide of the general Practice of Mankind, in every Place put this ſingle Kingdom, 'tis eaſy to determine.

Obligation is very ſtrong. The Determination of it to this or that particular Prince or Form of Government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Preſent Poſſeſſion has conſiderable Authority in theſe Caſes, and greater than in private Property; becauſe of the Diſorders, that attend all Revolutions and Changes of Government.

* Lee Locke on Government, Chap. 7. §. 90.

† Id. Chap. 11. §. 138, 139, 140.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXVI.

Of PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

IN the former Eſſay, we have endeavour'd to refute the *ſpeculative* Syſtems of Politics, advanc'd in this Nation; as well the religious Syſtem of the one Party, as the philoſophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* Conſequences, deduc'd by each Party, with regard to the Meaſures of Submiſſion, due to Sovereigns.

As the Obligation to Juſtice is founded intirely on the Intereſts of Society, which require mutual Abſtinence from Property, in order to preſerve Peace amongſt Mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the Execution of Juſtice would be attended with very pernicious Conſequences, that Virtue muſt be ſuſpended, and give place to public Utility, in ſuch extraordinary and ſuch preſſing Emergencies. The Maxim, *fiat Juſtitia & ruat Cœlum*, let Juſtice be perform'd, tho' the Univerſe be deſtroy'd, is apparently falſe, and by ſacrificing the End to the Means, ſhews a prepoſterous Idea of the Subordination of Duties. What Governor of a Town makes any Scruple of burning the Suburbs, when they facilitate the Advances of the Enemy? Or what General abſtains from plundering a neu-

a neutral Country, when the Neceſſities of War require it, and he cannot otherwiſe maintain his Army? The Caſe is the ſame with the Duty of Obedience to Magiſtrates; and common Senſe teaches us, that as Government obliges to Obedience only on Accouut of its Tendency to public Utility, it muſt always, in extraordinary Caſes, when public Ruin would evidently attend Obedience, yield to the primary and original Obligation. *Salus Populi ſuprema Lex*, the Safety of the People is the ſupreme Law. This Maxim is agreeable to the Sentiments of Mankind in all Ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the Inſurrections againſt a *Nero*, or a *Caracalla*, ſo infatuated with Party-Syſtems, as not to wiſh Succeſs to the Enterprize, and praiſe the Undertakers. Even our high monarchical Party, in ſpite of their ſublime Theory, are forc'd, in ſuch Caſes, to judge, and think, and approve, in Conformity to the reſt of Mankind.

RESISTANCE, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary Emergencies, the Queſtion can only be, amongſt good Reaſoners, with regard to the Degree of Neceſſity, which can juſtify Reſiſtance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I muſt confeſs, that I ſhall always incline to their Side, who draw the Bond of Allegiance the cloſeſt poſſible, and conſider an Infringement of it, as the laſt Refuge, in deſperate Caſes, when the public is in the higheſt Danger, from a cruel and abandon'd Tyranny. For beſides the Miſchiefs of a civil War, which commonly attend Inſurrection; 'tis certain, that where a Diſpoſition to Rebel-

bellion appears amongſt any People, it is one chief Chief Cauſe of Tyranny in the Rulers, and forces them into many violent Meaſures, which they never would have embrac'd, if every one had ſeem'd inclin'd to Submiſſion and Obedience. 'Tis thus the *Tyrannicide* or Aſſaſſination, approv'd of by ancient Maxims, inſtead of keeping Tyrants and Uſurpers in Awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now juſtly, upon that Account, aboliſh'd by the Laws of Nations, and univerſally condemn'd as a baſe and treacherous Method of bringing to Juſtice theſe Diſturbers of Society.

Besides; we muſt conſider, that as Obedience is our Duty in the common Courſe of Things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more prepoſterous than an anxious Care and Sollicitude in ſtating all the Caſes, wherein Reſiſtance may be allow'd. Thus, tho' a Philoſopher reaſonably acknowledges, in the Courſe of an Argument, that the Rules of Juſtice may be diſpenſed with in Caſes of urgent Neceſſity; what ſhould we think of a Preacher or Caſuiſt, who ſhould make it his chief Study to find out ſuch Caſes, and enforce them with all the Vehemence of Argument and Eloquence? Would he not be better employ'd in preaching up the general Doctrine, than in diſplaying the particular Exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclin'd, of ourſelves, to embrace, and to extend?

There are, however, two Reaſons, which may be pleaded in Defence of that Party amongſt us, who have,

have, with ſo much Induſtry, propagated the Maxims of Reſiſtance; Maxims, which, it muſt be confeſt, are, in general, ſo pernicious, and ſo deſtructive of all civil Society. The *firſt* is, that their Antagoniſts carrying the Doctrine of Obedience to ſuch an extravagant Height, as not only never to mention the Exception in extraordinary Caſes (which might, perhaps, be excuſable) but even poſitively to exclude it; it became neceſſary to inſiſt on theſe Exceptions, and defend the Rights of injur'd Truth and Liberty. The *ſecond*, and, perhaps, better Reaſon, is founded on the Nature of the *Britiſh* Conſtitution and Form of Government.

'TIS almoſt peculiar to our Conſtitution to eſtabliſh a firſt Magiſtrate with ſuch high Pre-eminence and Dignity, that, tho' limited by the Laws, he is, in a Manner, as far as regards his own Perſon, above the Laws, and can neither be queſtioned nor puniſhed for any Injury or Wrong, which may be committed by him. His Miniſters alone, or thoſe who act by his Commiſſion, are obnoxious to Juſtice; and while the Prince is thus allur'd, by the Proſpect of perſonal Safety, to give the Laws their free Courſe, an equal Security is, in effect, obtain'd, by the Puniſhment of the leſſer Offenders, and at the ſame Time a civil War is avoided, which would be the infallible Conſequence, were an Attack, at every Turn, made directly upon the Sovereign. But tho' the Conſtitution pays this ſalutary Compliment to the Prince, it can never reaſonably be underſtood, by that Maxim, to have determin'd its own Deſtruction, or to have eſtabliſh'd a tame

tame Submiſſion, where he protects his Miniſters, perſeveres in his Injuſtice, and uſurps the whole Power of the Commonwealth. This Caſe, indeed, is never expreſsly put by the Laws; becauſe it is impoſſible for them, in their ordinary Courſe, to provide a Remedy for it, or eſtabliſh any Magiſtrate, with ſuperior Authority, to chaſtiſe the exorbitancies of the Prince. But as a Right without a Remedy would be the greateſt of all Abſurdities; the Remedy, in this Caſe, is the extraordinary one of Reſiſtance, when Affairs come to that Extremity, that the Conſtitution can alone be defended by it. Reſiſtance, therefore, muſt, of courſe, become more frequent in the *Britiſh* Government, than in others, which are ſimpler, and conſiſt of fewer Parts and Movements. Where the King is the ſole Sovereign of the State, he has little Temptation to commit ſuch enormous Tyranny as may juſtly provoke Rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent Ambition, without any great Vices, may run him into that perillous Situation. This was evidently the Caſe with *Charles* the Firſt; and if we may now ſpeak Truth, after Animoſities are laid, this was alſo the Caſe with *James* the Second. Theſe were harmleſs, if not, in their private Character, good Men; but miſtaking the Nature of our Conſtitution, and engroſſing the whole legiſlative Power, it became neceſſary to oppoſe them with ſome Vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that Authority, which he had uſed with ſuch Imprudence and Indiſcretion.

FINIS

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